The United States military reportedly expended over 150 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor missiles during Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June 2025. The extraordinary use of high-end defensive munitions has raised grave concerns in Washington about the sustainability of America’s missile defense reserves in a rapidly destabilizing world.
According to a Wall Street Journal report citing U.S. defense officials, American THAAD batteries, operating in close coordination with Israeli defense forces, launched interceptors at a furious rate to combat successive waves of Iranian ballistic missiles. These missiles were aimed at Israeli cities, airbases, and critical infrastructure during the intense conflict.
“Operating alongside Israeli systems, THAAD operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles,” the report noted.
This expenditure represents nearly a quarter—25 percent—of all THAAD interceptors ever ordered or delivered to the Pentagon, according to Department of Defense procurement records. The scale of usage has alarmed military planners and lawmakers alike, as the pace and ferocity of Iran’s missile attacks stretched the limits of existing missile defense architecture.
Each THAAD interceptor costs approximately $12.7 million, underscoring the massive financial and industrial burden of sustaining such a defense. The THAAD system, developed by Lockheed Martin, is designed for exo-atmospheric interception, targeting short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, before impact.
Despite its impressive performance, replenishment of THAAD munitions is slow. In 2024, the Pentagon ordered only 11 THAAD interceptors. Projections suggest another 12 may be acquired by the end of 2025. At the current procurement rate, full replenishment could take anywhere from three to eight years—a dangerously long timeline amid multiple global flashpoints.
The war between Israel and Iran, now dubbed the “Twelve-Day Storm” in Israeli defense circles, marked the largest combat deployment of THAAD in history. While the system proved vital in protecting Israeli airspace from Shahab-series and Zulfiqar-class ballistic missiles, its unsustainable use rate served as a wake-up call for the U.S. military.
Though the U.S. maintains seven THAAD batteries globally—including in Guam, South Korea, and various undisclosed locations—only two were rushed to Israel during the height of the war. Even then, the deployments were only just sufficient to cope with the volume of Iranian strikes.
Midway through the conflict, Israeli defense stocks reportedly ran critically low on interceptors, prompting Washington to seek emergency resupplies from regional partners. The U.S. is believed to have asked Saudi Arabia to transfer part of its THAAD stockpile to Israel—a request that was politely declined.
“During the war, we asked everyone to donate,” one U.S. official told Middle East Eye. “When that didn’t work, we tried deal-making. It wasn’t aimed at one country.”
This candid admission reveals the strategic vulnerability posed by overreliance on a limited inventory. The Pentagon also deployed other systems, including the Patriot PAC-3, and naval assets equipped with SM-2 and SM-6 interceptors. However, it was THAAD that shouldered most of the burden against Iran’s higher-altitude ballistic threats.
Without THAAD, analysts suggest, Israeli cities might have suffered catastrophic impacts. The sheer speed and altitude of the incoming Iranian missiles made them difficult targets for lower-tier systems like Iron Dome or David’s Sling. In multiple cases, THAAD reportedly intercepted missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere, neutralizing threats that might otherwise have overwhelmed Israeli defenses.
For all its tactical success, the campaign also exposed a core vulnerability of U.S. military logistics: missile defense stockpiles, particularly of advanced systems, are insufficiently robust to sustain extended high-intensity operations.
The implications are far-reaching. With tensions high in the Indo-Pacific, military planners are now scrambling to reassess readiness for a Taiwan Strait contingency. Should a conflict break out between China and Taiwan, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command would likely require immediate deployment of THAAD units to Guam, Japan, and possibly the Philippines.
China’s DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles pose major threats that THAAD is specifically designed to counter. However, the system’s depleted inventory could limit U.S. options in an actual conflict.
Similarly, in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea continues to launch ballistic missile salvos—often simulating saturation attacks intended to test and overwhelm regional missile shields. With the current THAAD shortage, forward readiness across multiple theaters is being critically reassessed.
To address the shortfall, Congress and the Pentagon are under pressure to expand THAAD production. Multi-year procurement authorities and emergency funding streams are being proposed to expedite deliveries and mitigate industrial constraints.
But surge production is easier said than done. Each THAAD interceptor comprises highly sophisticated components: a hit-to-kill kinetic kill vehicle, precision guidance systems, advanced rocket motors, and integration with AN/TPY-2 radar and TFCC fire control units. These complex components require specialized manufacturing and long lead times.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been tasked with conducting a feasibility study into accelerated production timelines and industrial base expansion. However, industry insiders caution that meaningful capacity increases may take years to materialize.
For Israel, the conflict validated its approach to layered defense. The integration of THAAD into its existing Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems created an effective multi-tiered shield that blunted even large-scale Iranian missile barrages. Yet, for the U.S., it served as a clear warning: missile defense is not just about cutting-edge technology, but sustainable logistics and deep stockpiles.
“The broader lesson is that success in missile defense isn’t about having the best system,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges. “It’s about whether you can reload fast enough to stay in the fight.”
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is a mobile, truck-mounted missile system developed by Lockheed Martin and overseen by the Missile Defense Agency. It is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their terminal descent, typically at high altitude and outside the atmosphere.
Unlike systems that use proximity or blast warheads, THAAD relies on kinetic energy. Its “hit-to-kill” interceptor physically strikes incoming missiles at speeds exceeding Mach 8 (approximately 9,800 km/h), disintegrating them through direct collision.
Each standard THAAD battery:
- Interceptor Missiles: High-speed, non-explosive kill vehicles that neutralize threats through collision.
- AN/TPY-2 Radar: A long-range, X-band radar capable of tracking multiple targets hundreds of kilometers away.
- Mobile Launchers: Truck-based platforms that can rapidly deploy and fire interceptors in any theater.
- Fire Control and Communication (TFCC): Central command unit that fuses radar data and issues real-time firing orders.
THAAD is a component of the broader U.S. layered missile defense architecture:
- Patriot PAC-3: Targeting lower-altitude threats.
- Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Using SM-3 missiles aboard naval vessels to intercept midcourse-phase threats.
- Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): Focused on intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
As of mid-2025, the United States has deployed THAAD to several strategic locations:
- South Korea (Seongju): Positioned to deter North Korean missile threats.
- Guam: Protecting Indo-Pacific assets from Chinese missile systems.
- UAE and Saudi Arabia: Enhancing Gulf defense against Iran.
- Israel: Temporarily during the June 2025 conflict.
- Continental U.S.: Guarding key military and civilian installations.
The 2025 Iran-Israel war was the first instance in which THAAD was used in such large numbers and under combat pressure. While it validated U.S. missile defense technologies, it simultaneously revealed their fragility under sustained use.
To restore readiness, defense officials are calling for a wartime footing in missile production. Options include creating a second THAAD production line, entering joint ventures with allies, and establishing a multinational interceptor stockpile for coalition use.
Yet these solutions come with challenges. Export controls, proprietary technology issues, and congressional budgeting constraints all stand in the way of rapid expansion.
Still, as the global threat landscape shifts—from the Middle East to East Asia and Europe—the imperative is growing. The 2025 THAAD depletion crisis may come to be seen as a pivotal moment in reorienting U.S. defense policy toward resilience and sustainability.
