The United States’ direct operation in Venezuela, which resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, has sent shockwaves across the world, prompting widespread condemnation and raising profound questions about regional geopolitics, economic interests, and the balance of power in Latin America. China, among other nations, has publicly denounced the operation as a “clear violation of international law” and demanded the immediate release of the Venezuelan leader and his spouse.
US elite forces launched a pre-dawn raid on Caracas on January 3, swiftly seizing Maduro while airstrikes targeted key sites around the capital. Maduro and Flores were flown to the United States, where they appeared in a New York court on January 5. Both pleaded not guilty to narcotics-related charges, including counts of narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine.
Washington has framed the strike—the most significant US intervention in Latin America since the 1989 invasion of Panama—as a narrowly targeted law-enforcement action rather than a full-scale military intervention. However, the forcible removal of a sitting head of government has fueled unease both domestically and internationally. Analysts emphasize that the implications extend far beyond Venezuela itself, touching on China’s influence in the region, Beijing’s currency internationalization ambitions, and broader strategic calculations, including potential contingencies over Taiwan.
China has invested more heavily in Venezuela than in any other Latin American nation. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Venezuela has received over US$62 billion from China since 2007—accounting for more than half of all Chinese lending to Latin America. Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina trail far behind as recipients.
The partnership traces back to former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in 1999 sought to use China as a counterweight to US influence. Chávez signed trade agreements with Beijing, promising to supply up to one million barrels of oil per day in exchange for political and financial support. Maduro maintained these agreements after taking office in 2013, though new Chinese lending largely dried up after 2016 as both nations focused on restructuring existing debt.
Much of the oil flow was tied to debt repayment rather than open-market purchases. In 2025, Chinese imports of Venezuelan crude averaged approximately 470,000 barrels per day—roughly 4.5 percent of China’s seaborne crude imports—making China Venezuela’s largest buyer, accounting for 80 percent of all oil exports.
With Maduro now out of power, questions loom over the fate of this debt and the continuity of oil shipments. “US$60 billion in outstanding debt is not a trivial matter, but the bigger question is that recovery and the continuous flow of oil is now in the hands of (China’s) adversary,” said Dylan Loh, associate professor of public policy at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University.
US President Donald Trump has indicated that Washington intends to “run” Venezuela and tap its vast oil reserves, adding a layer of strategic risk to China’s energy security. “China has also lost one of its staunchest ideological allies in the Western Hemisphere,” Loh added.
Venezuela has been pricing oil in yuan since 2017, positioning the country as a testbed for Beijing’s ambitions to internationalize its currency. Analysts describe the US raid as a “stress test” of China’s ability to expand its financial influence under the constraints of US sanctions.
Josef Gregory Mahoney, a professor of politics at East China Normal University, suggested that the operation could form part of broader “currency wars.” Some analysts argue that the US action slows de-dollarization by reinforcing the dollar’s dominance, while others see competing interpretations.
Beyond financial and energy considerations, the operation carries symbolic weight for the region. Mahoney noted that countries involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative may reconsider their engagement. “It raises questions for every country in Latin America,” he said. “Do they divest themselves in terms of their relations with China, or move forward?”
Trade between China and Latin America has been growing steadily, reaching a record US$518.4 billion in 2024—double the volume from a decade prior. Beijing has also extended credit lines to regional blocs, such as the 66 billion yuan (US$9.2 billion) line announced in May 2025 to members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
However, analysts caution that Washington’s actions could provoke backlash. “The US ostentatiously invoking the Monroe Doctrine may actually cause pushback across the region,” said Leland Lazarus, founder of Lazarus Consulting. The Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, historically warned European powers against intervention in the Americas. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy reinforced a “Trump Corollary,” asserting the US right to deny foreign control over strategically vital assets in the hemisphere.
China faces a dilemma. While it presents itself as a systemic alternative to Washington, it is not a security guarantor, and its partnerships are limited to economic or diplomatic leverage rather than military protection. Loh observed, “These [initiatives] can be and will increasingly be contested by a show of force. Is China prepared to do more outside of traditional economic, coercive, or grey zone measures?”
The strike also highlights potential lessons for China’s Taiwan strategy, though experts are divided on the implications. The People’s Liberation Army conducted large-scale drills around Taiwan in late December 2025, simulating blockades and missile strikes. Following the Venezuela operation, some Chinese social media users suggested a similar tactic be applied to Taiwan.
Loh cautioned, however, that Taiwan remains fundamentally different. “There are no compelling push or pull factors for China to either delay or speed up whatever plans it has. Lai [Taiwan’s President] is not angling for independence.” Mahoney similarly stressed that military escalation carries high political, humanitarian, and strategic risks, especially given Taiwan’s role in semiconductors and as a key arms customer for the US.
Beyond energy, Venezuela’s vast natural resources add another layer of strategic concern for China. The country holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves—approximately 303 billion barrels—but production has collapsed to under 1 million barrels per day due to decades of underinvestment, infrastructure decay, and US sanctions.
Strategically, the US could gain access to Venezuelan minerals and rare earths, potentially undermining China’s global leverage in critical materials. China controls roughly 90 percent of global rare earth refining capacity, using this dominance as leverage in trade negotiations. Venezuela’s Orinoco Mining Arc contains gold, iron ore, bauxite, and coltan, with reported occurrences of rare earth elements. Control over geological survey data, such as that collected by China’s CITIC Construction in 2012, may also be threatened by Washington’s new presence in Caracas.
Lazarus emphasized that geological survey data is essential for resource extraction, and CITIC remains the only company with a comprehensive survey of Venezuela’s mineral resources. Any disruption in access could significantly hinder China’s long-term strategic planning in Latin America.
The US raid in Venezuela is not just a law-enforcement operation—it is a geopolitical signal. For China, the immediate economic impact is manageable, but the strategic implications are profound, ranging from energy security and currency internationalization to regional influence and access to critical minerals. Analysts warn that Beijing may need to reconsider its reliance on economic diplomacy alone, while balancing risks in Taiwan and other strategic theatres.
The operation also revives historical debates over US influence in Latin America, echoing the Monroe Doctrine, and forces regional governments to reassess their relations with both Washington and Beijing. As the dust settles in Caracas, the world watches closely—not only for the fate of Maduro and Flores, but for the broader reshaping of global power dynamics in the Western Hemisphere.
