Japan’s political landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation following a historic landslide victory by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in last week’s parliamentary elections.
For the first time since its founding in 1955, the conservative LDP now commands a two-thirds supermajority in the powerful lower house of the National Diet. The scale of the victory not only cements Takaichi’s authority within her party but also provides her government with the legislative leverage to pursue sweeping reforms — including potentially revising Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution.
Although her coalition still lacks a majority in the upper house, the lower house supermajority allows the cabinet to override opposition resistance if necessary. The result is a rare concentration of political power in Tokyo, giving Takaichi a formidable mandate to advance her agenda at a time of escalating regional tensions and shifting global alliances.
Throughout the campaign, Takaichi portrayed herself as a Japanese counterpart to Margaret Thatcher — a decisive conservative reformer unafraid to confront economic stagnation or geopolitical threats. She has also consistently framed her leadership as the continuation of the legacy of Shinzo Abe, who returned the LDP to power in 2012 with a promise to “restore a strong Japan.”
Under Abe’s nearly eight-year tenure, Japan moved away from the strict pacifism that defined its post-World War II posture. His doctrine of “proactive pacifism” sought to reinterpret constitutional constraints while expanding Japan’s security role abroad.
During Abe’s leadership, Japan:
Strengthened the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
Lifted long-standing bans on arms exports
Deepened security partnerships with NATO, the European Union, and the Quad
Consolidated its alliance with the United States
In 2014, a controversial reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution allowed the country to exercise “collective self-defense,” permitting the SDF to assist allies under attack even if Japan itself was not directly targeted.
Takaichi has made clear that she sees her role as completing what Abe began. Now, with an unprecedented parliamentary majority, she possesses the tools to do so.
At the center of debate is Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, which renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces for warfare. Although the SDF has existed for decades, its legitimacy has rested on careful constitutional interpretation.
With a two-thirds majority in the lower house — the threshold required to initiate constitutional revision — Takaichi’s government is closer than any administration in modern history to formally amending Article 9.
Such a move would require approval by two-thirds of both houses of parliament and then a national referendum. Public opinion remains divided. While concerns about China, North Korea, and Russia have increased support for stronger defense, many Japanese citizens remain cautious about abandoning pacifist principles that have defined the country’s postwar identity.
Nevertheless, Takaichi’s electoral mandate suggests that voters are willing to grant her latitude on security reform — at least for now.
One of Takaichi’s earliest foreign policy controversies came shortly after she assumed office. In remarks that reverberated across East Asia, she suggested that Japan would come to Taiwan’s defense if it were attacked by China.
Beijing reacted sharply. The government of Xi Jinping accused Tokyo of destabilizing the region and interfering in China’s internal affairs. Chinese authorities reportedly discouraged tourism to Japan and employed coercive economic rhetoric.
Takaichi, however, did not retract her comments. Instead, she doubled down, arguing that deterrence — not silence — was the best path to stability.
Neither leader appears eager to reset diplomatic ties in the near term. Relations between Tokyo and Beijing, already strained over territorial disputes in the East China Sea and concerns about Taiwan, now face a prolonged chill.
For Takaichi, however, an assertive China may serve a domestic political purpose. Rising regional tensions have bolstered public support for defense reform. A post-election poll showed 69 percent approval for her cabinet’s performance — a strong foundation for bold policy moves.
Japan has already embarked on one of the most significant defense buildups in its modern history. Under Takaichi, that trajectory is accelerating.
Despite Japan’s heavy public debt burden, the government has increased defense spending to 2 percent of GDP ahead of schedule — aligning with NATO’s benchmark and marking a sharp departure from the long-standing informal cap of around 1 percent.
Takaichi has pledged to spend even more.
Her administration is reportedly exploring the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines — a capability that would dramatically enhance Japan’s maritime deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific. While Tokyo remains committed to its non-nuclear weapons principles, nuclear propulsion technology would represent a substantial leap in naval endurance and operational reach.
Japan has also signaled a further loosening of restrictions on arms exports, potentially allowing the transfer of lethal weapons. Already, Tokyo has permitted the export of Patriot PAC-3 air defense missile systems to the United States to replenish stockpiles depleted by shipments to Ukraine and Israel.
