The language of power often reveals more than it intends. In a rare moment of candor on March 7, US President Donald Trump described the confrontation with Iran as “a big chess game at a very high level … I’m dealing with very smart players … high-level intellect. High, very high-IQ people.” In these words lies an implicit recognition: Iran is not a rival to be casually confronted or quickly subdued.
Yet, the response from Washington seems to belabor a disconnect between understanding the adversary and crafting effective strategy. The Trump administration has revived a 15-point roadmap that Iran rejected a year ago—a plan Tehran previously dismissed as unrealistic and coercive. By reintroducing the same plan, Washington signals a stubborn faith in a framework that Iran has already judged unviable, framing it once again as a pathway to de-escalation. Tehran, unsurprisingly, has dismissed the effort, describing it as “negotiating with itself” and reinforcing the perception that the US is attempting to impose terms rather than genuinely engage.
If Trump’s characterization of Iran as a “high-level” opponent is taken seriously, the decision to recycle a plan that Iran already rejected suggests a fundamental misjudgment. This misreading is not just tactical; it is strategic, revealing a gap between the complexity of the adversary and the simplicity of the approach being pursued.
Trump’s acknowledgment of Iran’s capabilities tacitly recognizes that this is a far more capable and complex adversary than those the US has faced in previous Middle Eastern wars, such as Iraq. The contrast is stark: Iraq, with its fractured institutions and weak regional influence, could be overwhelmed by superior firepower and technological dominance. Iran is different. It is a deeply embedded regional power, with resilient institutions, extensive networks of influence, and the capacity to impose asymmetric costs across multiple theaters of conflict. It knows how to manage maximum pressure and to exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries whose strategies rely on conventional notions of superiority.
This misreading is emblematic of a familiar but flawed assumption in US and Israeli strategic thought: that overwhelming military force can compensate for inadequate political and strategic understanding. History offers multiple examples where this assumption has failed—from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iran, the misjudgment is compounded by the failure to fully account for the political, economic, and historical terrain in which this confrontation is unfolding.
Unlike Iraq, Iran is not a brittle state that can be coerced through quick, decisive military strikes. Its institutions are robust, its regional influence is substantial, and its domestic population, despite internal dissent, exhibits remarkable resilience under external pressure. This adaptability makes the cost of military engagement uncertain and potentially unlimited, creating a quagmire that could entangle the United States and Israel for years to come.
The most immediate problem for the US and Israel is legitimacy. The war has been launched without clear international authorization. The United Nations has not sanctioned it, and in the case of the United States, Congress has not formally authorized military action. This lack of legal and political legitimacy undermines the ability to mobilize both domestic and international support.
Further eroding legitimacy is the discrepancy between the stated justification for war and intelligence assessments. US intelligence has reportedly indicated that Iran was not actively rebuilding its nuclear program following earlier strikes, contradicting one of Washington’s key rationales for initiating hostilities. The resignation of Joe Kent as head of the National Counterterrorism Center on March 17 added another layer of contradiction. In his resignation letter, Kent asserted that Iran posed no imminent threat—a statement that effectively undermines one of the original narratives justifying the war. These developments represent not minor bureaucratic disputes but fundamental cracks in the moral and legal scaffolding supporting the conflict.
Public opinion in the United States further compounds the problem. Americans remain deeply skeptical of another prolonged military engagement in the Middle East, weary from the decades-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Current polling shows that Trump’s Republicans are trailing Democrats ahead of the midterm elections in November—a political environment hardly conducive to sustained support for an unpopular and uncertain war. The combination of eroding legitimacy and domestic fatigue sets the stage for a conflict that is politically unsustainable, regardless of tactical battlefield success.
The international dimension further illustrates the precarious position of the United States and Israel. Traditional allies have begun distancing themselves from offensive operations. The United Kingdom, often portrayed as Washington’s closest partner, has limited itself to defensive coordination. Germany and France have also refrained from endorsing aggressive measures, while European states have declined US requests to deploy naval forces to secure the strategic Strait of Hormuz. This is not merely a disagreement over tactics; it reflects a deeper erosion of trust in US leadership and strategic judgment.
