Taiwan is considering the purchase of nine additional U.S.-made NASAMS air defense systems, a move that would raise its planned fleet to twelve batteries. The proposal reflects a shift toward layered, networked defenses against a growing mix of Chinese threats — from drones and aircraft to cruise and ballistic missiles — and signals Taiwan’s determination to harden its skies as regional tensions intensify.
The discussions gained momentum during the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition, held September 18–20, where officials and industry representatives showcased more than fifty weapons systems. Among them were the M1A2T Abrams tanks, HIMARS rocket launchers, and locally developed missile platforms. Yet the spotlight fell squarely on NASAMS, the Norwegian-American networked surface-to-air missile system already in service with NATO militaries.
Taiwan has three batteries on order, worth about US$761.9 million in a deal signed in October 2024 and cleared by Washington four months later. The first of those is scheduled to arrive before the end of 2025, though defense planners concede that delivery timelines are vulnerable to production delays and competing global orders. If Taipei finalizes the additional nine, the island would field a total of twelve batteries — enough to provide overlapping protection across critical command centers, ports, and industrial hubs.
NASAMS — the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System — is a joint creation of Norway’s Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and the U.S. defense giant Raytheon. It is often described as the world’s first operational short-to-medium range air defense system built around a networked architecture. Rather than operating as isolated batteries, multiple NASAMS units can be linked together through secure communications, allowing commanders to choreograph simultaneous interceptions and layer defensive coverage.
Each battery typically includes a Fire Distribution Center (the command hub), Raytheon’s AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radar, infrared and electro-optical sensors, and multi-missile launchers. Each launcher can be deployed up to 25 kilometers from its command node, offering commanders flexible placement around high-value targets. A single battery can deploy six AMRAAM missiles per launcher, and at battalion strength — twelve launchers — NASAMS can keep seventy-two interceptors on standby, all ready to fire in seconds.
The system has steadily evolved since its 1990s introduction. Today, NASAMS crews can mix and match missile types: the AIM-120 AMRAAM for standard engagements, the extended-range AMRAAM-ER for longer intercepts, and the AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder for close-in threats such as drones or helicopters. This flexibility makes it a modular backbone for layered defense.
Performance varies with radar and missile combinations, but standard NASAMS batteries can strike targets 24–32 kilometers out at altitudes up to 15,000 meters. With upgrades such as AESA radars, CEAFAR arrays, and passive sensors, the system can detect and track more complex attack profiles, including swarming drones or mixed missile salvos. NASAMS can also integrate with other systems, from short-range platforms like the Swedish RBS 70 to long-range U.S. Patriots.
Currently, thirteen militaries — including Norway, the United States, Spain, and Australia — operate NASAMS, and more than fifteen countries use Kongsberg’s command-and-control software as a backbone for other defenses. Its combat record includes active use in Ukraine, where it has downed Russian cruise missiles and drones, lending the system a reputation for real-world reliability.
For Taiwan, the attraction is straightforward. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has escalated pressure with near-daily aerial incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. Drones, bombers, and fighter jets routinely cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait, while naval task groups conduct live-fire drills that simulate blockades. Beijing’s playbook increasingly blends “gray zone” operations with high-end strike capabilities, designed to stretch Taiwan’s defenses thin and sap its readiness.
In such an environment, sheer numbers matter. A dozen NASAMS batteries would not give Taiwan complete coverage — the island’s geography makes that impossible — but they would create overlapping defensive zones over key cities, bases, and infrastructure nodes. The batteries would complement existing U.S.-made Patriot systems, which are optimized for high-altitude ballistic missile defense, and indigenous platforms like the Tien Kung (“Sky Bow”) series.
Taiwanese planners have framed this as building an “air defense wall,” with Patriots as the outer bricks, NASAMS and indigenous missiles as the middle layer, and short-range counter-drone systems as the inner shield. This layered approach is designed not just to absorb attacks but to complicate Chinese planning. Every extra battery forces PLA strategists to account for more interceptors, more radars, and more uncertainty.
The political message is just as important. By buying a system in wide NATO use, Taiwan signals interoperability with Western militaries and reassures its U.S. backers that it is investing in credible, proven defenses.
