In a move that has reverberated through South Asia’s strategic corridors, Türkiye’s donation of a Dogan-class fast attack missile boat — the TCG Volkan (P-343) — to the Maldives marks a sharp pivot in the Indian Ocean Region’s (IOR) evolving military balance. For India, the development is more than a symbolic gesture; it’s a flashing red light signaling the erosion of its strategic primacy in its own maritime backyard.
The TCG Volkan transfer, wrapped in a broader military agreement inked between Ankara and Malé, comes at a time of strained Indo-Maldivian relations and increasing cooperation between the Maldives and both Türkiye and China. The timing and scope of the donation suggest Türkiye is not merely interested in exporting surplus naval hardware — it’s positioning itself as a strategic actor in a region long dominated by India.
The vessel in question, the TCG Volkan, is a Dogan-class fast attack craft originally designed by German shipbuilder Lürssen Werft but deeply modified by Türkiye over the years. It represents the beginning of modern missile warfare for the Turkish Navy, having been the first platform in its fleet to incorporate the American-built Harpoon anti-ship missile system. These missiles allow for over-the-horizon strikes and bring high lethality to surface engagements.
Ahead of its handover, the vessel underwent an extensive upgrade at the Istanbul Naval Shipyard Command. Turkish officials have emphasized that the transfer is not just about gifting a warship — it’s part of a structured capacity-building program. Maldivian naval personnel began a five-week technical training program in Türkiye on April 7 and will complete it by May 9. Following the ship’s delivery — scheduled between April and June 2025 — Turkish naval officers will spend an additional two weeks in Maldivian waters conducting onboard operational training.
The ship’s arrival is likely to boost Malé’s maritime domain awareness and offensive capability, providing it with the first surface combat platform equipped with anti-ship missiles.
India’s traditional dominance over the Maldives — and the wider Indian Ocean — has come under increasing strain. While India has long provided defence support to Malé, including the deployment of helicopters, transport aircraft, and military personnel, the diplomatic climate has soured.
Tensions came to a head in early 2024 after a series of inflammatory remarks made by Maldivian officials against Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went viral on social media. The backlash in India was swift. A mass tourism boycott campaign erupted, putting pressure on the Maldivian economy, which is heavily dependent on Indian tourists.
Though the Maldivian government attempted damage control — suspending the offending officials and issuing conciliatory statements — bilateral trust took a major hit. The situation worsened after the election of President Mohamed Muizzu, a staunch advocate of the “India Out” movement, who immediately demanded the withdrawal of Indian military personnel from the country.
By May 2024, New Delhi complied, replacing its military personnel with civilian technicians to operate its aircraft. But the strategic vacuum left behind has since been filled — not by neutrality, but by partnerships with Türkiye and China.
Türkiye’s influence over Malé isn’t limited to maritime hardware. On March 3, the Maldives received its first shipment of Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), capable of surveillance and precision strikes. The TB2s are now stationed at Maafaru International Airport under a US$37 million procurement agreement with Baykar Technology, a Turkish drone powerhouse.
For Indian defence planners, the deployment of these UCAVs — within striking range of India’s southern coast — is a new variable that changes the strategic equation. With no formal defence partnership between Ankara and India, New Delhi is understandably wary of Türkiye’s intentions in the region. That concern has deepened with reports of Malé exploring further drone acquisitions from China.
The dual presence of Turkish and Chinese platforms in the Maldives — both operationally independent of Indian systems — raises red flags in India’s military establishment. The fear is not just loss of influence, but the growing possibility of regional surveillance networks and weapon systems aligned against Indian interests.
India has not been idle in the face of this strategic shift. In early 2025, it inaugurated INS Jatayu, a new naval outpost on Minicoy Island, part of the Lakshadweep archipelago. Situated just 130 nautical miles north of Malé, the base serves as a direct counterweight to the growing external presence in the Maldives.
Equipped with advanced radar arrays, warships, and BrahMos supersonic missile launchers, INS Jatayu is now a forward-operating base that enhances India’s ability to monitor and — if necessary — deter adversarial activity in the southern reaches of its maritime domain.
According to Indian naval officials, the new base is a “response to evolving maritime challenges and the need for rapid force projection in the IOR.” But the subtext is clear: New Delhi sees both Beijing and Ankara as emerging threats to its long-standing dominance in South Asia.
Much of the current tension can be traced back to China’s long-term efforts to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean. Through infrastructure projects like port development, submarine visits, and concessional loans under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has built dual-use assets across Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, and Myanmar.
The Maldives is now firmly part of this expanding network. President Muizzu’s first overseas trip after his election was to Beijing, not New Delhi. The optics alone made waves, but the deals signed during that visit have had even deeper implications. Reports indicate that Beijing has offered to co-develop a port in the Maldives, provide additional surveillance drones, and deepen digital and telecom cooperation — all of which are potential conduits for intelligence gathering.
India, long the security guarantor in the region, now finds itself reacting to a shifting tide it can no longer control alone.
For Türkiye, the Indian Ocean expansion is part of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vision of projecting Turkish power beyond its traditional zones of influence. Through its defence exports, naval diplomacy, and military training programs, Ankara has become a growing presence in Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and now — the IOR.
Unlike China, Türkiye does not bring massive debt burdens or infrastructure megaprojects. Its influence is more tactical: affordable drones, naval assistance, training programs, and arms transfers. This allows it to forge partnerships with small but strategically located nations like the Maldives, offering them autonomy from bigger powers.
What makes this especially alarming to India is that Türkiye’s assertive posture is couched in soft diplomacy — religious affinity, humanitarian outreach, and training-based cooperation — but is increasingly backed by real hardware and presence.
The Maldives now finds itself at the heart of a three-way tug-of-war. Its location — straddling vital shipping routes that connect the Middle East with East Asia — makes it a crown jewel in any maritime strategy.
Malé has cleverly used its geographic significance to extract tangible benefits from all sides. From India, it received helicopters and development assistance. From China, it gets infrastructure investment and diplomatic cover. From Türkiye, it now has drones and a missile boat.
President Muizzu’s strategy, at least for now, is working. He’s delivering on his “India Out” pledge while securing security partnerships with other major players. However, critics warn that Malé may be playing a dangerous game — courting rivals without a long-term balancing strategy could backfire, leaving it vulnerable in a more volatile regional landscape.
The donation of the TCG Volkan is not just a bilateral military transaction — it’s a symbol of a broader recalibration in the Indian Ocean’s power dynamics. India, which once viewed the IOR as a near-exclusive strategic domain, now faces a multipolar competition that includes China’s economic clout and Türkiye’s agile militarism.
For the Maldives, this presents both opportunity and risk. The ability to diversify defence partnerships offers more autonomy. But if strategic competition deepens, the country could become a frontline state in a rivalry it neither started nor can fully control.
As India strengthens its naval posture and Türkiye continues to expand its footprint, the next chapter in South Asia’s maritime balance will be written not in Delhi or Beijing alone — but increasingly in Ankara and Malé.
