- The Trump administration can build on its peace-deal momentum and push out Chinese influence in the Caucasus.
The Trump administration’s recent success in brokering the historic peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia — culminating in the establishment of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — has opened an unexpected window of strategic opportunity for Washington. The next critical step lies in consolidating this diplomatic achievement by recalibrating U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan, a country whose geography and energy resources make it indispensable to America’s long-term Eurasian strategy.
Azerbaijan occupies a unique position in global geopolitics. It is the only country bordering both Russia and Iran, while also sitting astride the main transit routes linking Europe and Central Asia. From Washington’s perspective, Azerbaijan is a pivotal partner for countering Russian and Iranian assertiveness — and now, increasingly, for checking China’s growing influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
In recent months, Azerbaijan has become a focal point in the geopolitical contest among the United States’ three chief adversaries. Following the signing of the TRIPP agreement in southern Armenia — which envisions a secure trade and transit corridor connecting the South Caucasus to Central Asia — Iran issued a fierce rebuke. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, warned that Tehran would block any “U.S.-backed corridor” in the region, describing TRIPP as a “graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries.” The reaction underscores how profoundly the agreement has unsettled Iran, which fears encirclement by U.S.-aligned states on its northern frontier.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has been deepening ties with China. In an interview with Al-Arabiya on August 27, Aliyev highlighted Azerbaijan’s long struggle for sovereignty, recalling the brief existence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920) before Soviet occupation. His remarks carried symbolic weight: they coincided with two high-profile visits to China — in April and August — where Aliyev met Xi Jinping to elevate bilateral relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” These moves demonstrate Baku’s intent to balance its foreign policy amid competing powers.
Yet, this very balancing act offers Washington both promise and peril.
Azerbaijan’s geographic proximity and sectarian identity make it a natural strategic counterweight to Iran. As a secular, Shia-majority nation sharing deep ethnic and cultural ties with millions of ethnic Azeris in northern Iran, Baku represents a subtle ideological alternative to Tehran’s clerical model. Historically, however, Azerbaijan’s ability to challenge Iran’s regional influence was constrained by its dependence on Russia for security and by the volatility of its own conflict with Armenia.
Those constraints have now eased. Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war — supported by Turkish drones and advanced tactics — reshaped the regional balance of power. More recently, Iran’s setbacks in its confrontation with Israel and internal instability have further weakened its regional hand. For Washington, this creates an opening to strengthen Azerbaijan as a reliable partner on Iran’s northern frontier, where U.S. presence has long been limited.
A second strategic opportunity lies in Baku’s deteriorating relationship with Moscow. For decades, Azerbaijan maintained a pragmatic partnership with Russia, balancing cooperation with quiet resistance to Kremlin pressure. That balance began to unravel after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war, which exposed Moscow’s waning influence in the South Caucasus. The situation worsened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which diverted resources and undermined Moscow’s credibility as a regional powerbroker.
Tensions reached a new low last December when an Azerbaijani commercial airliner was accidentally shot down over Russian territory, killing all 38 passengers and crew. Baku’s strong public condemnation signaled that it was no longer willing to defer to Moscow.
This geopolitical realignment on both its northern and southern flanks has positioned Azerbaijan as an emerging land bridge between East and West — a role that the TRIPP corridor can greatly enhance. By linking the South Caucasus with Central Asia through modernized rail, road, and digital infrastructure, TRIPP resolves the last bottleneck in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the so-called “Middle Corridor”). This route offers Europe and North America a direct alternative to the Russian and Iranian transport networks that have long dominated Eurasian trade.
While the corridor promises to boost U.S. access to Central Asia, it also appeals to Beijing. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) already envisions Azerbaijan as a vital link in its westward expansion. Beijing’s deepening involvement — from infrastructure projects to defense sales such as the transfer of JF-17 fighter jets via Pakistan — underscores its intent to integrate the South Caucasus into its broader Eurasian strategy. Unless Washington acts quickly, Azerbaijan’s strategic neutrality could tilt decisively in China’s favor.
To fully capitalize on these opportunities, the United States must dismantle the outdated constraints that have long limited its engagement with Baku. Chief among these is Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which prohibits most forms of direct U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan. The provision was originally passed amid the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when Armenia’s supporters in Congress sought to punish Azerbaijan for its wartime actions.
Today, however, the rationale for Section 907 has vanished. Azerbaijan and Armenia have signed a U.S.-brokered peace accord, and Baku has emerged as a stable, secular, and energy-rich partner with enormous strategic potential. Keeping Section 907 on the books now serves only to benefit Russia, Iran, and China — all eager to exploit any friction between Washington and Baku.
Repealing the law would unlock wide-ranging opportunities for American engagement. Azerbaijan’s energy sector offers significant potential for U.S. investment, not only through direct participation in oil and gas production but also via pipeline modernization and renewable energy ventures. Moreover, Baku’s location makes it a natural hub for the export of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to Europe — a development that would further weaken Russia’s grip on Eurasian energy markets.
Azerbaijan’s modernization drive extends beyond energy. American firms could play leading roles in infrastructure, aviation, and logistics, much as they have in neighboring Central Asian states. For instance, Uzbekistan Airways’ purchase of 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners worth $8 billion and Kazakhstan’s $4 billion contract with U.S.-based Wabtec for 300 freight locomotives demonstrate the commercial potential in the region. There is no reason why Azerbaijan should not become the next major U.S. partner in Eurasian trade and industrial development.
The Trump administration’s Eurasian strategy now hinges on sustaining the momentum generated by the TRIPP peace initiative. Deepening engagement with Azerbaijan is no longer optional — it is a strategic imperative. As China accelerates its Belt and Road investments, and Russia and Iran struggle to retain regional influence, Washington has a narrow window to secure its foothold in the Caucasus.
Repealing Section 907, expanding defense and economic cooperation, and embedding Azerbaijan within U.S.-led Eurasian connectivity projects will send a clear signal that America is committed to shaping — not merely observing — the future of this vital region.
In the emerging great-power competition across Eurasia, Azerbaijan is more than a partner of convenience. It is the linchpin of a stable, connected, and independent Caucasus — and a critical test of America’s capacity to convert peace diplomacy into enduring strategic advantage.