The initial three-battery deal — signed in late 2024 — was part of a broader package of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. At roughly US$761.9 million, the contract covers not just the hardware but also training, spare parts, and sustainment support. Washington formally cleared the deal in February 2025 after the U.S. State Department notified Congress.
The additional nine batteries, if approved, could represent one of Taiwan’s largest single defense purchases in recent years. Officials have not provided cost estimates, but given that the initial three ran more than $250 million each, the full twelve-battery fleet could approach or exceed $3 billion.
That price tag carries political weight. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) must balance urgent procurement needs with finite budgets. Already, Taipei is juggling payments for Abrams tanks, HIMARS rocket systems, and ongoing naval modernization. Critics warn that over-reliance on big-ticket imports could sideline indigenous programs, while proponents argue that the urgency of China’s threat leaves no room for delays.
For Washington, the sale fits within a broader strategy of “arming Taiwan to the teeth” — ensuring Taipei has enough asymmetric, mobile, and layered capabilities to deter aggression without relying on direct U.S. intervention. Yet arms sales remain politically sensitive, often sparking retaliation from Beijing in the form of sanctions on U.S. contractors or military maneuvers near Taiwan.
At the Taipei exhibition, NASAMS was not alone in the spotlight. Visitors encountered a showcase of 51 systems, illustrating Taiwan’s dual-track approach: buying advanced Western hardware while accelerating domestic defense projects.
On the foreign procurement side, the Abrams tanks and HIMARS launchers represent U.S. systems designed to bolster both deterrence and interoperability. On the local side, the Chiang-Kong missile and indigenous drones underscore Taiwan’s drive to expand its own defense industry.
Taken together, the mix reflects a doctrine shift. Taiwan no longer aims solely to blunt a full-scale invasion but also to survive and adapt in a prolonged conflict. Layered air defenses form one part of that posture; mobile rocket artillery and coastal strike missiles form another. The goal is to complicate Chinese operations across domains — air, sea, land, cyber, and information.
Still, optimism about NASAMS is tempered by practical challenges. Deliveries depend on U.S. production capacity already strained by global demand. Ukraine’s urgent need for NASAMS, for instance, competes directly with Taiwan’s orders. Training personnel to operate and maintain the system takes time, as does integrating it with Taiwan’s existing command-and-control networks.
Some analysts also caution against overestimating what twelve batteries can achieve. China’s missile arsenal is vast, numbering thousands of short- and medium-range systems. In a massed attack scenario, Taiwan’s defenses could be saturated. NASAMS excels at handling mixed, limited-scale raids — drones, cruise missiles, aircraft — but it is not designed to stop everything at once.
Others note that Taiwan’s geography makes any defense plan partial at best. Protecting Taipei, Kaohsiung, and key air bases leaves gaps elsewhere. But in deterrence logic, coverage does not need to be perfect; it only needs to raise costs and uncertainty enough to dissuade an attack.
If the additional nine batteries are approved, Taiwan’s NASAMS fleet would rank among the largest in Asia. Neighboring Japan relies on PAC-3 Patriots and Aegis-equipped destroyers for missile defense. South Korea deploys a mix of Patriots, indigenous KM-SAM systems, and the U.S. THAAD battery. By comparison, Taiwan’s layered shield would be smaller but denser relative to its geography.
The purchase could also ripple politically. Beijing has already denounced past U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as violations of its “One China” principle. A multi-billion-dollar NASAMS expansion would almost certainly trigger new threats or military demonstrations. Yet for Taipei, that reaction underscores the very need for such systems.
For Washington, Taiwan’s investment reinforces a narrative of burden-sharing: that Taipei is spending seriously on its own defense rather than expecting rescue. This could matter in U.S. domestic debates, where questions of cost, risk, and priorities loom large.
For now, the nine extra batteries remain unconfirmed. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has acknowledged discussions but stopped short of committing. Budget cycles, U.S. production schedules, and political timing will all influence whether the plan moves ahead.
Yet the trajectory is clear. Taiwan is building a dense, adaptive shield against the full spectrum of threats, from quadcopters to ballistic missiles. Twelve NASAMS batteries would not tip the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, but they would make any sudden escalation far more costly and complex.
More than hardware, the NASAMS deal represents a mindset: that Taiwan cannot afford gaps in its defenses, that it must prepare for both daily harassment and potential high-end conflict, and that its best chance of deterring China lies in a layered, networked, and resilient posture.
