Russia’s Su-57E stealth fighter has become the latest flashpoint in intensifying great-power rivalry, after the United States issued a stark warning to Algeria over its reported acquisition of the aircraft. Washington’s response signals a readiness to directly confront and penalise defence procurement decisions it views as undermining U.S. military, technological, and geopolitical dominance, exposing the increasingly unforgiving intersection between defence modernisation and global power competition.
The warning underscores a broader U.S. strategy aimed at constraining Russia’s defence-industrial recovery amid sweeping Western sanctions, while forcing third countries to frame major arms purchases not as sovereign military choices, but as geopolitical alignment statements with tangible economic consequences.
Testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 3 February 2026, Robert Palladino, Head of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, characterised Algeria’s reported purchase of the Su-57E as “problematic,” warning that the deal could trigger punitive measures under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
“We also have seen those media reports, and they’re concerning,” Palladino said, adding that transactions of this nature “may trigger” a determination under CAATSA, signalling that Washington is prepared to escalate economic coercion against partners that deepen military ties with Moscow.
While diplomatically calibrated, the remarks were unmistakably firm. They reflect a U.S. assessment that exports of advanced Russian combat aircraft are not merely commercial transactions, but strategic enablers that sustain Moscow’s defence-industrial base at a time when it remains under intense pressure from sanctions and wartime attrition.
By explicitly situating Algeria’s Su-57E procurement within the CAATSA framework, Washington has reframed the deal as a geopolitical litmus test, forcing Algiers to weigh its long-standing defence relationship with Russia against the potential financial, diplomatic, and technological costs of alienating the United States.
The warning carries particular weight because Algeria is not a marginal actor. It is one of Africa’s most heavily armed states, a critical energy supplier to Europe, and a pivotal security player in counterterrorism operations across the Sahel and Maghreb.
Algeria’s natural gas exports have taken on heightened strategic importance since Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Algiers plays a central role in regional stability across North Africa, a region increasingly affected by insurgency, political fragmentation, and great-power competition.
That Washington is willing to publicly threaten sanctions against such a partner underscores the degree to which Russian high-end arms exports are now viewed as intolerable strategic challenges rather than manageable diplomatic irritants.
More broadly, the U.S. response reflects a calculation that tolerating fifth-generation Russian combat aircraft exports risks normalising Moscow’s re-entry into advanced weapons markets, undermining the cumulative impact of Western sanctions.
Enacted in 2017, CAATSA empowers the U.S. executive branch to impose sanctions on entities engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defence or intelligence sectors. In practice, the law has transformed arms procurement into a geopolitical alignment decision, particularly for countries outside formal U.S. alliances.
Palladino’s warning that Algeria’s reported deal “may trigger” sanctions signals that Washington views the Su-57E acquisition as crossing the threshold from routine defence cooperation into sanctionable strategic collaboration.
The precedent for such enforcement was established in 2019, when Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system resulted in its expulsion from the F-35 programme and the loss of roughly US$1.4 billion in sunk investments. That episode demonstrated CAATSA’s capacity to impose tangible military, economic, and technological costs.
By contrast, India’s acquisition of the same S-400 system led only to threats, not sanctions, highlighting CAATSA’s selective application based on strategic value, alliance politics, and geopolitical leverage.
For Algeria, which lacks India’s centrality to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, the risk calculus is considerably harsher. Potential sanctions could restrict access to U.S. financial institutions, complicate energy-sector financing, and disrupt technology transfers, imposing secondary economic effects well beyond the defence domain.
This selectivity reinforces the perception that CAATSA functions less as a neutral legal instrument and more as a coercive geopolitical lever, designed to discipline states whose strategic autonomy challenges U.S. preferences.
Developed by Sukhoi under the PAK FA programme, the Su-57 represents Russia’s most ambitious attempt to field a fifth-generation multirole combat aircraft capable of contesting Western air dominance through reduced observability, supercruise performance, and advanced sensor fusion.
First flown in 2010 and entering limited service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2020, the platform remains numerically scarce, with fewer than 20 operational aircraft. This limited fleet has raised persistent questions about production maturity, sustainment capacity, and long-term reliability.
