Three American warships, including the guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale and two US Coast Guard cutters, USCGC Stone and USCGC Diligence, entered Port-au-Prince Bay earlier this week, marking one of the most visible demonstrations of US military power near Haiti in years. The deployment comes amid spiralling gang violence, deepening political paralysis, and a worsening humanitarian crisis in the Caribbean nation.
In a post on X, the US Embassy in Haiti said the arrival of the vessels was meant to “reflect the United States’ unwavering commitment to Haiti’s security, stability and a brighter future.” Yet the timing, scope, and broader geopolitical context of the mission suggest that Washington’s move is about far more than reassurance alone.
Just one month after US special forces stunned the world by apprehending Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a high-risk cross-border raid, the Trump administration’s expansive regional security campaign—known as “Operation Southern Spear”—has now turned its focus toward the Western Hemisphere’s most unstable and impoverished country.
The presence of the USS Stockdale immediately signals a serious escalation. An Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, the Stockdale is among the most capable surface combatants in the US Navy. Designed for anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare, the ship is equipped with advanced radar systems, vertical launch missile cells, and sophisticated command-and-control technology.
The destroyer was previously part of the US Caribbean fleet deployed last year for counter-narcotics operations, underscoring its dual-use role in both high-end military missions and law-enforcement support.
Accompanying it are the USCGC Stone and USCGC Diligence, two active Coast Guard cutters routinely used for maritime security, law enforcement, search and rescue, and counter-smuggling operations. In the Western Hemisphere, Coast Guard vessels often operate alongside Navy ships, blurring the line between military deterrence and policing of illicit maritime networks.
According to US officials, the flotilla was dispatched “at the direction of the Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth as part of Operation Southern Spear, an initiative launched last year to “detect, disrupt, and degrade transnational criminal and illicit maritime networks.”
Operation Southern Spear is widely viewed as a hybrid campaign combining elements of America’s long-running “war on drugs” with a newer “war on violence” in the Western Hemisphere—an area Washington has historically regarded as its strategic backyard.
US officials argue that transnational criminal organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking pose a direct threat to US national security. In practice, the operation has been aggressive. According to available figures, Southern Spear has killed more than 100 people in boat strikes against suspected drug traffickers in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific since its launch.
While Venezuela, with its oil reserves and defiant government, has long been a focal point of US pressure, Haiti presents a very different case. It has no major strategic resources, no rival superpower backing, and no nuclear ambitions. Yet its instability has increasingly alarmed US policymakers.
“Haiti may be poor, but it is not peripheral,” a former US defence official said. “Its collapse creates space for organised crime, mass migration, and external influence—none of which Washington is willing to tolerate so close to Florida.”
Haiti’s descent into chaos accelerated after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, an event that shattered what little institutional stability remained. Since then, the country has had no functioning central government, no elected national officials, and no effective control over its own capital.
Armed gangs now control nearly 90% of Port-au-Prince, according to international assessments. They extort businesses, kidnap civilians, blockade roads, and routinely overpower under-resourced police units.
The humanitarian toll is staggering. The UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that around two million people in Haiti face severe food insecurity, while more than 1.4 million have been internally displaced by violence. Basic services—including healthcare, electricity, and water—are either failing or nonexistent in large parts of the country.
For the United States, Haiti’s crisis is not a distant tragedy. Located just a few hundred miles from Florida, the country’s instability directly affects US migration patterns, regional security dynamics, and domestic politics.
Gangs, Smuggling, and Regional Spillover
US intelligence assessments increasingly suggest that Haitian gangs are no longer purely local actors. Some are believed to be facilitating drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering, connecting Caribbean routes to markets in the United States.
The Organised Crime Index has warned that Haiti’s weak policing and porous borders have allowed transnational criminal networks to flourish. Weapons—often traced back to the US—flow into the country, while drugs move out, fuelling violence and corruption on both sides of the maritime corridor.
In response, Washington has taken unprecedented steps. It has designated two powerful Haitian gang entities—the Gran Grif gang and the Viv Ansanm coalition—as foreign terrorist organisations, a move that expands US legal authority to target their finances, leaders, and overseas supporters.
