For over a century, Turkey has systematically denied its Kurdish population fundamental democratic rights and autonomy. Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, successive governments have sought to suppress Kurdish identity, banning the Kurdish language, outlawing cultural expressions, and violently quashing any movement toward self-determination.
Now, in 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is once again leveraging the Kurdish issue to consolidate power, this time in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape that extends beyond Turkey’s borders.
Kurdish aspirations for an independent state date back to the early 20th century. After World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres initially promised the Kurds a homeland, but this was overturned by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which established modern Turkey’s borders without provisions for Kurdish autonomy. Ever since, the Turkish state has waged a relentless campaign against Kurdish political expression.
From the 1920s to the 1990s, Kurdish uprisings were brutally suppressed, and any movement advocating for autonomy was deemed a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), founded in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist group, emerged in response to this repression. Over the decades, its armed insurgency and the Turkish government’s counterinsurgency operations have claimed tens of thousands of lives.
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) initially pursued peace talks with the PKK in the early 2010s, but negotiations collapsed in 2015. Since then, Erdogan has taken a hardline stance, branding the PKK and its affiliates as existential threats to Turkey’s Islamic and national identity.
Erdogan’s Tactical Use of the Kurdish Issue
Facing political challenges at home, Erdogan has turned to nationalist rhetoric, framing the Kurdish struggle as a threat to the “Islamic order.” In 2016, the AKP escalated its anti-Kurdish narrative, branding Kurdish militants as “atheists and Zoroastrians” to appeal to its conservative base.
But Erdogan’s approach to insurgencies is inconsistent. Internationally, he has voiced support for armed Islamist groups, including those in Kashmir, while ruthlessly suppressing Kurdish militants at home.
His latest move is to use Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, as a bargaining chip. Ocalan, who has been in Turkish custody since 1999, is reportedly under pressure to call for the PKK’s disarmament. This marks a significant shift from the group’s long-standing demand for autonomy.
Why is Erdogan Seeking PKK’s Disarmament Now?
Erdogan’s sudden push for Kurdish disarmament is not a move toward genuine reconciliation. Instead, it is a geopolitical maneuver to counter growing Israeli influence in the region.
During the 2024 UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined a new Middle East strategy, emphasizing the role of the Kurds. He praised the Kurdish governance model as democratic and secular, contrasting it with Islamist-backed groups. Netanyahu also pointed to the strong historical ties between the Kurdish and Jewish peoples.
In post-Assad Syria, power is fragmented between three major factions:
- The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)
- Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist militant group allied with Turkey
- The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition backed by the U.S.
Among these groups, the SDF is the only secular, democratic force. It has established military ties with Israel and cooperated with the U.S. against ISIS. This has raised concerns in Ankara that an empowered Kurdish entity could emerge as a regional player, backed by Israel and Western allies.
By pressuring Ocalan to call for the PKK’s dissolution, Erdogan aims to weaken the broader Kurdish movement, ensuring that Kurdish forces do not gain further ground in Syria, Iraq, or within Turkey itself.
Iran
Erdogan’s Kurdish strategy is not just about domestic politics; it is deeply intertwined with regional dynamics, particularly concerning Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, which also has a significant Kurdish population, has long viewed Kurdish aspirations for independence as a direct threat. If Tehran perceives Kurdish empowerment—especially through Israeli backing—as a destabilizing force, it may intensify its own suppression of Iranian Kurds.
Furthermore, Iran’s proxy network, including Hezbollah, suffered setbacks in recent clashes with Israel. If Iran moves to crack down on ethnic minorities at home, including Kurds, this could complicate Erdogan’s attempts to manipulate Kurdish politics.
For Erdogan, the challenge is twofold: he must contain Kurdish nationalism while ensuring that Kurdish forces in the region do not align with Israel, the U.S., or other Western interests.
What Will the Kurds Do?
The Kurdish response to Erdogan’s maneuvering remains uncertain. Several key questions arise:
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Will the Kurdish community across four countries accept Ocalan’s proposed disarmament? The PKK’s armed struggle has been central to Kurdish resistance. While some Kurdish factions may consider alternative political strategies, many remain skeptical of Turkish promises.
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What will Ankara offer in return? Erdogan’s government has yet to present any concrete concessions that would justify Kurdish disarmament. Without guarantees of cultural and political rights, Kurdish groups are unlikely to abandon their struggle.
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How will Israel respond? If Kurdish forces, particularly in Syria and Iraq, choose to maintain military resistance, Israel may deepen its support. This could further complicate Turkey’s regional ambitions.
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What role will the U.S. play? The U.S. has historically backed Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria but has been reluctant to challenge Turkey, a NATO ally. However, Washington’s stance could shift if Erdogan continues to align with Islamist factions while suppressing democratic Kurdish movements.
Erdogan’s Tightrope Walk
Erdogan is navigating a precarious path. His dream of reviving Ottoman-era influence clashes with the reality of an evolving Middle East where Kurdish forces, backed by Israel and the West, could emerge as a decisive factor.
Turkey’s strategy of branding Kurdish militants as terrorists while supporting Islamist groups elsewhere exposes its inconsistencies on the world stage. The October 7 attack by Hamas and the subsequent shifts in Middle Eastern alliances have only accelerated these contradictions.
As Erdogan plays his hand in the Kurdish conflict, he must weigh the risk of pushing the Kurds further into the arms of Israel and Western allies. If his efforts to neutralize the PKK backfire, Turkey could find itself facing a reinvigorated Kurdish resistance, not just within its borders but across the entire region.
The Kurdish question, unresolved for a century, remains one of the most volatile fault lines in Middle Eastern politics. What happens next will shape the balance of power in the region for years to come.