US global influence has historically relied on a combination of legitimacy and coercive capacity. When either is compromised, the ability to project power effectively is diminished. The present conflict demonstrates both forms of erosion: military might is visible, but moral and strategic authority is waning. Graphic images of civilian casualties, including the deaths of over 160 schoolchildren in an airstrike on the war’s first day, have shocked international observers and further tarnished the US and Israeli reputations. Far from consolidating leadership, the war accelerates its decline.
Israel faces a parallel erosion of legitimacy, one that began with its military operations in Gaza and has now deepened with the confrontation against Iran. The war in Gaza caused widespread civilian casualties and humanitarian devastation, eliciting unprecedented criticism—even from traditional allies. The decision to strike Iran during active negotiations, for a second time, reinforces the perception that escalation is prioritized over diplomacy. This perception threatens Israel’s credibility in the international arena, particularly among allies that previously deferred to its security imperatives.
The conduct of the conflict exacerbates these challenges. Assassinations of Iranian leaders, while framed in Washington and Tel Aviv as tactical victories, have proven to be strategic setbacks. Far from destabilizing Iran, these actions have unified domestic support for the regime. Mass pro-government demonstrations illustrate how external aggression can paradoxically strengthen internal legitimacy, particularly when framed as resistance against foreign coercion.
The dynamics of asymmetric conflict further highlight the strategic challenges facing the US and Israel. Iran does not need to achieve conventional military victories; it only needs to endure, impose costs, and avoid catastrophic losses. The weaker power in such conflicts often succeeds by forcing the stronger adversary to pay unsustainable costs, eroding its political will and strategic patience.
This dynamic is already evident. Trump’s administration, after rapid escalation, appears to be searching for an off-ramp, signaling openness to negotiation. Yet these gestures emerge from a position of diminishing leverage. Meanwhile, Iran continues to wield influence over critical energy flows, absorb external pressures, and shape the tempo of escalation on its own terms. The longer the conflict endures, the more the strategic balance favors Tehran.
Beyond military and political dimensions, the war is destabilizing the global economy. Oil prices have surged, inflationary pressures are mounting, and market volatility has reached levels reminiscent of both the 1970s oil shocks and the disruptions caused by the Ukraine war. The deployment of thousands of US troops to the Middle East, including Marines and paratroopers reportedly tasked with securing Kharg Island—home to Iran’s most critical oil infrastructure—represents a high-stakes escalation with potential global ramifications.
Gulf states are increasingly questioning the assumption that US military presence guarantees security. Reports suggest some nations are exploring diversified partnerships, engaging with China and Russia to hedge against US unreliability. This mirrors patterns observed after Iraq, when US failures opened space for alternative powers to expand influence in the region.
Wars are not won solely by destroying the enemy’s capabilities; they require securing sustainable and legitimate political outcomes. On both fronts, the US and Israel are falling short. Iran, by contrast, does not require military victory—only resilience and the ability to impose costs. This logic, central to asymmetric warfare, underlines why enduring adversaries often outlast ostensibly stronger powers.
The current conflict underscores a broader lesson in geopolitics: empires rarely recognize the point at which they are losing. Escalation becomes the default response, coupled with an insistence that victory is imminent. By the time the costs—economic, political, and reputational—become undeniable, it is often too late to reverse course.
For the United States and Israel, battlefield successes may be achievable, but they risk losing the war that truly matters: the war for legitimacy, influence, and stability. Without credibility, even military triumphs are hollow. Domestic support erodes, international alliances fray, and adversaries exploit weaknesses, leaving strategic objectives unfulfilled.
Iran’s approach contrasts sharply. By enduring, leveraging asymmetric capabilities, and exploiting the political vulnerabilities of its adversaries, Tehran holds key strategic cards. The longer the conflict persists, the more leverage it accrues, illustrating a fundamental asymmetry in modern conflict: the stronger power must achieve a decisive outcome or face strategic attrition, while the weaker power can prevail by simply avoiding defeat.
