NATO’s long-fractured air-power architecture appears to be entering a decisive period of realignment, as new indications suggest Washington and Ankara are inching toward resolving one of the most consequential defence disputes of the past decade. Fresh signals from senior US officials now point to a potential breakthrough that could reopen Turkey’s pathway into the F-35 Lightning II program—an outcome with sweeping implications for NATO’s fifth-generation capabilities and the strategic balance from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East.
The latest catalyst emerged when US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack publicly acknowledged that Washington’s core objection—Ankara’s possession of the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system—is “nearing resolution.” His comments mark the first major shift in tone since Turkey was expelled from the F-35 consortium in 2019 after taking delivery of the S-400 from Russia.
This evolving posture comes against a backdrop of escalating instability across Europe and the Middle East, and an increasing reliance on frontline NATO states such as Turkey, whose control of vital air corridors and operational reach make it indispensable to Western strategic planning.
Speaking at a conference in Abu Dhabi, Barrack delivered the most definitive message yet that Ankara’s handling of the S-400 is beginning to address Washington’s longstanding concerns. “Turkey has resolved the ‘operability’ issues with its S-400 missile systems as they are not in use,” he said, directly responding to fears that the Russian radar system could expose sensitive F-35 stealth data to Moscow. He then went further, confirming: “Turkey is moving closer to getting rid of the Russian system altogether.”
Pressed on whether Ankara had taken “meaningful steps” toward this objective, he simply replied: “Yes.” Barrack added that he believes “those issues will be resolved in the next upcoming four to six months,” hinting at a possible timeline for what could become a historic reconciliation.
If realised, Turkey’s return to the F-35 program would restore one of the program’s earliest and most significant partners, reshaping NATO’s fifth-generation force structure and restoring a capability gap that has widened since Ankara’s removal.
The path to this moment has been shaped by years of escalating tension. In 2017, Ankara signed a USD 2.5 billion agreement with Russia to purchase the S-400 Triumph air-defence system after failed attempts to negotiate US Patriot batteries with technology-transfer guarantees. Turkish officials defended the move as a sovereign necessity, driven by rising missile threats from Syria and the broader region.
But Washington interpreted the decision as a strategic rupture. The S-400’s powerful radar systems—capable of tracking aircraft at ranges up to 600 km—were seen as incompatible with the F-35’s stealth profile. US officials argued that co-locating the systems risked allowing Russian-linked radar to map the jet’s radar-cross-section and electromagnetic signatures, undermining the core advantage of the world’s most advanced stealth platform.
The F-35A, equipped with the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, advanced EW systems, and a Pratt & Whitney F135 engine producing 43,000 pounds of thrust, is designed not only as a fighter but as an information node in a classified NATO-wide data-sharing network. Even indirect exposure to an advanced foreign radar system could threaten the integrity of that ecosystem.
This led the US to eject Turkey from the F-35 program in July 2019, halting deliveries, removing Turkish pilots from training, and freezing Ankara’s industrial role. Turkey had already invested USD 1.4 billion toward its planned fleet of 100 F-35As, and Turkish firms were manufacturing hundreds of key aircraft components—including fuselage structures and landing gear.
The fallout deepened when Washington imposed CAATSA sanctions in 2020, marking the first time such measures had been directed at a NATO ally.
At its core, the dispute hinges on a fundamental clash between stealth technology and modern long-range radar systems.
The Russian S-400’s Big Bird radar and 40N6E missile—with a 400 km range and hypersonic speeds—are engineered to counter stealth aircraft. Even an inactive system is perceived as a potential intelligence conduit. Historically, Russia has used foreign-operated systems to gather aerospace telemetry, refining its algorithms and improving its global counter-stealth posture.
This explains why Barrack’s recent confirmation that the S-400 “is not in use” represents a critical shift in Washington’s calculus. For years, US officials insisted that Turkey must either fully divest the system or render it permanently inoperable. Ankara’s emerging position—that the system is unpowered, disconnected, and moving toward de facto decommissioning—appears to satisfy this requirement without forcing the symbolic humiliation of returning the hardware to Russia.
The breakthrough comes after nearly eight years of diplomatic stalemate that strained US–Turkey relations and raised questions about NATO’s ability to coordinate defence procurement among its members.
Between 2021 and 2024, Washington maintained its hard line: Turkey could not rejoin the F-35 program without fully removing the S-400 from its inventory. But by 2025, as NATO grappled with a widening Middle East conflict, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s expanding global military footprint, alliance planners became increasingly aware of the risks of marginalising a state that commands the Black Sea entry points and hosts key NATO air bases.
The geopolitical climate shifted markedly in September 2025 when President Donald Trump met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Washington. Discussions reportedly included “creative solutions” to the S-400 standoff. Trump later hinted that Turkey was “going to do something for us,” signalling a pivot toward strategic pragmatism.
Barrack’s latest comments now give substance to those hints, confirming that Turkey has already taken the steps necessary to neutralise the system.
For Turkey, the consequences of expulsion from the F-35 program have been far-reaching. Turkish defence industry executives warn that removal from the supply chain disrupted production lines for over 900 F-35 components previously fabricated in Turkey. Turkish Air Force officials argue that the absence of a fifth-generation aircraft has created a capability gap that cannot be filled until the domestic KAAN fighter becomes operational—likely in the 2030s.
President Erdoğan reaffirmed in October 2025 that the F-35 issue and CAATSA sanctions “must be resolved,” signalling a consistent desire to end the dispute.
Yet Ankara has sought to preserve its strategic dignity by maintaining formal ownership of the S-400 while rendering it unusable—an approach that now appears to align with Washington’s minimum security threshold.
Turkey’s potential reintegration into the F-35 program would carry significant implications for regional power dynamics.
For NATO, it would restore a critical southern air-power hub, enabling seamless joint operations across the Black Sea, Levant, and Eastern Mediterranean. It would also strengthen NATO’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control network (JADC2), where the F-35 acts as a central enabler.
For Greece, which has recently begun receiving its own F-35s, Turkey’s return would eliminate the brief qualitative edge Athens hoped to enjoy in the Aegean theatre.
For Russia, the loss would be both symbolic and material—undermining the export credibility of the S-400 and reducing Moscow’s technological leverage over a key NATO state.
Israel, meanwhile, remains cautious, reflecting concerns about advanced stealth technology being fielded by a regional actor with whom relations have often been strained.
Finally, for countries like India and Malaysia navigating complex procurement landscapes, Turkey’s experience highlights a broader lesson: fifth-generation fighter integration is as much a political challenge as a technological one.
With timelines now defined and diplomatic space widening, the next four to six months will be crucial. If Turkey completes its disengagement from the S-400, the US may move to lift sanctions, restore industrial partnerships, and approve Ankara’s request for an initial batch of around 40 F-35A fighters.
Such a shift would accelerate Turkey’s transition toward network-centric warfare, deepen NATO’s southern air-power architecture, and reestablish political trust after years of friction.
