The U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) has confirmed it is prepared to significantly expand the operational nuclear capabilities of America’s strategic forces in the wake of the expiration of the New START arms control treaty with Russia. The command says it retains both the capability and training to upload additional warheads onto Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and to restore nuclear strike capability to the entire B-52 bomber fleet if directed by the President.
The statements mark one of the clearest public indications yet that the United States is positioning itself for a potentially more expansive nuclear posture following the collapse of the last remaining bilateral strategic arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow. New START expired without a follow-on treaty in place, removing the legally binding limits that had capped deployed strategic nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and launchers for over a decade.
Under New START, the United States and Russia were each limited to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems, including ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. The treaty also established detailed inspection and verification measures designed to provide transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation.
To meet those obligations, the United States had adjusted elements of its nuclear triad. The Air Force reduced the number of warheads deployed on its land-based ICBMs and converted 30 of its 76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers into conventional-only aircraft.
Now, with those constraints removed, AFGSC says it is ready to reverse some of those changes if national leadership deems it necessary.
“The conclusion of New START allows us to streamline our focus and dedicate more resources to our core mission: ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent,” an AFGSC spokesperson said in a statement. “This managed transition enhances our operational readiness and our ability to respond to the nation’s call.”
While declining to comment on specific force postures, the spokesperson added that the command “maintains the capability and training to MIRV the Minuteman III ICBM force and convert its entire B-52 fleet into dual-capable long-range strike platforms if directed by the President.”
The United States currently maintains 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, designated LGM-30G, deployed in hardened silos across five states: Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. Each missile is presently armed with a single nuclear warhead—either a W78 or a W87—consistent with arms control commitments made under successive treaties, including New START.
However, the Minuteman III was originally fielded in 1970 in a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration. Each missile carried three W78 warheads, each with an estimated yield of approximately 335 kilotons—more than 20 times the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
MIRV technology allows a single ballistic missile to release multiple warheads, each capable of striking a different target. During the Cold War, MIRVs dramatically increased the destructive potential of ICBM forces and complicated adversaries’ missile defense calculations.
In the decades following the Cold War, U.S. strategic arms control agreements led to the “downloading” of Minuteman III missiles to a single warhead apiece. The move was intended to enhance strategic stability by reducing incentives for a first strike, as single-warhead missiles present less lucrative targets than MIRVed systems.
The early retirement of the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM in 2005 further reflected this shift. The Peacekeeper was capable of carrying up to 11 W87 warheads. After its decommissioning, many of those W87 warheads were refurbished and transferred to the Minuteman III fleet.
The W87 is believed to have a yield of at least 300 kilotons, with some reports suggesting its design allows for modifications that could increase yield to approximately 475 kilotons.
Re-MIRVing the Minuteman III fleet would require technical modifications. Some missiles would need to be refitted with MIRV-capable post-boost vehicles, or “buses,” capable of deploying multiple warheads along independent trajectories. The availability of additional warheads is another open question, as is the cost and timeline for executing such an upload.
During a 2024 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, then-STRATCOM commander Gen. Anthony Cotton indicated that serious consideration should be given to what re-MIRVing would entail.
“I do believe that we need to take serious consideration in seeing what uploading and re-MIRVing the ICBM looks like, and what does it take to potentially do that,” Cotton said at the time.
Strategic analysts note that uploading additional warheads onto existing missiles would be one of the fastest ways to increase the number of deployed strategic warheads without building new delivery systems. However, such a move could also heighten tensions with Russia and complicate efforts to bring China into future arms control talks.
Any decision to re-MIRV Minuteman III missiles could also influence the future configuration of their replacement: the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM.
The Sentinel program is intended to replace the aging Minuteman III force beginning in the 2030s. Under the constraints of New START, the Air Force had planned to deploy Sentinel with a single warhead per missile.
However, the program is currently undergoing restructuring after experiencing significant cost overruns and delays. Much of the expense has been attributed to the need for extensive modernization of ground-based infrastructure, including launch facilities, command and control systems, and support equipment.
With New START no longer in effect, policymakers could revisit the planned warhead configuration for Sentinel. While there has been no official announcement of changes, the removal of treaty-imposed limits provides greater flexibility in determining the missile’s ultimate capability.
