The intensifying missile wars stretching from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific are exposing a critical weakness in modern air defense: the growing imbalance between the cost of attacking weapons and the price of stopping them. Against this backdrop, the renewed testing of the US Navy’s electromagnetic railgun is reviving a once-controversial concept that some strategists believe could reshape the economics of missile defense.
After years of dormancy, the US Navy has quietly resumed live-fire testing of its prototype electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), signaling renewed interest in a technology long viewed as both revolutionary and impractical. According to defense reporting by The War Zone, a three-day test campaign took place at White Sands Missile Range in February 2025, marking the first publicly acknowledged activity surrounding the weapon since the Navy effectively shelved the program in 2021.
The tests were conducted jointly by units from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, including the White Sands Detachment and the Dahlgren Division, working under the oversight of the Naval Sea Systems Command and its hypersonics research efforts. The activity suggests that the technology—once considered too complex and expensive to field—may still play a role in future naval warfare.
At the center of the renewed attention is a simple but powerful idea: using electricity instead of gunpowder to launch projectiles at extremely high speeds. Railguns accelerate projectiles using electromagnetic force, potentially propelling them at velocities exceeding Mach 6, far faster than conventional naval artillery. Such speeds could allow a single warship to strike targets hundreds of kilometers away, intercept incoming missiles, or launch test vehicles for hypersonic research.
While the precise purpose of the latest tests remains unclear, analysts believe the system may now be used primarily as a high-speed launch platform for hypersonic research payloads. The US military has been rapidly expanding its hypersonic testing infrastructure, and the railgun’s ability to accelerate objects to extreme velocities without rocket propulsion makes it a useful experimental tool.
Yet the renewed activity is also tied to a broader strategic debate inside the US Navy about the future of large surface combatants.
Interest in the railgun coincides with plans for a new class of massive US warships known informally as the “Trump class,” formally designated BBG(X). These vessels are envisioned as 35,000-ton heavily armed surface combatants combining the firepower of guided missile cruisers with technologies associated with future warfare.
The proposed ships would carry a vast arsenal including missile systems, directed-energy weapons and possibly railguns. According to defense commentators, the design concept includes up to 128 vertical launch cells, hypersonic weapons and advanced sensors.
Supporters argue the ships could restore capabilities that the US Navy lost when it retired its last battleships in the early 1990s.
Military analyst Christian Orr has argued that the BBG(X) concept could reintroduce naval gunfire support capabilities once provided by the legendary Iowa-class battleship. Those ships were able to deliver massive artillery fire during conflicts ranging from World War II to the Gulf War.
But the new generation would go far beyond traditional naval guns. Plans reportedly include lasers for point defense, advanced missiles, and potentially nuclear-armed cruise missiles such as the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N), alongside hypersonic strike systems like the Conventional Prompt Strike.
The first ship of the class, expected to be named the USS Defiant, would not enter service until the early 2030s if the program proceeds as planned.
Not everyone believes the concept is viable.
Defense analyst Mark Cancian has argued that the BBG(X) program may prove infeasible due to its complexity and cost. Estimates suggest each ship could displace between 30,000 and 40,000 tons—larger than many aircraft carriers of the mid-20th century—and cost as much as US$13.5 billion per vessel.
That price tag would rival the cost of a modern aircraft carrier, raising concerns about affordability at a time when the Navy faces mounting shipbuilding challenges.
Cancian also argues that the program runs counter to the Navy’s evolving operational doctrine. In recent years, the service has emphasized “distributed maritime operations,” a strategy that favors numerous smaller, networked platforms rather than a handful of extremely large and expensive ships.
Under this concept, naval power would be spread across many vessels, making it harder for adversaries to disable US forces with a few well-placed missile strikes.
Large warships like the proposed BBG(X), critics say, risk becoming high-value targets in an era of precision missiles and satellite surveillance.
Cancian has suggested that political and industrial constraints could doom the program before completion, predicting it might be canceled after consuming years of development funding.
The renewed interest in railgun technology is also being shaped by events on the battlefield.
The widening war involving the United States, Israel and Iran has demonstrated the vulnerabilities of modern missile defense systems. Iranian strikes have reportedly targeted key radar installations that form the backbone of regional missile defense networks.
Among the systems affected was the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar located in Qatar. Additional attacks reportedly damaged multiple AN/TPY-2 radar units linked to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) network.
According to strategic analyst Turki Faisal Al-Rasheed, these strikes disrupted the layered defense architecture protecting US bases and allied infrastructure in the Gulf.
Missile defense systems rely heavily on radar sensors to detect and track incoming threats. When those sensors are damaged or destroyed, remaining interceptors may still be available but lose much of their targeting capability.
This vulnerability highlights a deeper structural problem: modern missile defenses are expensive and complex systems that depend on a network of sensors, command systems and interceptors working together.
If even one element fails, the entire defense network can be compromised.
Beyond technical vulnerabilities, missile defense faces a growing economic dilemma.
