A report published by Syria Retold Daily on January 11, 2026, has sparked renewed attention on the evolving relationship between Türkiye and Syria, claiming that the Turkish government is considering the sale of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles to the Syrian Arab Army. While no procurement steps, formal negotiations, or public expressions of interest have been confirmed by either side, the report has drawn interest because of what such a move could symbolize politically rather than for its immediate military impact.
If accurate, the claim would mark a notable development in relations between Ankara and Damascus following years of hostility during the rule of former president Bashar al-Assad. It would also come within the broader context of a military cooperation framework signed in August 2025 between Türkiye and Syria’s transitional authorities, which formally established Turkish support for rebuilding Syria’s armed forces after the collapse of the Assad-era state.
Following Assad’s fall, Türkiye moved relatively quickly to formalize ties with the new Syrian leadership. In August 2025, the two sides signed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding on military cooperation covering training, logistics, advisory assistance, and the supply of selected military equipment, including unmanned systems. The agreement marked a clear departure from the confrontational dynamic that had characterized Turkish-Syrian relations for more than a decade, during which Ankara openly supported opposition forces and Turkish drones were used against Syrian government units.
Under the terms of the agreement, Syrian soldiers have begun receiving training at Turkish military facilities, while Syrian cadets have been admitted to Turkish military academies across land, air, and naval branches. Turkish officers have also provided advisory support on institutional reform, focusing on command-and-control structures, logistics systems, and force organization. The framework foresees the delivery of weapons systems and equipment, including armored vehicles and support assets, though quantities, timelines, and specific platforms have not been publicly disclosed. Through this process, Türkiye has emerged as the most influential external partner in the restructuring of Syria’s armed forces.
Despite this support, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces remain a mixed and uneven force after more than a decade of war, fragmentation, and attrition. On paper, Syria still fields manpower in the low hundreds of thousands when regular units, reserves, and affiliated formations are combined. In practice, however, readiness varies sharply by unit and region. Many formations suffer from limited training cycles, uneven discipline, and shortages of modern equipment.
Ground forces continue to form the backbone of Syria’s military, relying heavily on aging Soviet-era platforms such as T-55, T-62, and T-72 main battle tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and a wide assortment of towed and self-propelled artillery. While these systems remain functional in some units, maintenance and spare parts availability are inconsistent. The air force retains a number of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, but operational availability is constrained by limited pilot training, reduced maintenance capacity, and the wear accumulated over years of intensive use. Air defense units still operate legacy systems, though coverage and effectiveness vary significantly depending on location and logistical support.
As a result, Syria’s current military posture emphasizes control and stability rather than power projection. Since the political transition, Syrian forces have focused primarily on internal security missions, including securing major cities, transport corridors, border crossings, and critical infrastructure such as power stations and energy facilities. In sensitive regions, deployments are aimed at monitoring rival armed groups and preventing infiltration or sudden attacks rather than preparing for large-scale offensive operations.
Air assets are used selectively, mainly for reconnaissance and occasional precision strikes when conditions permit. Sustained air campaigns are beyond current capacity. Similarly, air defense units prioritize the protection of key installations and population centers instead of attempting nationwide coverage. This reflects both resource limitations and a strategic preference for defensive, intelligence-driven operations over maneuver warfare.
Within this context, relations between Syria and Türkiye have gradually shifted from open confrontation to cautious, interest-based engagement. Ankara’s priorities have centered on stabilizing its southern border, limiting hostile armed activity near Turkish-controlled areas, and managing the long-term pressures associated with refugees. For Damascus, engagement with Türkiye offers a pragmatic channel to influence developments in northern Syria and to secure external support for rebuilding state institutions.
This evolving relationship remains carefully calibrated. Coordination has largely taken the form of indirect communication and selective cooperation rather than formal alliances. As a result, any defense-related move carries political weight that often exceeds its immediate military significance. The reported consideration of transferring a Turkish-made drone system to the Syrian Army fits squarely into this pattern.
Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly the Bayraktar TB2, were previously employed against Syrian government forces during the war, making any potential sale politically sensitive. A transfer would also imply some level of training, technical assistance, and ongoing maintenance support, since unmanned systems depend on ground control stations, secure communications, and skilled operators. For Ankara, this would require careful oversight to ensure that such systems are used in line with agreed objectives and do not undermine Turkish security interests.
At the same time, the absence of details regarding conditions, scale, or oversight mechanisms suggests that any such move—if it materializes at all—could initially be limited or symbolic rather than transformative. It may represent an exploratory step within a cautiously expanding relationship rather than a commitment to deep military integration. Even so, the report highlights an opening that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.
The Bayraktar TB2 itself is one of Türkiye’s most prominent defense exports. Developed by Baykar in the early 2010s, the system was part of a broader national effort to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and establish a domestically controlled armed drone capability. The TB2 conducted its first flight in 2014 and entered service shortly afterward, initially performing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions before being cleared for armed operations.
Production expanded steadily as operational experience accumulated, both within Türkiye and through export customers. Total output has exceeded 600 units, reflecting strong domestic demand and international interest. Over time, the platform was refined in response to combat experience and restrictions on foreign-supplied components, leading to the integration of locally produced subsystems and the development of upgraded variants with improved avionics and satellite communications.
Technically, the TB2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle optimized for persistence rather than speed. It has a wingspan of around 12 meters, a length of approximately 6.5 meters, and a maximum takeoff weight close to 700 kilograms. A single internal combustion engine drives a rear-mounted propeller, prioritizing fuel efficiency and endurance. The airframe features a twin-boom tail and high-aspect-ratio wings designed for stable flight at medium altitude.
The system is operated from a ground control station by a small crew responsible for piloting, sensor operation, and mission management. Communications are handled through line-of-sight data links, with satellite communications available on upgraded versions, extending operational reach.
Operationally, the TB2 combines persistent surveillance with limited precision strike capability. Endurance can exceed 24 hours depending on payload and mission profile, allowing continuous monitoring of areas of interest. Its payload capacity of roughly 150 kilograms is typically allocated to electro-optical and infrared sensors and lightweight laser-guided munitions such as the MAM-C and MAM-L. Operating altitudes generally range between 18,000 and 25,000 feet.
The platform performs best in permissive or moderately contested environments, where its endurance and sensors provide a clear advantage. Survivability depends heavily on tactics, altitude management, and the density of opposing air defenses and electronic warfare systems. For Syria, such a system would primarily enhance reconnaissance, border monitoring, and limited strike options rather than fundamentally alter the military balance.
Whether the reported consideration of a TB2 sale develops into a concrete policy remains unclear. For now, it stands as another indicator of the slow but notable evolution in Turkish-Syrian relations, where even tentative defense cooperation carries significant political meaning.