Beyond crime, US strategists worry about broader geopolitical implications. Haiti’s strategic location in the Caribbean means prolonged instability could open the door to foreign influence, including from rivals such as China and Russia, both of which have been expanding their presence across Latin America and the Caribbean.
Political Vacuum and the End of the TPC
The warship deployment coincides with two politically explosive developments in Haiti: the expiration of US Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians, and the impending end of the mandate of Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (TPC).
The TPC, a nine-member interim body, was meant to shepherd Haiti toward elections. Instead, it has become mired in infighting, legitimacy disputes, and accusations of corruption.
“This year marks the country’s fifth without a president, its tenth without holding presidential elections, and its third without a single democratically elected official in power,” noted a recent Atlantic Council analysis. On February 7, the TPC’s mandate officially expires.
The council has already declared that elections were “materially impossible” by the original deadline due to the dire security situation. The first round of voting has now been postponed to August 2026, though experts warn that without dramatic improvements in security, even that timeline may prove unrealistic.
As the TPC’s tenure winds down, some members have reportedly attempted to oust Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, triggering a sharp response from Washington.
The US has thrown its weight firmly behind Prime Minister Fils-Aimé, who is widely seen as aligned with American priorities on gang suppression and security cooperation. US officials have warned against any last-minute changes to Haiti’s governing structure as the TPC approaches expiration.
In a clear escalation, Washington imposed visa restrictions on several TPC members and officials accused of having ties to gangs or organised crime. The move has heightened tensions between the US and factions within Haiti’s political elite.
“The U.S. would consider anyone supporting such a disruptive step, favouring the gangs, to be acting contrary to the interests of the United States, the region, and the Haitian people, and will act accordingly,” Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said on X.
The message was unambiguous: Washington is prepared to use diplomatic, economic, and potentially military leverage to shape Haiti’s political trajectory.
The looming political vacuum has raised fears of another violent showdown in Port-au-Prince. Although recent operations by Haitian police and a drone task force have reopened some roads and pushed gangs back in limited areas, the overall security picture remains fragile.
Rumours of former President Michel Martelly possibly returning to the country, combined with reports of armed mobilisations by various groups, have added to the sense of impending crisis.
Analysts warn that without a clear transition plan and sustained security support, Haiti could quickly descend into renewed urban warfare—this time with even fewer institutional buffers than before.
Compounding tensions is the US decision not to extend Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals. TPS allows migrants from crisis-hit countries to live and work legally in the US on a temporary basis.
The Trump administration argues that conditions in Haiti are “safe” enough for returns. Many experts strongly disagree.
They warn that mass deportations to an already collapsing state could accelerate internal displacement, overwhelm communities, and paradoxically increase irregular migration—both to the neighbouring Dominican Republic and back toward the United States.
“The risk is a vicious cycle,” said one migration specialist. “Deportations worsen instability, instability drives migration, and migration fuels political backlash in the US.”
In response to the deteriorating situation, the US has supported international efforts to bolster Haitian security forces. Last month, the UN’s special envoy for Haiti confirmed that a UN-backed security force had been deployed to assist local police in combating armed gangs.
The envoy, Carlos Ruiz, said the force is expected to reach 5,500 troops by summer or early autumn, though it currently stands at around 1,000 officers, most of them from Kenya.
While the mission has had some tactical successes, critics argue it remains under-resourced and politically constrained, limiting its ability to reclaim territory from entrenched gangs.
The arrival of US warships in Port-au-Prince Bay sends a layered message. To Haitian gangs, it is a warning that the United States is willing to escalate. To Haiti’s political class, it is a reminder that Washington is watching closely—and will intervene if it believes chaos threatens its interests.
To the region, it underscores a broader truth: under Operation Southern Spear, the United States is reasserting hard power in the Caribbean, determined to prevent state collapse, criminal entrenchment, and geopolitical drift in its immediate neighbourhood.
Whether this show of force will stabilise Haiti—or merely mark the opening of a deeper US entanglement in yet another crisis—remains an open and pressing question.