Attacking weapons—especially drones and short-range missiles—are becoming cheaper and easier to produce. Defending against them often requires firing interceptors that cost orders of magnitude more.
Iran’s widely used Shahed-136 attack drones are estimated to cost roughly US$35,000 each. Even if those estimates vary, the cost remains relatively low compared with most missile defense interceptors.
By contrast, a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs roughly US$3 million per round.
The disparity becomes even more dramatic for long-range defense systems. Each interceptor fired by the THAAD battery is estimated to cost around US$15 million.
Ballistic missiles also vary widely in cost, but some Iranian models remain relatively inexpensive compared with the interceptors used against them. Analysts estimate the Emad missile may cost around US$250,000, while the Ghadr missile and Khorramshahr missile may cost several million dollars each.
In many cases, defenders must launch multiple interceptors to ensure a successful interception, further raising costs.
The imbalance creates what defense analysts call a “cost exchange problem.” Attackers can launch large numbers of cheap weapons, forcing defenders to expend far more expensive interceptors to stop them.
Over time, this dynamic can deplete interceptor inventories faster than they can be replenished.
Recent reports suggest this problem is already emerging in active conflicts.
According to US officials cited by media reports, Israel may be running low on certain missile interceptors amid continued attacks. The United States could potentially supply additional interceptors, but doing so might strain its own stockpiles.
The challenge highlights the logistical limits of interceptor-based defense systems during prolonged wars.
Even advanced militaries may struggle to maintain sufficient stocks when facing sustained missile barrages.
Supporters of railgun technology argue it could partially address this cost imbalance.
Instead of expensive guided missiles, railguns fire solid metal projectiles at extremely high speeds. These projectiles rely on kinetic energy rather than explosives to destroy their targets.
The result is a much cheaper round that could theoretically be produced in large numbers.
The US Navy’s Hypervelocity Projectile, originally developed for railguns but adaptable to conventional guns, was estimated to cost around US$85,000 per shot in earlier studies.
Even if prices have increased since those early estimates, railgun projectiles would still be dramatically cheaper than most missile interceptors.
In theory, a railgun could fire dozens of projectiles in rapid succession to intercept incoming missiles, drones or aircraft. Such a system could provide high-volume defensive fire against saturation attacks.
For naval forces operating far from supply bases, that capability could prove invaluable.
Despite these potential advantages, railguns have struggled to move from prototype to operational weapon.
The technology poses significant engineering challenges.
Railguns require enormous electrical power to accelerate projectiles to extreme speeds. Warships would need large power generation systems and advanced energy storage technologies to operate them effectively.
Heat is another major issue. The intense electrical currents used in railguns generate extreme temperatures that can damage the weapon’s internal components.
Barrel wear has also been a persistent problem. The rails that guide the projectile can degrade rapidly after repeated firing, limiting the weapon’s operational lifespan.
These issues were among the reasons the US Navy paused development in 2021.
Even if those technical hurdles are overcome, railguns are unlikely to replace missile interceptors entirely.
Studies suggest that railguns would have a relatively limited engagement range compared with existing missile defense systems.
Defense researchers estimate railguns could intercept targets at distances between roughly 18 and 74 kilometers.
That range is significantly shorter than systems like THAAD, which can engage ballistic missiles at distances of roughly 150 to 200 kilometers.
The Patriot system also offers broader coverage. Its radar can track targets at distances of up to about 150 kilometers and provide guidance for multiple interceptors simultaneously.
Because of these limitations, railguns would likely serve primarily as point-defense weapons rather than long-range area defense systems.
They could protect ships, bases or critical infrastructure against incoming threats that have already penetrated outer defensive layers.
While current conflicts in the Middle East are highlighting the limits of missile defense, the problem may be even more acute in the Indo-Pacific.
China possesses the world’s largest arsenal of non-nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles designed to target regional military bases and naval forces.
These weapons could threaten US bases across the First Island Chain, including facilities in Japan and Guam.
Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles are also designed to target aircraft carriers and other high-value naval assets.
Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal.
Recent developments include nuclear-capable cruise missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and experimental underwater nuclear delivery systems.
Pyongyang has also demonstrated intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States mainland.
The sheer scale of these missile arsenals presents a daunting challenge for missile defense planners.
In a major conflict, adversaries could launch hundreds or even thousands of missiles in coordinated barrages designed to overwhelm defenses.
Stopping such attacks using expensive interceptors alone could prove economically unsustainable.
For decades, missile defense strategy focused primarily on improving interception technology.
Today, the challenge is increasingly about scale and cost.
Defenders must find ways to stop large numbers of incoming threats without exhausting their own resources.
That reality is pushing militaries to explore alternative approaches, including directed-energy weapons, electronic warfare and high-velocity guns.
Railguns represent one possible path forward, offering the potential for lower-cost, high-volume defensive fire.
But whether the technology can overcome its engineering challenges remains uncertain.
What is clear is that the era of missile saturation warfare has arrived.
From the skies above the Persian Gulf to the contested waters of the Western Pacific, modern conflict is increasingly defined by barrages of missiles, drones and hypersonic weapons.
