As tensions once again rise across the Middle East, one question continues to perplex policymakers and military planners alike: how is Iran—battered by decades of sanctions, politically isolated, economically strained, and militarily degraded—still able to stand firm against the combined might of Israel and the United States?
The imbalance on paper appears overwhelming. Israel demonstrated complete air superiority during the 12-day war in June 2025, flying unchallenged across Iranian airspace. Iran’s aging air force proved ineffective, and its air defense network was systematically dismantled in precision Israeli strikes. Senior Iranian commanders were killed in targeted operations, weakening the country’s military leadership. Tehran’s regional proxy network—Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen—has been significantly degraded. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, long a crucial ally, is now in exile in Russia. Moscow itself is consumed by the war in Ukraine. China, while supportive diplomatically and economically, has shown no indication of direct military involvement.
At home, Iran’s currency has collapsed, inflation is soaring, and internal dissent poses a serious challenge to the regime’s authority. Israeli officials argue that Tehran is at its weakest point in decades and potentially vulnerable to a regime-change operation backed by external force.
Opposing Iran is not only Israel—the region’s most capable military power—but also the global superpower, the United States. Washington maintains nearly 18 military bases in the broader region and has deployed more than 40,000 troops. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, advanced fighter aircraft, guided missile destroyers, and sophisticated air defense systems have been rushed into theater. Regional allies—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and Bahrain—are aligned strategically with Washington.
And yet, despite this lopsided balance, many military experts are warning against any American misadventure.
William Hartung, Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, cautioned that Iran could become “another Iraq War” for Washington.
“It’s reminiscent of the beginning of the Iraq War, when they said it’s going to be a cakewalk,” Hartung said. “It’s not going to cost anything. A couple of trillion dollars, hundreds of thousands of casualties, many U.S. veterans coming home with PTSD, a regime that was sectarian that paved the way for ISIS — it couldn’t have gone worse. This is a different beginning, but the end is uncertain, and I don’t think we want to go there.”
Hungarian security analyst Georg Spöttle similarly warned that Washington might opt for a limited “warning airstrike,” but a prolonged war would be politically untenable for the American public.
So why does Iran, despite its visible weaknesses, remain such a formidable deterrent?
The answer lies in geography, asymmetric warfare, missile power, and the strategic chokepoints that define the region’s energy lifelines.
Iran’s most powerful asset is not an aircraft carrier or stealth fighter—it is geography.
The country sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption transits through this narrow waterway. The economies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and beyond depend on uninterrupted access to Hormuz for energy exports.
In the event of full-scale conflict, Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait. Such a move would not require a conventional naval battle. Instead, Tehran could deploy submarine mines, coastal anti-ship cruise missiles, shore-based rocket systems, drones, mini-submarines, and swarms of fast-attack boats.
Even a temporary disruption would send global oil prices soaring and destabilize financial markets worldwide.
This vulnerability explains why many Gulf states—despite their quiet strategic alignment with Washington—are wary of direct military intervention against Tehran. Their economic survival depends on stability in Hormuz.
Iran could also widen the conflict by destabilizing the Red Sea through its Houthi allies in Yemen. The Houthis have already demonstrated their capacity to disrupt shipping lanes using drones and missiles. A broader regional escalation could entangle global trade routes, raising shipping insurance costs and energy prices, with worldwide repercussions.
If geography is Iran’s shield, missiles are its sword.
Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Estimates prior to the June 2025 war placed Iran’s ballistic missile inventory at between 2,500 and 3,000 missiles. During the 12-day conflict, Tehran launched more than 500 missiles at Israel, with several penetrating Israel’s multilayered air defense systems.
Since then, Iran has accelerated production.
Reports indicate that Tehran replenished its stocks with sodium perchlorate imports from China, a key component in solid rocket fuel. Military analysts say Iran may now be producing hundreds of ballistic missiles per month.
Crucially, Iran has shifted from liquid-fueled systems to solid-fuel designs. This reduces launch preparation time from hours to minutes, complicating preemptive strikes and reducing vulnerability to surveillance. Systems such as the Kheibar Shekan, Shahab-3, Sejjil, and Khorramshahr provide ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers or more—placing Israel and most US regional bases within reach.
Iran also claims to have developed hypersonic-capable systems such as Fattah-1 and Fattah-2, designed with maneuverable warheads to evade missile defenses. While the exact performance characteristics remain debated, the psychological and strategic impact is significant.
Iran’s arsenal also includes cruise missiles and thousands of Shahed-series drones, which have been used extensively by Russia in Ukraine. Drones offer Tehran a cost-effective way to saturate enemy defenses and impose economic costs disproportionate to their price.
Most US bases in the region lie within missile range. In any conflict, Iran could target runways, fuel depots, command centers, and logistical hubs, potentially causing significant casualties and operational disruption.
Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter warned that Iran could “cause devastating damage to U.S. military bases” and carry out attacks that would strain Israel’s resilience.
Iran’s navy is structured around asymmetric doctrine rather than conventional sea control.
It operates through two branches: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). Instead of competing ship-for-ship with the US Navy, Iran emphasizes fast-attack craft, mini-submarines, mines, drones, and coastal missile batteries.
In the confined waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, these tools become potent force multipliers. Swarming tactics using dozens of small, fast boats armed with rockets and anti-ship missiles could overwhelm larger vessels. Mini-submarines, particularly the Ghadir-class, are well-suited for shallow waters and mine-laying operations.
Iran’s submarine fleet, including Kilo-class boats and domestically produced Fateh-class vessels, provides a stealth element capable of launching torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Global Firepower ranks Iran’s navy 37th worldwide, but rankings obscure the unique geography of the Gulf. In narrow chokepoints, even a modest force can impose severe operational risks on a superior navy.
The US experience with the Houthis in 2025 offers a cautionary example. During Operation Rough Rider, Washington sought to suppress Houthi drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping. Despite lacking a formal navy, the Houthis managed to disrupt maritime traffic for months. The operation cost over $1 billion, and the US reportedly lost two F/A-18 jets and seven MQ-9 drones, without decisively neutralizing the threat.
If a non-state actor could impose such costs, planners must assume a far greater challenge from a state actor like Iran.
Beyond hardware and geography lies the political dimension.
A limited Israeli strike might degrade facilities or eliminate leadership targets. But a prolonged US-led campaign could escalate unpredictably. Iran could respond not only with direct missile strikes but also through cyber operations, proxy attacks, and maritime disruption.
American public opinion remains wary after two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The financial and human costs of another Middle Eastern conflict could prove politically unsustainable.
Moreover, even a weakened regime can draw strength from nationalist sentiment during external attack. Military interveantion aimed at regime change may inadvertently consolidate domestic support around the leadership.
Iran does not need parity with the US or Israel to deter them. It needs only to raise the projected cost of war beyond what adversaries are willing to pay.
By combining geography, missile saturation, drone warfare, naval asymmetry, and regional proxy leverage, Tehran has built a deterrence model designed not to win a conventional war but to make one prohibitively expensive.
That reality explains why, despite overwhelming conventional superiority, Washington and its allies proceed with caution.
Iran’s economy may be fragile. Its air force may be obsolete. Its regional network may be weakened. But its strategic position, missile arsenal, and asymmetric capabilities ensure that any conflict would ripple far beyond its borders.
As another potential confrontation looms, the lesson from recent history is clear: wars that appear simple at the outset rarely remain so. In the volatile chessboard of the Middle East, even a cornered power can reshape the board in ways that no superpower can easily control.