The export-oriented Su-57E variant features internal weapons bays capable of carrying R-77M beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and Kh-31PD anti-radiation missiles, enabling both air-superiority and suppression-of-enemy-air-defence missions.
Powered by AL-41F1 engines, the aircraft is reportedly capable of exceeding Mach 2 and sustaining supersonic cruise without afterburners. Export-focused upgrades showcased at international airshows include enhanced panoramic cockpit displays and two-dimensional thrust-vectoring nozzles, improving pilot situational awareness and manoeuvrability.
Strategically, however, the Su-57E’s value to Russia extends beyond performance metrics. It functions as a flagship export product intended to demonstrate technological resilience despite sanctions and battlefield attrition in Ukraine.
Leaked pricing data from Rostec suggests a unit cost of around €238 million, approximately US$257 million, making each aircraft as much a political statement as a military asset.
Algeria’s pursuit of the Su-57E reflects a long-standing defence doctrine rooted in strategic autonomy, deterrence, and territorial defence within a volatile regional security environment.
The Algerian People’s National Army Air Force has historically relied on Soviet and Russian platforms, including Su-30MKA multirole fighters, MiG-29 variants, and Su-24 strike aircraft. Decades of interoperability and logistical familiarity have made Russian systems a natural choice.
The retirement of Algeria’s MiG-25 interceptors in 2022 created a gap in high-altitude interception and strategic deterrence, which the Su-57E is positioned to fill through its extended sensor reach and multirole flexibility.
Reports indicating the delivery of the first two Su-57E aircraft, alongside the training of Algerian pilots in Russia, suggest the programme has progressed beyond speculation into operational integration.
The acquisition reportedly forms part of a broader modernisation package that includes Su-35S fighters and up to 14 Su-34 fighter-bombers equipped with advanced electronic warfare suites, signalling a comprehensive overhaul rather than a symbolic purchase.
Satellite imagery confirming Su-35S aircraft at Oum El Bouaghi Air Base in March 2025 reinforces the scale of Algeria’s investment in high-end Russian combat aviation.
Collectively, these acquisitions aim to secure air superiority over regional rivals, particularly Morocco’s F-16 fleet, while enhancing Algeria’s strike, deterrence, and electronic warfare capabilities.
From Algiers’ perspective, the strategic payoff may outweigh the potential costs of U.S. sanctions, especially given Algeria’s energy leverage and diversified diplomatic relationships.
Washington’s warning extends far beyond North Africa. It serves as a cautionary signal to states across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa that advanced Russian arms purchases will increasingly be treated as geopolitical alignment choices.
Countries such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt—each balancing relations with Russia and the West—must now reassess the sanction exposure associated with high-end Russian platforms, particularly fifth-generation aircraft and strategic air-defence systems.
In Southeast Asia, where air force modernisation prioritises survivability against advanced air defences, aggressive CAATSA enforcement could constrain procurement choices and accelerate a shift toward European or indigenous alternatives.
For Russia, the Algeria deal represents both a financial lifeline and a reputational showcase, countering narratives of isolation and technological stagnation. It also underscores Moscow’s strategic pivot toward Africa as a defence export market less constrained by Western political conditionality.
For the United States, however, aggressive sanctions enforcement risks alienating partners and accelerating the fragmentation of the global defence market into competing technological spheres.
The U.S. warning over Algeria’s Su-57E acquisition encapsulates the evolving nature of global airpower competition, where fifth-generation fighters have become symbols of strategic alignment as much as instruments of military capability.
Palladino’s assertion that Washington will “watch closely” and use diplomatic leverage to “stop behavior which is not acceptable” highlights a growing willingness to subordinate partner sovereignty to broader geopolitical objectives.
For Algeria, proceeding with the Su-57E represents a calculated assertion of defence sovereignty, grounded in the belief that energy leverage and regional importance can mitigate sanctions.
Yet the risks remain substantial. CAATSA enforcement could constrain access to finance, technology, and defence cooperation, while the Su-57E itself carries operational uncertainties tied to limited production and an unproven combat record.
Ultimately, the Algeria–Su-57E episode illustrates how future airpower procurement will be shaped as much by sanctions regimes and geopolitical rivalry as by radar cross-sections and sensor fusion—ensuring that the skies over North Africa, and beyond, remain arenas of strategic contestation.