Restoring nuclear capability to the 30 conventional-only B-52Hs may prove less technically complex than re-MIRVing ICBMs, though cost and policy considerations remain significant.
Under New START, the Air Force converted a portion of its B-52 fleet to conventional-only status. According to a 2018 letter from Russian authorities obtained by The Wall Street Journal, the conversion process included removing the nuclear code enabling switch and interconnection box, installing inhibitor plates, disconnecting cable connectors, and capping wire bundles.
Moscow at the time questioned whether those modifications were sufficiently irreversible, raising concerns that the bombers could be quickly returned to nuclear service.
Nuclear-capable B-52Hs are externally identifiable by a pair of distinctive antennas located on either side of the rear fuselage. Reversing the conversion would likely involve reinstalling removed components and recertifying the aircraft for nuclear operations.
Some defense analysts argue the process would be relatively straightforward.
“The restoration could probably be done without much difficulty. The necessary wiring is probably still in place… and physical components that had been removed could be re-installed,” Mark Gunzinger of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies said in 2024.
Others caution that the costs could be substantial, particularly as the Air Force is already undertaking major upgrades to extend the B-52’s service life into the 2050s.
Representative Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee at the time, warned that restoring nuclear capability across the fleet would represent “another added expense” amid ongoing modernization efforts.
Congress has already granted the Air Force authority to reconvert conventional-only B-52Hs to dual-capable status following New START’s expiration. However, lawmakers did not mandate the move or allocate specific funding for it.
Currently, the only nuclear weapon authorized for use on the B-52 is the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). First introduced in the 1980s, the AGM-86B allows bombers to strike targets from standoff distances, reducing exposure to advanced air defenses.
The ALCM is slated to be replaced by the AGM-181A Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, which is now in development. The LRSO will also arm the forthcoming B-21 Raider stealth bomber, providing a next-generation nuclear standoff capability designed to penetrate increasingly sophisticated air defense networks.
The B-52 fleet itself is undergoing extensive modernization, including the installation of new Rolls-Royce F130 engines, upgraded radar systems, and improved avionics. Once these upgrades are complete, the aircraft will be redesignated as the B-52J.
With the expiration of New START, there are no longer formal restrictions on the number of nuclear-capable bombers the United States may deploy, including future B-21s. This development could shape long-term procurement decisions.
U.S. officials have emphasized that they remain committed to pursuing new strategic arms control agreements. However, Washington has made clear that it wants China included in any future framework.
China is currently engaged in a rapid nuclear modernization and expansion effort. While its arsenal remains significantly smaller than those of the United States and Russia, open-source intelligence assessments indicate Beijing is constructing new missile silos, expanding its ballistic missile submarine fleet, and developing advanced delivery systems.
Chinese officials have repeatedly declined to join trilateral arms control negotiations, arguing that their country’s arsenal is far smaller than those of the two traditional nuclear superpowers.
Complicating matters further, U.S. authorities have publicly alleged that China has engaged in secret high-level nuclear testing, an accusation Beijing denies. Such claims could further strain diplomatic efforts aimed at establishing new arms control mechanisms.
For now, the United States has not announced specific plans to increase the size of its deployed nuclear arsenal. But AFGSC’s statements underscore that the military retains the technical means to expand its posture relatively quickly.
Uploading additional warheads onto Minuteman III missiles or restoring nuclear capability to the full B-52 fleet would represent significant shifts in U.S. strategic posture. Proponents argue such moves could strengthen deterrence in an era of renewed great-power competition. Critics warn they could accelerate a new arms race.
The end of New START marks a pivotal moment for global nuclear stability. Without legally binding limits and verification mechanisms in place, transparency between Washington and Moscow is reduced, and uncertainty may grow.
Whether the United States ultimately chooses to exercise the options now publicly acknowledged by Air Force Global Strike Command will depend on political decisions made in Washington—and on how the broader strategic environment evolves.
For now, the message from AFGSC is clear: the tools remain available, and the force stands ready, should national leadership decide that a larger or differently configured nuclear arsenal is required in a rapidly changing world.
