The U.S. Navy on Dec. 4, 2025, publicly released the results of four major investigations stemming from a string of serious mishaps during the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) nine-month deployment across the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and wider Middle East. The probes—each conducted separately—examined a friendly-fire shootdown, a collision with a merchant vessel, and two lost F/A-18 Super Hornets during a period of some of the most sustained carrier operations seen since the height of the Iraq War.
Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jim Kilby underscored the service’s broader point as the findings were published: while the Truman Strike Group was operating under continuous ballistic-missile, anti-ship missile, and one-way attack drone threats from Yemen’s Houthi forces, every one of the four incidents was preventable. “The Navy is committed to being a learning organization,” Kilby said. “These investigations reinforce the need to continue investing in our people to ensure we deliver battle-ready forces.”
Senior officials acknowledged the extraordinary pressure of Operation Rough Rider—the multinational effort to blunt missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea—but stressed that operational intensity cannot excuse lapses in coordination, situational awareness, or procedural rigor.
Below is a detailed account of the four events and what investigators concluded.
The most alarming incident took place on Dec. 22, 2024, when the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Gettysburg mistakenly identified a U.S. Navy F/A-18F from Carrier Air Wing One as a hostile antiship missile and fired an SM-2 surface-to-air missile that destroyed the aircraft.
The Super Hornet had been returning from a buddy-tanker mission supporting a Defensive Counter Air (DCA) patrol. Both aviators safely ejected, but investigators noted the situation nearly escalated into a double shootdown, as another Super Hornet narrowly evaded the missile—missing by only 100 feet.
The Navy report paints a picture of a combat information center (CIC) overwhelmed by confusion, equipment limitations, and poor understanding of the strike group’s air plan. A confluence of factors—an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) malfunction, degraded AN/SPY-1 radar coverage due to a helicopter landing, and an unrelated E-2D Hawkeye radar issue—caused the returning jets to appear as “unknown” contacts.
Crucially, investigators said the Gettysburg had not trained sufficiently with the Truman Strike Group before deployment. In the 45 days leading up to the incident, the cruiser had operated with the CSG just 15 percent of the time. A planned 10-day integrated group sail had been reduced to only two days because of an oiler shortage.
Moreover, the ship’s CIC watchstanders “did not understand the timing of the event, the departure and return to force plan, or the potential threat response,” the report said. The Gettysburg had also not participated in strike planning for the operations underway that night.
Command climate and leadership failings played a decisive role. Investigators placed significant blame on the commanding officer, concluding the decision to fire was “neither reasonable nor prudent.” There were no mechanical flaws in the Aegis Weapon System itself, though the Navy has since spent roughly $55 million to correct system deficiencies and improve IFF resilience.
The second incident occurred on Feb. 12, 2025, when the Harry S. Truman collided with the merchant vessel Besiktas-M near Port Said, Egypt. The Navy says the incident was entirely avoidable.
According to the investigation, the carrier was moving at 19 knots—far above the planned speed—while navigating one of the world’s most congested maritime corridors. Fatigue, a “just get it done” command atmosphere, and breakdowns in basic navigation discipline were listed as contributing factors.
Rear Adm. Todd Whalen, endorsing the final report, described how narrowly the Navy avoided a mass-casualty disaster. A one-degree difference in the ship’s trajectory could have pierced a berthing compartment containing 120 sleeping sailors. At the time of impact, eight sailors were in a small space less than 10 feet away from the collision point. “A one-degree change in trajectory could have destroyed the space and caused eight fatalities,” Whalen wrote.
Investigators concluded Capt. Snowden, the commanding officer, had effectively “abdicated his responsibility” for navigation to subordinates—violating core Navy regulations. He was relieved of command shortly afterward.
Still, the investigation acknowledged Snowden’s immediate actions upon returning to the bridge—ordering a “hard right rudder” that reduced the closing speed and angle of impact—likely saving lives and preventing catastrophic structural damage. His witness testimony was praised for “candor and professionalism.”
The carrier underwent temporary repairs at Souda Bay, Crete, involving hull patching, structural support additions, and removal of damaged materials. The total repair cost was $685,000, with full restoration planned during the ship’s upcoming Refueling and Complex Overhaul.
A third incident occurred on Apr. 28, 2025, when an F/A-18E Super Hornet from VFA-136 and its tow tractor were swept overboard during high-speed evasive maneuvers triggered by a reported inbound ballistic missile.
Truman was traveling at 30 knots and conducting a rapid starboard turn as part of its defensive protocol. Inside the hangar bay, sailors were repositioning the aircraft after removing chocks and tiedown chains so the hangar doors could be closed. When the ship heeled over during the sudden turn, the aircraft’s brakes failed and the towing crew lost control.
The Super Hornet, valued at $36 million, slid across the slick hangar surface—made worse by degraded non-skid coating—and plunged overboard along with the $61,000 tow tractor. Two sailors involved in the movement bailed out in time and were unharmed.
Investigators cited insufficient communication between the bridge, flight deck control, and hangar bay teams, as well as material issues with the worn non-skid floor and the aircraft’s brake failure. Although actions were “within standard operating procedures,” the incident revealed vulnerabilities in hangar safety during combat maneuvers.
The final investigation covered the May 6, 2025 loss of an F/A-18F from VFA-11 during a landing mishap caused by the failure of the ship’s #4 arresting wire. The sheave damper—a hydraulic component critical for absorbing landing forces—malfunctioned due to a missing washer. The resulting “Tasmanian devil” spin of the crosshead severed the arresting wire, sending the jet careening off the deck.
The pilot and weapon systems officer successfully ejected and sustained only minor injuries.
Investigators emphasized that the missing washer could have been absent for weeks. Maintenance personnel failed to detect the problem both during routine work the day before the mishap and during pre-operational checks on the day of the incident. Low manning, gaps in operator knowledge, and the relentless operational tempo while in the Red Sea region contributed to the oversight.
In addition to the $60 million aircraft loss, the Navy incurred $207,000 in arresting gear repairs and $47,000 to replace a destroyed life raft.
While none of the four incidents caused loss of life, the cumulative damage—three Super Hornets destroyed, a major collision, and a friendly-fire shootdown—marks the Truman Strike Group’s deployment as one of the most incident-heavy in recent Navy history.
Officials have already taken numerous corrective actions, including leadership changes, new training requirements, improved integrated strike group exercises, and targeted investments in equipment reliability. With U.S. carriers expected to remain heavily engaged in contested maritime environments, Navy leaders say the lessons from the Truman investigations must drive reforms long before the next deployment begins.
