As political tensions mount in parliament and opposition calls for the revocation of bilateral boundary agreements intensify, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has reaffirmed its commitment to the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU 2000) with Cambodia. The ministry insists the MoU remains a legally binding and indispensable framework for resolving land and maritime boundary disputes, despite growing demands for its cancellation.
Benjamin Sukanjanajtee, director-general of the Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, addressed reporters on Monday, making clear that MoU 2000 provides the necessary legal and procedural foundation for ongoing negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia. The statement comes at a critical juncture, as the opposition has sought to exploit nationalist sentiment and frame the MoU as an unfair concession to Cambodia.
The roots of the Thai-Cambodian boundary issue stretch back to the early 20th century. The 1904 and 1907 Siam–France treaties established preliminary demarcation lines between what was then Siam (Thailand) and French Indochina. These treaties were accompanied by maps drawn at a scale of 1:200,000, which later became a source of contention due to alleged inaccuracies and the circumstances under which Siam accepted them.
The most prominent flashpoint in these disputes is the area surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage site. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded the temple itself to Cambodia in 1962 but did not definitively rule on the surrounding land, leaving ambiguities that have fueled nationalist rhetoric and periodic border clashes.
To address these long-standing ambiguities, Thailand and Cambodia signed MoU 2000, establishing the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and the Joint Technical Subcommittee (JTSC). These bodies were tasked with jointly surveying border areas, setting markers, and preparing maps acceptable to both governments and legislatures.
Benjamin Sukanjanajtee emphasized that MoU 2000 is not a concession to Cambodia but rather a safeguard for Thailand’s territorial interests.
“The MoU requires both countries to survey and demarcate boundaries together. Neither side can unilaterally alter border markers or claim disputed areas,” he said.
He added that Thailand cannot legally ignore the 1904 and 1907 treaties, as these serve as the internationally recognized legal foundation. Any unilateral move to abandon MoU 2000 could weaken Thailand’s position in future negotiations or disputes.
MoU 2000, he stressed, goes beyond demarcation. It includes provisions requiring both countries to:
Refrain from altering the border environment in ways that would prejudice the survey process.
Resolve disputes exclusively through bilateral negotiations, without involving third parties.
Cooperate in demining operations, enabling safe technical surveys in heavily mined areas along the border.
“Landmine clearance is not just a technical matter,” Benjamin noted. “It is essential for the safety of survey teams and for ensuring that both sides can engage in boundary demarcation without humanitarian risks.”
Last week, Thailand’s House of Representatives witnessed heated debates over the status of MoU 2000 and MoU 2001. The opposition, citing concerns about national sovereignty, sought to introduce an urgent motion to revoke both agreements.
Government chief whip Visuth Chainaroon countered accusations that the ruling Pheu Thai party was blocking parliamentary debate. He explained that the House session was cut short by the speaker because the opposition had not finalized its motion.
“The opposition claimed it was ready to submit a motion, but in reality, they had not reached consensus among themselves,” Visuth said. “It is misleading to say the government blocked the motion.”
Visuth accused the opposition of politicizing a sensitive national security matter for electoral gain. “Boundary issues require patience, diplomacy, and technical expertise—not political games,” he said.
The opposition’s push to revoke MoU 2000 is framed as a defense of national sovereignty. Critics argue that the MoU ties Thailand too tightly to colonial-era treaties and places constraints on the country’s ability to protect its territory.
Some nationalist lawmakers allege that the agreement has already cost Thailand significant land near the Preah Vihear Temple. Others warn that continued reliance on MoU 2000 could open the door to further territorial concessions.
“Thailand should not be bound by outdated treaties signed under colonial pressure,” said one opposition figure during parliamentary debate. “By clinging to MoU 2000, we risk losing not only Preah Vihear but also other areas along the border.”
Such arguments resonate with sections of the Thai public, especially in provinces adjacent to Cambodia, where border disputes have occasionally sparked violence.
While the current debate is unfolding within Thailand, its implications are deeply felt in Cambodia. Officials in Phnom Penh view MoU 2000 as a stabilizing mechanism that ensures disputes are addressed through joint dialogue rather than unilateral action or armed conflict.
Cambodia’s Foreign Ministry has consistently affirmed its commitment to MoU 2000 and has cautioned against attempts to politicize boundary demarcation. Cambodian analysts note that the agreement is the only practical framework for avoiding future clashes along the border.
For Phnom Penh, Thailand’s revocation of the MoU would be seen as a destabilizing act, potentially justifying international arbitration or appeal to the ICJ—something Bangkok has sought to avoid since its partial defeat in the Preah Vihear case.
International law experts caution that revoking MoU 2000 could backfire on Thailand.
“The MoU is essentially a procedural agreement that allows Thailand to assert its rights within a defined framework,” explained a legal scholar from Chulalongkorn University. “If Thailand cancels it unilaterally, Cambodia could argue that Bangkok is reneging on its treaty obligations, which might undermine Thailand’s credibility in international forums.”
Indeed, MoU 2000 explicitly binds both countries to direct negotiations and excludes third-party involvement. Without it, Cambodia could pursue international arbitration or once again petition the ICJ for clarification, potentially placing Thailand at a disadvantage.
Beyond politics and diplomacy, the Thai-Cambodian border is home to millions of people whose lives are directly affected by uncertainty over boundary lines. Farmers often find themselves caught in disputed zones, facing restrictions on land use or threats of arrest.
Landmine contamination remains a deadly legacy of decades of conflict. According to humanitarian groups, MoU 2000’s provisions on demining have saved lives by enabling joint clearance operations.
“Canceling MoU 2000 would not just be a diplomatic signal,” said a Thai NGO worker involved in border development projects. “It would jeopardize ongoing cooperation that has real humanitarian benefits for communities on both sides.”
The debate over MoU 2000 is unfolding against a backdrop of shifting political dynamics in Bangkok. With elections looming, opposition parties are eager to exploit issues that resonate with nationalist voters. Boundary disputes, particularly those tied to Preah Vihear, remain potent symbols of sovereignty.
For the ruling coalition, defending MoU 2000 is a delicate balancing act. On one hand, it must avoid appearing weak on territorial integrity. On the other, it cannot afford to unravel a framework that has preserved relative stability with Cambodia for over two decades.
The MFA to articulate the government’s position. Analysts say this reflects the government’s recognition of the issue’s volatility.
Thailand’s handling of MoU 2000 also carries regional implications. As ASEAN partners, both Thailand and Cambodia are expected to manage disputes peacefully in line with the ASEAN Charter. Abruptly revoking MoU 2000 could undermine ASEAN’s principle of non-confrontation and complicate regional diplomacy.
Moreover, the border dispute has historically attracted international attention, particularly from UNESCO and the ICJ. Thailand’s withdrawal from a cooperative framework could once again draw global scrutiny, potentially damaging its reputation as a responsible regional actor.
Experts outline several possible paths:
Maintain MoU 2000
Thailand continues working with Cambodia through the JBC and JTSC.
Demarcation progresses incrementally, with parliamentary oversight ensuring accountability.
Renegotiate the MoU
Bangkok seeks to amend certain provisions, particularly those related to disputed maps.
This option requires Cambodia’s consent, which may not be forthcoming.
Unilateral Revocation
Thailand cancels the MoU under opposition pressure.
Cambodia responds by escalating the issue to the ICJ or international forums.
Border tensions and skirmishes become more likely.
Most analysts agree that the first option, though politically difficult, offers the most stability.
