China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is being driven by President Xi Jinping to undergo its most radical transformation since its founding, shifting from a manpower-heavy force toward what Chinese leaders describe as “new quality combat forces” built around high technology, joint operations, and “intelligentized warfare.”
At the core of Xi’s vision is the ambition to turn the PLA into a world-class military by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. The strategy aims to replace numerical strength with technological superiority, emphasizing artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and space capabilities, advanced command-and-control systems, and next-generation weaponry designed to dominate future conflicts.
In recent months, authoritative Chinese policy documents and commentaries have proliferated around the concept of “new quality combat forces,” reflecting a concerted effort by the Chinese leadership to give doctrinal clarity to the sweeping reforms. According to Arran Hope of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, these writings signal a decisive shift in how Beijing conceptualizes warfare, moving away from platform-centric thinking toward system-level competition enabled by emerging technologies.
The term entered official usage in 2024, when Xi ordered the disbandment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF), a powerful but opaque organization responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions. In its place, the PLA established a set of specialized forces collectively referred to as “new quality combat forces,” a move that initially generated speculation and confusion. Recent official explanations, however, suggest that the restructuring was intended to streamline command, reduce bureaucratic friction, and better integrate advanced technologies into joint operations.
The overhaul has produced what analysts describe as a “4+4” structure. Alongside the PLA’s four traditional services—the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—are four specialized arms placed directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC), which Xi chairs.
These new arms are designed to function as the PLA’s enabling backbone, often described in Chinese writings as the “nervous system,” “eyes and ears,” and “cyber shield” supporting the traditional combat forces, which are portrayed as the PLA’s “fists.”
The first of these is the Information Support Force (ISF), which has emerged as the military’s central node for networked warfare. Its role is to coordinate the construction, integration, and protection of network information systems across all theater commands, ensuring seamless command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Xi has repeatedly emphasized the strategic importance of the ISF, urging it to maintain information superiority and support joint operations to achieve what he calls “joint victory.” In official language, this requires smooth information transmission, deep integration of information resources, and the ability to deliver precise and effective information support across all domains of warfare.
The ISF’s prominence was on display during China’s massive military parade on September 3, marking the 80th anniversary of victory in the war against Japanese aggression and the global fight against fascism. The force showcased network-cloud-equipped vehicles, digital intelligence platforms, space-ground networking systems, and information integration vehicles, all designed to rapidly establish battlefield networks in support of joint operations.
The second specialized arm is the Cyberspace Force (CSF), responsible for both offensive and defensive cyber operations. Often described as the PLA’s “shield,” the CSF’s mandate spans electronic warfare, psychological operations, and the detection and neutralization of cyber intrusions. Safeguarding what Beijing terms “cyber sovereignty” is a central mission, reflecting China’s belief that cyberspace is now a core domain of national security competition.
The third is the Aerospace Force (ASF), which manages China’s military space capabilities. Acting as the PLA’s “eyes and ears,” it oversees satellite navigation, communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while also developing counter-space capabilities intended to disrupt adversary systems. Chinese writings stress the need to enhance China’s ability to “enter, exit, and openly use space,” underscoring the PLA’s view of space as both a strategic high ground and a contested battlefield.
The fourth arm, the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), is tasked with ensuring unified logistics support across China’s five theater commands. This includes the supply of equipment, fuel, ammunition, and medical services, an area long recognized by Chinese military planners as a critical weakness in joint operations.
All four forces are classified at the “deputy theater command leader” level, placing them just below theater commands in the PLA hierarchy. This status is intended to allow theater commanders quicker access to specialized capabilities, reducing delays caused by layered bureaucratic processes.
Beyond organizational reform, the “new quality” concept is tightly linked to China’s push toward “intelligentized warfare,” a term used to describe combat dominated by AI-enabled systems, autonomous platforms, and data-driven decision-making.
Xi has set ambitious timelines. By 2027, the PLA is expected to achieve a major leap in combat readiness and modernization, integrating mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. Chinese military writings envision a force equipped with unmanned systems, robotic ground platforms, sixth-generation fighter aircraft, hypersonic weapons, and advanced missile systems.
Arran Hope notes that recent articles in the People’s Daily frame these developments in sweeping theoretical language, describing an “acceleration of decision-making from ‘carbon-based’ to ‘silicon-based’ systems.” Chinese authors argue that command processes are evolving from human-centered models toward increasingly automated and, eventually, “human-out-of-the-loop” decision-making.
In this vision, AI-powered weapon systems are no longer mere tools but “intelligent nodes” within a larger operational network. These systems are expected to intersect with fields such as neuroscience, human-machine interfaces, bionic robotics, and smart munitions. Algorithms are seen as central to future warfare, embedded at every stage of the kill chain to enable rapid decision-making and, in Chinese formulations, “victory before the battle begins.”
Chinese military thinkers also argue that emerging technologies are expanding the battlespace into new frontiers, including the deep sea, outer space, cyberspace, and the cognitive domain. Phenomena such as deepfakes, information silos, and cognitive manipulation are increasingly treated as operational challenges alongside traditional kinetic threats.
A notable theme in recent Chinese discourse is the shift from “weaponry competition” to “system confrontation.” Chinese strategists argue that future wars will be contests between national systems, requiring seamless coordination between military, economic, technological, and industrial resources.
Xi has encapsulated this idea by calling for the “efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of new quality productive forces and new quality combat forces.” In practice, this means deepening civil-military fusion, harmonizing civilian and military standards, and ensuring that major infrastructure projects incorporate national defense requirements from the outset.
Chinese experts interpret this as an effort to mobilize the full power of the state behind national objectives, strengthening unity between the military and the Communist Party, as well as between the armed forces and society at large.
Despite the ambitious vision, Chinese military analysts acknowledge significant obstacles. Official writings concede the existence of “technical gaps and capability weaknesses” compared to Western militaries, alongside structural and systemic challenges within the PLA.
Personnel issues remain a particular concern. General Zhang Youxia, the first-ranked vice chairman of the CMC, has publicly warned about “entrenched evils,” “harmful influences,” and “two-faced individuals” within the ranks, language widely interpreted as a reference to corruption and disloyalty.
Corruption has been a persistent problem in the PLA, prompting repeated purges under Xi’s leadership. Senior officers, including Rocket Force commanders and even CMC members, have been removed for graft linked to promotions, procurement, and logistics. Investigations have revealed alarming failures, including reports of faulty missile systems and non-functional silo infrastructure, raising questions about the real readiness of some units.
The CMC itself has shrunk to its smallest size in decades, with key posts reportedly left vacant following high-profile dismissals. While Xi has portrayed the anti-corruption drive as essential to combat effectiveness, critics argue that the concentration of decision-making power and strict party discipline may undermine initiative and flexibility—qualities often associated with modern mission command.
As China presses ahead with its drive toward “new quality combat forces,” the gap between ambition and execution remains a central question. The reforms underscore Beijing’s determination to reshape the PLA for future wars, but they also expose the internal tensions and institutional hurdles that could shape China’s military trajectory in the years ahead.
