In the dark skies above the Pacific, an F-35 Lightning II cuts through the night, its radar slicing through clouds and silence to detect threats miles away. Inside the cockpit, a pilot relies not only on decades of training and technology but on an obscure metal few Americans could name: gallium.
This rare element, a byproduct of aluminum and zinc refining, sits at the core of the F-35’s AN/APG-81 radar system—a critical component that gives the U.S. jet its unmatched edge in modern warfare. But now, that edge is under threat.
As of April 2025, China—controlling 98 percent of the global refined gallium supply—has clamped down on exports to the United States, citing national security concerns. The decision, amid a deepening trade war and geopolitical rivalry, throws a wrench into the heart of the U.S. defense machine. With gallium in short supply, the Pentagon faces a looming crisis that could undermine the F-35 program and the nation’s broader military readiness.
Built by Lockheed Martin, the F-35 is more than a fighter; it’s a platform designed for 21st-century warfare. Stealthy, networked, and versatile, the aircraft operates across all domains—air, land, sea, and even cyber.
At the center of this capability is the AN/APG-81 radar, a product of Northrop Grumman. Unlike traditional radar, it’s an active electronically scanned array (AESA) system, using thousands of tiny modules that transmit and receive signals with extreme precision. These modules depend on gallium arsenide (GaAs) semiconductors—materials that outperform conventional silicon in high-frequency environments.
Gallium arsenide and its cousin, gallium nitride (GaN), enable the radar to detect multiple targets simultaneously, resist heat and radiation, and jam or deceive enemy systems. Without them, the F-35 loses much of what makes it superior.
Gallium is not mined directly. It’s extracted in small amounts from the residue of bauxite and sphalerite processing—the ores used to produce aluminum and zinc. While minor in volume, gallium’s strategic role in defense and telecommunications is immense.
In the F-35’s radar, gallium arsenide chips are the workhorses that allow for high-speed signal switching, crucial for long-range target detection. Gallium nitride, even more advanced, is used in the jet’s electronic warfare suite to produce high-powered signals that jam enemy radars or mislead incoming missiles.
These same materials also power the jet’s communication systems. The Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), a secure, stealth-friendly network, relies on gallium-based amplifiers to maintain real-time, high-bandwidth connections between aircraft, satellites, and ground control.
All of these systems—radar, jammers, communication—are essential to the F-35’s ability to operate in high-threat environments like the South China Sea or the skies over Eastern Europe. Without gallium, they cannot be built, maintained, or upgraded.
The U.S. Geological Survey reported in early 2025 that China refined 98% of the world’s gallium in 2023. This dominance is no accident. China’s vast bauxite resources, coupled with decades of state-backed investments in refining and purification, have given Beijing near-total control over this critical supply chain.
In late 2024, China expanded export controls on gallium, germanium, and antimony—three key inputs in defense and semiconductor industries. The official reason: protecting national interests. Unofficially, analysts see it as retaliation for U.S. sanctions on Chinese chipmakers and broader trade tariffs imposed by both the Biden and Trump administrations.
The fallout has been immediate. Prices for gallium spiked more than 50 percent in 2024 and are expected to climb further. Deliveries to U.S. defense contractors have slowed. Though Lockheed Martin has not publicly acknowledged delays due to gallium shortages, insiders suggest that the Pentagon has begun quietly reallocating existing stocks and delaying less urgent maintenance.
This isn’t just a pricing issue. It’s a strategic vulnerability.
Lockheed Martin produces around 150 F-35s per year, with more than 1,000 already delivered to the U.S. and its allies. Each aircraft contains thousands of gallium-based components, particularly within the radar and electronic warfare systems.
If gallium becomes unavailable, production could slow or even halt. Costs would rise, as contractors scramble to find alternative suppliers or redesign systems. Maintenance cycles would stretch, reducing the number of combat-ready jets. For frontline units, that means fewer sorties, diminished deterrence, and less margin for error in a crisis.
Allies, too, would feel the pinch. Nations like Japan, the UK, and Australia depend on F-35s for regional security. Delays in delivery or capability upgrades could fracture trust and leave gaps in collective defense networks.
