Taiwan has announced plans for an additional USD 40 billion in defence spending over the coming years, unveiling the centrepiece of the new budget — an ambitious, Israeli-inspired multi-layered air defence network known as T-Dome. The system is designed to shield the island from swarms of Chinese fighter jets, ballistic and cruise missiles, and the rapidly expanding fleet of unmanned drones deployed by Beijing.
Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who first revealed the T-Dome concept during the island’s National Day address on October 10, has called the project an essential “safety net” for Taiwan’s 23 million citizens. Lai argues that China’s sharply intensifying military pressure on Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific region leaves Taipei with no option but to elevate its defensive posture.
Beijing, which considers Taiwan an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China, has repeatedly vowed to bring the island under its control — by force if necessary. Over the past three years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has carried out record-breaking air and naval incursions around Taiwan, alongside large-scale joint combat drills simulating potential invasion operations.
While T-Dome has drawn comparisons with Israel’s Iron Dome, Taipei-based security analyst J. Michael Cole says the similarities only go so far. Iron Dome, he notes, was primarily designed to intercept short-range projectiles such as unguided rockets. Taiwan, however, faces a far more complex threat environment.
“This is aimed at PLA aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as, increasingly, drones,” Cole said. “The T-Dome has to counter multiple layers of threats simultaneously, at different altitudes and speeds, coming from multiple directions.”
Taiwan already operates a mix of US-built and domestically developed air defence systems — including Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries and Sky Bow III interceptors — and is awaiting the delivery of the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) from the United States. The T-Dome network would fuse these systems with radars, sensors, early-warning platforms, and artificial intelligence-assisted command centres to create what Lai describes as “high-level detection and effective interception.”
Defence Minister Wellington Koo said integration is the heart of the entire project. “If you do not integrate these detection devices, then those air-defence missiles — whether for counter-fire, counter-attack, or counter-drone purposes — can’t achieve efficient interception or effective fire coordination and allocation,” he said.
According to Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), the T-Dome architecture will consist of two main components. The first is a command and control (C2) system capable of collecting radar data, identifying threats within seconds, and assigning the correct interceptor to neutralise them.
“The system collects radar data, identifies threats, decides which interceptor should fire, and coordinates all units so they react within seconds,” Su said. “This level of coordination is essential given the speed and volume of potential Chinese missile attacks.”
The second component is the interceptor layer — a family of weapons that can shoot down incoming threats at varying distances and altitudes, from hypersonic missiles to slow-moving drones.
Su says Taiwan’s defence planners have studied Ukraine’s battlefield experiences closely. The war has underscored the critical need for an air defence umbrella capable of defending not just cities but also mobile combat units and vital infrastructure. With China possessing hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and with the PLA Navy deploying warships capable of launching large missile salvos from waters near the island, Taipei believes a rapid upgrade of its air defence resilience is necessary.
“Chinese warships routinely deployed near Taiwan are capable of firing hundreds of missiles at Taiwan’s airports, radar sites, and military bases within three minutes,” Su warned. “That does not include the hundreds of land-based missiles China has. This is why Taiwan needs an integrated air defence system capable of responding to these emerging challenges.”
Despite the urgency, Taipei’s timeline remains constrained by logistical realities — especially US arms delivery delays. Taiwan is already waiting for billions of dollars’ worth of American weapons, including advanced missiles, artillery systems, and drones. The defence ministry has published a preliminary list of items earmarked for procurement under the new budget, including long-range precision-strike missiles, anti-ballistic systems, anti-armour weapons, and various unmanned platforms.
The opposition-controlled parliament has yet to approve the new defence budget, and it remains unclear how much of the funding will ultimately go toward US-supplied systems. However, President Lai has signalled that “significant” US arms acquisitions are expected.
Lai said on Wednesday that Taiwan aims to achieve a “high level” of joint combat readiness by 2027, a year US officials have previously flagged as a potential timeline for a Chinese military move against Taiwan. By 2033, Taipei hopes to have built “highly resilient and comprehensive deterrent defence capabilities.”
Yet experts caution that T-Dome will not be fully operational anytime soon.
“Completing the entire T-Dome architecture before 2027 is impossible,” Su said. “System integration and the production of new interceptors — missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and directed-energy weapons — will all take time.”
Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, argues that operational readiness depends not only on equipment but on how Taiwan defines — and achieves — effectiveness.
“It really comes down to how you define effectiveness, how you define readiness, and what’s included in T-Dome,” he said. “Are they counting war reserve munitions? Do they have enough missiles in storage? Are they distributed? And does the military know how to operate all of it?”