The implications extend beyond the immediate battlefield. The erosion of legitimacy in the United States has global consequences, weakening its ability to lead coalitions, influence multilateral institutions, and shape international norms. Historical patterns suggest that once legitimacy is compromised across multiple fronts, it is extraordinarily difficult to rebuild. Future adversaries and allies alike will factor this loss into their calculations, adjusting behavior to account for diminished US authority.
The economic, political, and strategic reverberations are intertwined. Rising oil prices, inflationary pressures, and geopolitical uncertainty create conditions that compound domestic political vulnerabilities, further constraining strategic options. Allies may hedge or distance themselves, neutral states may exploit openings, and adversaries can recalibrate strategies with impunity.
Israel faces its own parallel dilemma. Its global standing has been significantly damaged by conduct in Gaza and now by escalation against Iran. Civilian casualties and humanitarian devastation have eroded international credibility, and the willingness to strike during ongoing negotiations sends a signal that diplomacy is subordinate to escalation. This perception undermines Israel’s ability to build coalitions, secure strategic depth, and project long-term influence in the region.
Even tactical victories—such as successful targeted strikes or military raids—cannot compensate for the loss of strategic credibility. In conflicts of this nature, where political outcomes matter as much as military ones, legitimacy is not optional; it is central to sustaining any long-term advantage.
History offers sobering parallels. Vietnam demonstrated that superior firepower cannot substitute for political legitimacy or understanding the adversary. Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the dangers of underestimating the resilience and adaptability of local actors. In each case, initial tactical successes gave way to strategic stagnation or failure.
The current conflict follows a similar trajectory. Tactical operations may succeed in isolating or degrading certain Iranian capabilities, but the broader objectives—stability, influence, and long-term security—remain elusive. The lessons are clear: wars of attrition favor those who can endure, impose costs, and exploit the overextension of stronger powers.
Ultimately, the confrontation with Iran exemplifies the limits of conventional power when applied without political clarity and strategic foresight. The US and Israel may control the skies, dominate conventional capabilities, and demonstrate technological superiority, but these advantages cannot substitute for legitimacy, resilience, or understanding the adversary.
Iran, conversely, benefits from asymmetry, adaptability, and strategic patience. It need not win in a traditional sense; it only needs to impose costs, endure pressure, and outlast its adversaries. The longer the war continues, the more these dynamics shift in Tehran’s favor, highlighting a fundamental lesson in modern conflict: power is not solely measured by firepower, but by the ability to sustain legitimacy, influence, and strategic leverage over time.\
The confrontation with Iran is shaping into a defining moment for US and Israeli influence in the Middle East. Tactical successes may be visible and immediate, but the strategic calculus is more complex. Legitimacy is eroding, domestic and international support is faltering, and adversaries are leveraging asymmetric strategies to impose costs and shape the conflict on their own terms.
Trump’s candid description of Iran as a “high-level” adversary may be one of the few accurate assessments in US public discourse. Yet, the response—from recycling previously rejected plans to escalating military engagement without clear objectives—suggests that understanding has not translated into effective strategy.
Empires rarely recognize the point at which they are losing. They escalate, double down, and insist victory is near. By the time the costs become undeniable—economic crisis, political fragmentation, and global isolation—it is often too late. The United States and Israel may win individual battles, but they risk losing the war that truly matters: the war for legitimacy, stability, and long-term influence.
As history demonstrates, such losses are consequential. They redefine the limits of power, reshape alliances, and alter global perceptions of authority. For the US and Israel, the confrontation with Iran is not just a test of military capacity—it is a test of strategic judgment, political legitimacy, and the enduring resilience of influence in a complex and rapidly shifting world.
If the current trajectory continues, it is not the capabilities of the adversary that will ultimately define the outcome, but the ability of the United States and Israel to reconcile tactical action with strategic foresight—a reconciliation that, thus far, appears elusive. The war may continue, but its lessons are already apparent: in conflicts defined by asymmetry, endurance, and legitimacy, the stronger power can lose even when it dominates the battlefield.