The F-35’s radar system, the AN/APG-81, can reportedly track fighter-sized targets more than 150 miles away. It can map terrain, detect low-signature drones, and jam or spoof enemy radar systems—all thanks to gallium semiconductors.
This isn’t science fiction. In combat tests and real-world deployments—from Syria to the Indo-Pacific—the radar has proven its ability to operate in heavily contested environments. In one 2023 exercise, F-35s penetrated a simulated enemy airspace defended by S-400 missile batteries, using their radar and electronic warfare systems to detect, evade, and engage without being tracked.
Those missions depend on gallium. And not just in the radar.
The jet’s Barracuda electronic warfare suite, the ASQ-239, uses gallium nitride to generate high-powered signals that can disable enemy sensors. It protects not just the F-35, but any friendly aircraft flying nearby. The MADL system, using gallium-based amplifiers, links multiple F-35s in a “combat cloud,” sharing target data and mission updates in real time.
These systems make the F-35 more than a fighter—they make it a battlefield command node. Remove gallium from the equation, and the architecture of American air dominance begins to crack.
The vulnerability the U.S. faces now didn’t appear overnight. A 2019 Department of Defense report warned that gallium was a critical material and identified China’s monopoly as a threat to national security. Yet little action followed.
Unlike oil in the 1970s, gallium did not spur urgency. Domestic production remains negligible. A few recycling efforts exist, but the cost and complexity of extracting gallium from electronic waste remain prohibitive.
Japan and Germany refine small amounts, but nowhere near enough to offset a Chinese embargo. Australia and Canada have the raw ores but lack the high-purity refining infrastructure. In short, the U.S. has known about the problem—and failed to fix it.
China, by contrast, has used its control tactically. In 2010, it restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing market turmoil. In 2025, it’s using gallium to send a clear message to Washington: We can hurt you without a missile launch.
This is economic warfare at its most strategic. The Brookings Institution called it “a silent weapon with global reach.” By restricting gallium exports, China is not merely raising prices—it is directly undermining the combat readiness of America’s most important military platform.
And the effects go beyond the F-35. The EA-18G Growler, America’s premier electronic attack aircraft, also uses gallium nitride systems. Satellites, used for communication and navigation, rely on gallium arsenide solar cells. Even missile guidance systems and radar warning receivers depend on these materials.
As gallium stocks dwindle, choices will have to be made. Prioritize F-35 radar modules or satellite comms? Finish new jets or maintain existing fleets? There are no good answers—only trade-offs.
There is no quick fix. Building a domestic gallium supply chain will take years and billions in investment. A new gallium recovery facility in Ohio is underway but won’t be operational until 2028. Canada and Australia could be partners, but developing refining capacity is a slow, capital-intensive process.
Allies are stepping up. Through the AUKUS pact, the U.S., UK, and Australia are discussing critical mineral collaboration. The Quad alliance—with Japan and India—has launched initiatives to secure rare earths and strategic metals. But bureaucratic inertia and economic constraints remain steep obstacles.
Even recycling, often touted as a solution, is limited by cost and technology. Alternatives to gallium—such as silicon carbide or new radar architectures—are still in early development and unlikely to meet military specs anytime soon.
The gallium shortage is more than a supply chain issue—it’s a test of strategic will. For decades, the U.S. defense industry chased efficiency, outsourcing key materials to the cheapest suppliers. Now, it’s paying the price.
The F-35 is a marvel of modern engineering. It combines stealth, power, connectivity, and flexibility like no other aircraft. But it also represents a dangerous paradox: America’s most advanced weapon is built on a material almost entirely controlled by a geopolitical rival.
The stakes could not be higher. In a future conflict over Taiwan, in the South China Sea, or elsewhere, the difference between victory and defeat may hinge not on who has the best fighter, but on who can keep it flying.
The U.S. must move swiftly. It must invest in domestic refining, secure deals with allies, and incentivize research into gallium alternatives. But most of all, it must recognize that technological superiority means little without resource security.
Gallium may be obscure, but its importance is now impossible to ignore. The F-35 remains the tip of the spear—but if that spear cannot be sharpened, it may one day fail to strike.
