Uzbekistan is on the verge of a major leap in its military aviation capabilities, with authoritative defence sources indicating that Tashkent is close to finalising a deal to acquire the China-Pakistan JF-17 Thunder multirole combat aircraft. The prospective purchase signals not only a technological upgrade for Uzbekistan’s ageing air force but also a significant geopolitical pivot towards China and Pakistan in its defence partnerships — a move likely to reshape the regional balance of power in Central Asia.
The first signs of Uzbekistan’s potential acquisition emerged when video footage surfaced on Uzbek social media, purportedly showing an Uzbek Air Force pilot undergoing training on a Chinese-origin fighter jet. Defence analysts and military watchers quickly identified the aircraft as resembling the JF-17 Thunder, triggering widespread speculation.
While the Uzbek government has yet to issue an official confirmation, sources within Uzbekistan’s Defence Industry Agency — operating under the Ministry of Defence — have indicated that Beijing has already approved the export of the JF-17 to Tashkent. If confirmed, Uzbekistan will become the fourth export customer of the JF-17, following Pakistan, Myanmar, and Nigeria.
More than just an aircraft deal, the development reflects deeper shifts in regional alliances, procurement preferences, and the strategic recalibration of Central Asian states.
The JF-17 Thunder, co-developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), has emerged over the last decade as a cost-effective, versatile alternative to expensive Western and legacy Russian fighter jets.
The aircraft was designed from the outset to meet the requirements of developing countries seeking affordable yet capable multirole fighters. Its popularity among Pakistan’s allies is rooted in its flexibility, relatively low cost, and access to modern weaponry without the political strings often attached to Western platforms.
Key specifications of JF-17 Thunder Fighters:
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Maximum speed: Mach 1.6
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Combat radius: 700–800 km
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Operational range: ~1,200 km
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Maximum take-off weight: 12,700 kg
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Seven hardpoints for weapons
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Capable of deploying BVR missiles, guided bombs, EW pods
The latest Block III variant — which Uzbekistan is believed to be targeting — represents a generational leap in capability, incorporating advanced avionics, electronic warfare systems, and radar technology rivaling some fifth-generation fighters.
What sets the JF-17 Block III apart is its integration of cutting-edge Chinese technologies previously limited to elite platforms like the J-20 “Mighty Dragon.”
Most notably:
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KLJ-7A AESA radar: Providing superior tracking, target acquisition, and resistance to jamming.
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PL-10 short-range IR missile: High off-boresight capability comparable to the US AIM-9X Sidewinder.
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PL-15 BVR missile: Estimated range of 200–300 km, outclassing many existing regional missiles.
Chinese military analysts have suggested the KLJ-7A radar offers performance similar to the US-made AN/APG-81 radar found on the F-35 and the Russian N036 radar deployed on the Su-57 — a remarkable claim for a lightweight fighter at the JF-17’s price point.
Uzbekistan’s military aviation fleet is largely composed of Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, platforms that — while upgraded — are increasingly obsolete against modern threats. More crucially, sourcing spare parts and upgrades from Russia has become complicated by Moscow’s military commitments in Ukraine and sanctions disrupting its defence export industry.
Tashkent’s pursuit of the JF-17 thus reflects several strategic calculations:
- Diversification of arms suppliers away from Russia.
- Access to modern combat capabilities at affordable costs.
- Reduced reliance on aging Soviet platforms.
- A pathway to future technology transfer and local assembly.
Beijing and Islamabad offer not just aircraft, but an entire ecosystem of support — including pilot training, maintenance partnerships, and potentially local production opportunities in the long term.
This aligns neatly with Uzbekistan’s broader goal of developing indigenous defence manufacturing capacity, increasing its strategic autonomy.
China’s growing role as a defence partner in Central Asia is not accidental. With Russia stretched thin and Western suppliers either politically unavailable or financially impractical for many regional states, China has moved swiftly to fill the vacuum.
Uzbekistan has already demonstrated a willingness to deepen defence cooperation with China:
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Acquisition of FM-90 short-range air defence systems.
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Interest in KS-1C medium-range SAM systems.
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Display of Chinese systems at its Defence Industry Agency’s technology exhibitions.
Notably, Turkmenistan has already operationalised a multi-layered Chinese air defence architecture, including the FD-2000 (HQ-9 export variant), FM-90, and KS-1C systems. Uzbekistan appears poised to follow a similar trajectory.
China’s competitive pricing, rapid delivery schedules, and willingness to offer attractive financing or technology transfer terms have made its platforms increasingly appealing to countries like Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan’s acquisition of the JF-17 Block III will likely trigger a ripple effect across the Central Asian region.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, traditionally reliant on Russian hardware, are already reassessing their procurement strategies given the delays and rising costs from Moscow. Turkmenistan has tilted heavily towards China. Tajikistan, with its limited resources, may look to follow Uzbekistan’s lead in diversifying suppliers.
Moreover, the arrival of PL-15-equipped fighters in Central Asia will alter the region’s airpower matrix significantly. With an estimated 200-300 km BVR missile capability, Uzbekistan would possess strike ranges far superior to most legacy Russian systems fielded by its neighbours.
This could give Tashkent unprecedented leverage in regional security dynamics, particularly in air policing, border security, and counter-terrorism operations along its volatile peripheries.
For Pakistan, Uzbekistan’s potential acquisition of the JF-17 marks another win for its growing defence export strategy. Islamabad has actively sought to market the JF-17 as part of its foreign policy toolkit, strengthening ties with African, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian countries.
Pakistan’s ability to offer operational experience, affordable maintenance packages, and close military-to-military relations has positioned it as an attractive partner for countries seeking non-aligned defence procurement options.
Uzbekistan’s deal would cement Islamabad’s role as a rising player in the international arms market, bolstering its prestige and economic returns from the JF-17 programme.
Despite the momentum, several questions remain:
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Will the deal cover only aircraft acquisition, or extend to weapons packages, pilot training, and long-term maintenance contracts?
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Will Tashkent seek to co-produce or assemble parts of the JF-17 domestically, as Pakistan has done with China?
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How will Moscow react to Tashkent’s increasing tilt towards Beijing and Islamabad?
Russia remains a key player in Central Asia and has historically viewed the region as within its sphere of influence. While Moscow may not be able to block Uzbekistan’s procurement decisions outright, it could seek to counterbalance through diplomatic or security mechanisms.
If Uzbekistan proceeds with the JF-17 Block III deal, it will mark not just an aircraft purchase but a visible symbol of the shifting strategic alignments in Central Asia. For decades reliant on Soviet and Russian military equipment, Uzbekistan now appears ready to embrace Chinese and Pakistani platforms to modernise its defence posture.
This transformation carries both opportunity and risk.
On one hand, it enables Tashkent to break free from logistical dependency on Moscow and field a more capable, flexible air force suited to modern threats. On the other, it further embeds Uzbekistan within China’s expanding orbit — a reality with long-term geopolitical implications.
For Beijing and Islamabad, the deal represents a validation of their co-development strategy for the JF-17 Thunder. For Central Asia, it could herald the dawn of a new era — one where Chinese technology, Pakistani expertise, and regional ambition combine to reshape the strategic airpower landscape of the heart of Eurasia.