In a landmark move, Japan agreed to sell Mogami-class frigates to Australia, deepening defense-industrial ties in the Indo-Pacific. It has also partnered with Italy and the United Kingdom to co-develop a next-generation fighter jet under the Global Combat Air Programme — a project that could reshape aerospace collaboration among advanced democracies.
These initiatives reflect a broader transformation: Japan is emerging not only as a consumer of security but also as a supplier.
Japan’s security outreach now extends well beyond Asia.
Tokyo is participating in a NATO-led initiative to supply Ukraine with military equipment. Although Japan’s contributions are limited to non-lethal items, the symbolism is significant. It underscores Tokyo’s willingness to frame security challenges in Europe and Asia as interconnected.
Deeper defense cooperation with NATO could follow — particularly in areas such as cyber defense, maritime security, and defense technology.
Japan’s evolving posture also strengthens its standing within the Quad grouping — alongside the United States, India, and Australia — as well as its bilateral alliance with Washington.
Beyond military hardware, Takaichi is pursuing an overhaul of Japan’s intelligence architecture.
She has pledged to pass a new anti-spy law, establish a National Intelligence Bureau modeled on the US Central Intelligence Agency, and issue a comprehensive national intelligence strategy.
Japan’s intelligence capabilities have historically been fragmented across ministries, often hampered by bureaucratic rivalries. Centralization, proponents argue, would improve coordination and responsiveness in an era of hybrid warfare and gray-zone threats.
The long-term ambition is ambitious: eventual membership in the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network comprising the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
While accession would require significant reforms and political trust, even incremental progress would represent a milestone in Japan’s integration into Western security frameworks.
Despite her assertive posture, Takaichi recognizes that Japan’s security ultimately hinges on its alliance with Washington.
The challenge lies in navigating what some analysts call the “Donroe doctrine” — associated with the evolving strategic priorities of former US President Donald Trump. This approach emphasizes a shift in US focus toward the Western hemisphere, potentially reducing attention to the Indo-Pacific.
Trump publicly endorsed Takaichi during her campaign, signaling alignment on certain strategic themes. When she visits Washington on March 19, she is expected to seek clarity on US China policy and ensure that Japan’s security concerns remain central to American planning.
Her diplomatic efforts may be particularly urgent ahead of Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing. Any US-China trade deal could have ripple effects across the Indo-Pacific balance of power.
To offset potential disruptions, Takaichi may accelerate implementation of Japan’s US$550 billion investment pledge in the United States, reinforcing economic interdependence as a stabilizing factor in the alliance.
The implications of Japan’s political shift extend beyond its borders.
For China, a more militarily assertive Japan complicates strategic calculations in the East China Sea and around Taiwan. For South Korea, it presents both opportunities for trilateral cooperation with the United States and sensitivities rooted in historical memory.
For Southeast Asian nations, Japan’s expanded security role could offer reassurance amid intensifying US-China rivalry — but also raise questions about the militarization of the region.
Russia, too, watches closely. Japan’s condemnation of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and participation in sanctions have further strained relations, particularly over disputed territories in the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories.
Despite her commanding majority, Takaichi faces constraints.
Japan’s aging population, slow economic growth, and heavy debt limit fiscal maneuverability. Defense spending increases must compete with social welfare demands.
Moreover, constitutional revision requires not only parliamentary approval but also a national referendum. Japanese voters have historically been cautious about altering foundational documents.
While 69 percent approval is impressive, sustained support will depend on economic stability and diplomatic prudence.
A decade ago, Angela Merkel was widely described as the “leader of the free world.” Today, some commentators hail Takaichi as the “world’s most powerful woman” — a reflection not only of her domestic mandate but also of Japan’s growing strategic weight.
Her leadership unfolds amid great-power rivalry, uncertain alliances, and technological transformation. Whether she steers Japan toward constitutional revision, deeper Western integration, or a carefully calibrated balance between deterrence and diplomacy will define her legacy.
What is clear is that Japan stands at a pivotal moment.
With a two-thirds supermajority and strong public backing, Takaichi possesses the political capital to reshape Japan’s defense posture more profoundly than any leader in generations. The choices she makes — on Taiwan, on military spending, on intelligence reform, and on alliance management — will reverberate across the Indo-Pacific.
