The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has confirmed that China now possesses more nuclear warheads than the United Kingdom and France combined and is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country. This revelation, presented in SIPRI’s latest yearbook released on June 16, underscores an accelerating shift in the global nuclear balance and has triggered alarm bells particularly within the corridors of the U.S. Department of Defense.
At the heart of this geopolitical transformation is the undeniable fact: China has added approximately 100 new nuclear warheads annually since 2023, taking its total count to over 600 warheads as of 2025. This places Beijing not only as a quantitatively growing nuclear power but as a qualitatively evolving one, reshaping the doctrines, deterrence equations, and security calculations of major global powers.
SIPRI’s report notes that China’s current nuclear warhead count stands at 600, with projections of 1,000 by 2030 and as many as 1,500 warheads by 2035—though still fewer than the U.S. (5,177) and Russia (5,459). Yet, it’s not just the numbers but the tempo and opacity of this buildup that most concerns experts.
“Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many ICBMs as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade,” SIPRI said in its statement, while noting that China’s overall stockpile would still be smaller than that of the two leading nuclear powers.
As of January 2025, China had completed or was nearing completion of around 350 ICBM silos spread across six strategic regions — three in its northern deserts and three in its eastern mountainous areas. These silos could host either single-warhead missiles or those equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), drastically increasing China’s nuclear delivery capabilities.
China’s adoption of MIRV technology is a pivotal development. Its older DF-5 ICBMs were recently upgraded with MIRVs, and the newer DF-41 missile, which carries similar technology, has already been deployed.
If each silo is armed with a MIRV-equipped missile carrying three warheads, the total number of warheads deployed via ICBMs alone could exceed 1,200 by the next decade, SIPRI warned.
This rapid evolution is not just limited to land-based systems. According to SIPRI and corroborated by the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report, China is significantly enhancing its triad of nuclear delivery platforms — land-based missiles, sea-launched missiles, and strategic bombers.
Beijing’s Type 094 SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) are being refitted with longer-range missiles, while the next-generation Type 096 SSBN, capable of launching MIRV-equipped missiles, is reportedly under development. However, its construction timeline has been delayed from early to mid-2020s, and it is now expected to enter service in the late 2020s or early 2030s.
The Pentagon also highlighted China’s DF-27 missile, potentially carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, as a new development that could complicate global missile defense systems. Although the PLA Rocket Force has reportedly begun deploying this weapon, full deployment remains unconfirmed.
Meanwhile, China’s recent revelation of the DF-5’s capabilities via state broadcaster CCTV — a missile with a 12,000 km range and a yield up to 4 megatons — offered a rare glimpse into the destructive potential within China’s expanding arsenal. The broadcast marked a rare public disclosure of specifications typically shrouded in secrecy, indicating either a confidence in or a strategic messaging effort surrounding China’s nuclear posture.
The question naturally arises: How can China support such a large-scale nuclear expansion?
A study by Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, titled “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025”, explores the crucial role of fissile materials. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, China had 14 metric tonnes of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and 2.9 tonnes of separated plutonium available for weapons use as of 2023.
This inventory, experts suggest, is sufficient to support an arsenal of roughly 1,000 warheads. But going beyond that will require increased production. China, reportedly, is already moving in that direction.
The Pentagon reported that two new centrifuge enrichment plants, one in Emeishan and the other in Lanzhou, began operations in 2023. These facilities, designed for the enrichment of uranium and the production of tritium (used to boost nuclear weapon yields), signal Beijing’s intention to sustain and possibly accelerate its arsenal expansion well into the next decade.
In public statements, China continues to assert a defensive nuclear doctrine. The country’s official position, reiterated by the Foreign Ministry on the same day SIPRI released its yearbook, is as follows:
“China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.”
Yet this proclaimed “minimum deterrence” strategy is increasingly at odds with the facts on the ground. Analysts argue that China has never clearly defined what constitutes a ‘minimum’ nuclear capability, leaving its doctrine open to broad interpretation.
Kristensen argues that under Xi Jinping, China has abandoned its previously modest approach to nuclear arms. “They will still call what they have minimal deterrence, no matter the number,” he says. “But it’s clearly very different from what they had in the past.”
This sentiment is echoed by the Pentagon, which notes that China’s nuclear strategy “probably includes” a first-use option under specific scenarios — particularly if its nuclear forces or command-and-control structures are targeted by conventional means.
This is a key departure from the traditional “no first use” doctrine and introduces significant strategic ambiguity into China’s nuclear policy.
The issue of China’s nuclear signaling has become a growing concern. In 2023, Beijing conducted a missile test from Hainan Island into the South Pacific, landing within the nuclear-weapons-free zone of French Polynesia — in direct contradiction to its stated policies.
Such incidents raise questions not only about doctrinal consistency but about strategic intent. Is China posturing for deterrence, or preparing for eventual parity and possible coercive leverage?
“There is a growing uncertainty and ambiguity about what circumstances could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by China,” said an unnamed senior U.S. defense analyst. “And that is what is deeply worrying.”
The implications of China’s expanding nuclear arsenal are profound.
For the United States, it challenges the long-standing assumption that it could maintain nuclear superiority over China while focusing deterrence on Russia.
For India, China’s rise compels a reassessment of its own nuclear posture and deterrence dynamics in South Asia.
For NATO and Europe, the growing reach of Chinese ICBMs, such as the DF-5, brings new geographies within range.
And for non-nuclear states, the trend represents a weakening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as one of the world’s five NPT-recognized nuclear powers appears to be discarding restraint.
Strategic scholars are now debating whether China’s expansion is offensive or reactive. Some argue it is a response to U.S. missile defenses and developments in space-based warfare. Others say it reflects a long-term goal of achieving nuclear peer status with the U.S. and Russia.
SIPRI’s yearbook, in its balanced analysis, avoids assigning motive. But its language is unambiguous: “China is in the middle of a significant modernisation and expansion of its nuclear arsenal.”
While the Cold War was defined by a clear bipolar nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the emerging nuclear landscape is far more fragmented, asymmetric, and opaque. China’s ascent as a nuclear power is a defining characteristic of this new era.
What makes China’s nuclear rise uniquely challenging is not merely the pace or scope of its arsenal growth, but the deliberate uncertainty surrounding its doctrine, thresholds, and intentions. This opacity hinders the formation of stable deterrence dynamics and increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation, especially in a crisis.
As Kristensen puts it, “We are seeing a new China — not just economically and politically, but militarily and strategically. And the world must adapt to that reality with open eyes and a clear understanding of the stakes.”
