On July 19, 2024, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, aged 80. Just a day earlier, Trong had been relieved of his duties for health reasons, following months of speculation due to his frequent absences from key meetings and visibly deteriorating health. His sudden departure has left a significant vacuum in Vietnam’s political landscape, ending a near-unprecedented third term in office abruptly. To Lam, the Public Security Minister, and recently promoted to State President, is set to assume Trong’s duties, signaling potential shifts in the nation’s governance.
Nguyen Phu Trong led the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) since 2011, during which he sought to revitalize an institution plagued by internal rivalries, corruption, and self-serving interests. By the early 2010s, the CPV faced widespread public discontent and pro-democracy movements, as ideology and morality were overshadowed by rampant corruption and the private sector’s burgeoning influence.
Trong’s leadership focused on reinforcing the party’s monopoly on power through increased repression of activists and democratizers, coupled with high-profile anti-corruption campaigns. This dual approach helped appease public anger while containing threats from the private sector. However, his tenure also left behind a party deeply fragmented by power struggles and a reshaped political landscape.
Trong’s signature initiative, the “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign, aimed to cleanse the party of corrupt elements. However, it was also leveraged by key figures like To Lam and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh to consolidate their own power by purging potential rivals. This led to unprecedented upheavals within the Politburo, with more members sacked than ever before, and the resignation of two presidents within two years. The Politburo’s current composition heavily favors military personnel and securocrats, setting the stage for a more authoritarian tilt.
Trong’s leadership saw the violation of several critical party norms established in the early 1990s to prevent the rise of a supreme leader and ensure a balance of power. These norms included mandatory retirement at 65 for Politburo members, a maximum of two terms for top positions, and the separation of the four most powerful roles: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly.
By holding dual roles as General Secretary and State President from 2018 to 2021, Trong broke a 35-year precedent. His tenure extended into a third term, defying retirement-age rules. This centralization of power eroded the checks and balances designed to maintain party pluralism and prevent dictatorship.
The CPV’s principle of “democratic centralism” aimed to create a form of internal pluralism, allowing policy debates without destabilizing the party. Regular reshuffles and a clear separation of powers facilitated this. However, Trong’s consolidation of power dismantled this structure, leading to an increasingly fragile party apparatus.
The anti-corruption campaign, while targeting graft, also centralized authority among a small group of Politburo members, sidelining provincial politics, and reinforcing central control. This concentration of power has made the party more susceptible to the rise of a single dominant leader, akin to a strongman.
Trong’s passing leaves the CPV at a crossroads. While the anti-corruption campaign did remove some corrupt elements, it also paved the way for figures like To Lam, who may now solidify their hold on power. Lam’s potential ascension as General Secretary in 2026, alongside his role as State President, could mark a significant shift towards a more authoritarian regime.
Trong’s anti-corruption efforts were driven by his ideological commitment to Marxism and a moralist approach. He believed that the root of corruption lay in personal vice rather than systemic flaws. His vision echoed that of Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara, aiming to create a “new socialist man” free from greed and nepotism.
However, this approach necessitated concentrating power in the hands of a few “moral” leaders, contradicting the party’s foundational principles. Trong’s efforts to change individuals instead of overhauling the system revealed the inherent limitations of his strategy. As a result, the CPV is now more fragmented, with power struggles and opportunism undermining collective leadership.
The current political scenario, with the dominance of military and security factions, suggests a potential drift towards a less pluralistic and more centralized form of governance. Trong’s attempts to purify the party inadvertently created an environment ripe for strongman rule. His anti-corruption crusade, while partially successful, also led to the weakening of institutional norms and increased the fragility of the party structure.
The immediate future of the CPV hinges on how effectively To Lam and other leaders navigate this transitional period. If Lam consolidates his power, Vietnam may see a significant shift towards a more authoritarian regime, reminiscent of China under Xi Jinping. This could have profound implications for Vietnam’s domestic policies and its relations with the international community.
Nguyen Phu Trong’s death marks the end of an era for the Communist Party of Vietnam. His leadership, characterized by a relentless anti-corruption campaign and the centralization of power, leaves behind a complex legacy. While he succeeded in reinforcing the party’s monopoly on power, he also dismantled key norms that prevented the rise of a supreme leader. The CPV now faces an uncertain future, with potential shifts towards authoritarianism under the emerging leadership of figures like To Lam.
The coming years will be crucial in determining whether the party can maintain its cohesion and adapt to the challenges posed by its internal power dynamics and external pressures. As Vietnam navigates this transitional phase, the legacy of Nguyen Phu Trong will continue to shape its political landscape.
