Vietnamese state television footage aired in early January and subsequently circulated online has offered a rare and revealing look into the Vietnam People’s Navy’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, showing Russian-built Kamov Ka-28 Helix-A helicopters conducting what appears to be a full, operationally representative ASW mission. The broadcast, dated January 11, 2026, and highlighted by defense observer Lee Ann Quann on X, captured a Ka-28 operating alongside surface combatants and deploying an APRP-2 air-launched anti-submarine weapon—marking the first publicly observed instance of the system’s apparent operational use rather than a ceremonial or scripted exercise.
For analysts and regional naval watchers, the footage stood out precisely because of its realism. Instead of the carefully staged flypasts or static deck displays that often characterize military broadcasts, the Ka-28s were shown executing mission profiles consistent with real-world ASW operations. The controlled release of the APRP-2 weapon from the helicopter, in particular, suggested that the system is fully integrated into Vietnam’s naval aviation strike chain, spanning detection, targeting, and engagement. This was not a symbolic demonstration of inventory, but a message that the capability is mature, trained, and ready for employment.
The Ka-28 Helix-A is the dedicated export anti-submarine variant of the Kamov Ka-27 family and remains among the most capable rotary-wing ASW platforms in Southeast Asia. In Vietnamese service, the helicopter is optimized for both littoral and blue-water operations, reflecting the country’s complex maritime geography. Each Ka-28 can deploy a comprehensive sensor suite, including sonobuoys for wide-area acoustic surveillance and a dipping sonar for precise localization and classification of submarine contacts. These sensors allow the aircraft to independently search large maritime areas or cue off contacts generated by surface ships.
Once a submarine is detected and classified, the Ka-28 can prosecute the target using a range of specialized munitions. These include lightweight aerial torpedoes such as the UMGT-1 “Orlan” (known by its NATO designation AT-3 Orlan), as well as high-speed anti-submarine missiles from the APR-2 “Yastreb” family. The appearance of the APRP-2 during the January broadcast strongly suggests alignment with this latter class of weapons, underscoring Vietnam’s emphasis on rapid, decisive underwater engagement.
The APRP-2 designation used by Vietnam appears consistent with the Russian APR-2 Yastreb lineage. Developed to counter modern submarines—including nuclear-powered platforms—the APR-2 family is designed to operate against targets at depths of up to 600 meters and speeds of up to 43 knots. The system traces its origins to the earlier APR-1 Condor and entered service in its modernized APR-2M Hawk-M configuration in the mid-1970s. Despite its Cold War roots, the weapon remains formidable due to its unique engagement profile and high terminal speed.
Weighing approximately 575 kilograms and measuring around 3.7 meters in length, the APR-2 carries an 80-kilogram high-explosive warhead equipped with a non-contact acoustic fuze intended to defeat reinforced submarine hulls. Unlike conventional lightweight torpedoes, which rely on sustained propulsion and maneuvering, the APR-2 employs an underwater solid-fuel rocket motor. This allows it to achieve very high terminal speeds—reportedly up to 62 knots—dramatically compressing the engagement timeline and reducing a submarine’s opportunity to evade once detected.
Operationally, the missile is released from an aircraft or helicopter at altitudes between roughly 300 and 2,000 meters. After entering the water following a controlled deceleration, it begins a programmed dive while initially operating in passive acoustic mode. If no contact is detected, propulsion activates and the weapon transitions to active hydroacoustic search. By combining inertial guidance with terminal acoustic homing, the APR-2 achieves an effective underwater engagement range of approximately 1.5 to 2 kilometers, with reported kill probabilities as high as 0.85 even when target designation data contains significant error.
Deploying such a heavy ASW missile from a helicopter is a demanding task. It requires precise flight control, robust release mechanisms, and aircrews trained to operate at low altitude over open water while coordinating with surface units. The release posture shown in the Vietnamese footage appeared deliberate and controlled, suggesting placement into a defined “water box” rather than a purely demonstrative drop. For professional observers, this detail reinforced the impression that the Navy intended to showcase a realistic combat employment scenario rather than a choreographed display.
Equally significant is the broader operational context in which the Ka-28 and APRP-2 were shown. Vietnamese naval aviation ASW missions are designed to function in close coordination with surface combatants, and recent exercises have emphasized interoperability with both legacy Petya-class frigates and more modern Gepard-class frigates. In this joint construct, surface ships provide persistent presence, hull-mounted sonar coverage, and command-and-control functions, while helicopters extend the sensor and strike envelope far beyond the ships’ immediate surroundings.
A Ka-28 armed with an APR-2-class missile can rapidly respond to a submarine contact generated by a frigate, approach from an unexpected axis, and launch a high-speed attack that forces the target into evasive maneuvers. These maneuvers, in turn, increase the submarine’s acoustic signature, making it more vulnerable to follow-on attacks by surface ships or additional aircraft. This layered approach reflects a mature understanding of modern ASW doctrine, where speed, coordination, and pressure are used to deny submarines safe operating areas.
Vietnam’s growing sophistication in undersea warfare is not accidental. The Navy’s experience operating its own Kilo-class submarines has provided valuable insight into submarine tactics, acoustic behavior, and operational vulnerabilities. This dual perspective—operating both submarines and the systems designed to hunt them—has informed training, doctrine development, and force structure decisions. By pairing ship-based sensors with helicopter-delivered, high-speed weapons, Vietnam is building an ASW posture focused on rapid response and denial of sanctuary in critical maritime approaches.
From an industrial and sustainment standpoint, the APRP-2 nomenclature aligns with Vietnam’s broader efforts to adapt and localize legacy Russian-origin systems. Over the past decade, Hanoi has invested in domestic maintenance, life-extension programs, and incremental integration updates to ensure long-term viability of its defense inventory. Whether APRP-2 represents a refurbished APR-2 Yastreb, a modified packaging standard, or a configuration tailored to Vietnamese logistics, training, and safety requirements, its public appearance signals continued commitment to maintaining credible, combat-ready ASW munitions.
Strategically, the decision to publicly show the APRP-2 in flight alongside Ka-28 helicopters and frontline frigates fits squarely within the evolving security environment of the South China Sea. Increased submarine activity, the protection of seabed infrastructure, and contested maritime spaces have all elevated the importance of rapid undersea response capabilities. By choosing to display not just sensors but an actual strike sequence, Vietnam has sent a calculated deterrent message: its anti-submarine forces are not merely searching the depths—they are prepared to strike quickly, decisively, and in coordination with the rest of the fleet.
