The war in Ukraine has reshaped modern warfare, not with flashy hypersonics or stealth bombers—but with something far less glamorous: low-cost, low-speed aerial drones. One-Way Attack (OWA) drones, also known as loitering munitions or kamikaze drones, have become a central feature in the evolving battlefield. They’re simple, deadly, and now, ubiquitous.
While the United States, Russia, and China have long invested in drone technologies, Ukraine has shown the world that these systems don’t have to be sophisticated to be effective. Stripped-down, commercially-derived aircraft are being used to devastating effect. Their low cost and long range make them ideal weapons for saturation attacks, capable of striking deep into enemy territory, sometimes over 1,000 kilometers away. And with Russia and Ukraine deploying them in vast numbers—especially during the recent wave of strikes known as Operation Sindoor—India is beginning to ask an unavoidable question: Are we prepared?
OWA drones are a new kind of air threat. They typically fly at altitudes low enough to evade radar and bypass conventional air defense systems. Unlike traditional military UAVs, these drones are designed for one-way missions. Once launched, they don’t return. Their job is simple: reach a target and detonate.
They’re inexpensive to manufacture, thanks to their use of low-speed, low-durability components—often scavenged from commercially available hobbyist aircraft or adapted from light sport planes. They aren’t fast or maneuverable, but they don’t need to be. Their lethality lies in their volume and reach. A swarm of them can easily overload traditional point-defense systems. And intercepting them with expensive long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) makes little sense economically. A $30,000 drone shot down by a $3 million missile is a losing proposition, especially if hundreds more are coming.
This dynamic has shifted the cost-benefit equation of air defense. The biggest gap now lies in countering these drones effectively without bankrupting your arsenal.
To deal with the drone threat, Ukraine has tried using fast-mover aircraft like the F-16 and Mirage 2000, supplied by NATO. These fighter jets carry a large payload of air-to-air missiles, and while the cost per missile is still significant, it’s far lower than a long-range SAM. The strategy has had some success—but not without cost.
Reports suggest Ukraine has lost at least two to three F-16s while intercepting drones. These aircraft weren’t lost in dogfights with other fighters. They were lost trying to hunt slow, low-flying, radar-evading drones. Why? Because modern fighter aircraft are not optimized for such missions. Their radars are tuned for high-speed, high-altitude targets. Chasing a lawnmower-sized drone at 300 feet AGL (Above Ground Level) is both technically challenging and operationally risky. Pilots must fly low and slow—conditions that make them easy prey for enemy MANPADS or hidden anti-aircraft guns.
Adding to the challenge is how drones like Russia’s Geran-2 (a variant of Iran’s Shahed-136) have evolved. The latest iterations are equipped with more powerful engines and can now fly at altitudes up to 3 km, out of reach of many mobile fire teams. But when needed, they drop as low as 50 meters to slip past radar. During final approach, they can dive at speeds of 400 km/h, overwhelming point defenses in seconds.
While both Ukraine and Russia use helicopters and retrofitted light aircraft to patrol for drones—particularly at night—Russia has gone a step further. In a move that may set the global trend, a Russian experimental aircraft design bureau has revealed a reimagined Yak-52—an aerobatic trainer turned counter-drone interceptor.
The Yak-52B2, based on the original Soviet-era sport plane, is tailored for drone hunting. It mounts radar and a semi-automatic carbine, has a weapon aiming system, and carries modern avionics for all-weather operations. Each wing can carry a 90 kg payload, allowing for modular mission configurations. One wing features a 360-degree radar. The other, currently, is fitted with light weapons—though future variants could carry MANPADS, laser-guided rockets, or airburst munitions.
It’s not just about the platform. It’s about the operational logic: low-speed, low-altitude patrols in drone ingress corridors, using inexpensive, manned aircraft to visually detect and destroy small drones in bulk. This approach is already being mirrored on both sides of the Ukraine war. Ukraine flies L-39 jets, Mi-24 helicopters, and even agricultural planes rigged with night vision systems. Russia does the same with Ka-52s, Su-25s, and hobbyist aircraft carrying improvised weaponry.
India faces its own unique threat landscape, particularly along its northern and western borders. Drones have already played a role in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Pakistan-based non-state actors have used commercial drones for surveillance and cross-border payload drops. But the real wake-up call came from Ukraine.
The scale and persistence of OWA drone strikes there have exposed a fundamental vulnerability in modern air defense architectures. If hundreds of drones were launched across India’s borders simultaneously, could the existing Akash, SPYDER, or Barak-8 systems handle the load—without depleting high-value missile stocks?
India needs a layered, cost-effective counter-drone strategy. This must include jammers, directed energy weapons, ground-based air defense, and increasingly—manned aerial platforms.
India already has a potential answer sitting in its hangars: the HAL HTT-40.
Originally developed as a basic trainer aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the HTT-40 could evolve into a dedicated counter-drone aircraft. It checks many of the boxes: it’s slow, stable, maneuverable, and aerobatic. It can fly low and loiter for extended periods. And most importantly—it’s indigenous, cost-effective, and already in production.
In March 2023, India’s Ministry of Defence inked a deal with HAL for 70 HTT-40 aircraft, with deliveries spread over six years. The aircraft is powered by a Honeywell TPE331 turboprop engine, has modern avionics, and includes features like hot refueling and zero-zero ejection seats. While initially intended to address India’s trainer shortage, its performance characteristics make it an ideal candidate for repurposing.
With relatively minor upgrades—modular weapon pylons, lightweight radar systems, night vision integration, and hardpoints for electro-optical pods—the HTT-40 could transform into a platform similar to the Yak-52B2. A low-cost, homegrown drone interceptor.
This isn’t just a tactical question. It’s strategic. In any future conflict, the ability to keep India’s energy infrastructure, command centers, and logistics hubs safe from drone swarms will determine operational tempo and public morale.
Long-range drones could be launched from deep inside adversary territory, or even covertly from maritime platforms. Their targets could include oil depots, forward airbases, mobile radar stations, and civilian infrastructure. With their low signatures and cheap price tags, defending against them becomes a quantity-over-quality game. And that’s where manned slow-speed interceptors shine.
They can be rapidly deployed, carry inexpensive munitions (such as 12-gauge shotguns, autocannons, or MANPADS), and be operated by squadrons trained in visual and sensor-based detection of drones. Their endurance and adaptability give them a flexibility no SAM system can match.
A full-spectrum counter-drone architecture must be layered, scalable, and adaptable. India has already invested in radar-augmented fencing systems, jammers, directed energy weapons, and loitering munitions. But the absence of a manned counter-drone aircraft is a glaring gap.
Repurposing the HTT-40 provides a near-term, indigenous solution. It would give India the ability to field squadrons of drone hunters within 3–5 years, with costs far lower than buying new fighter aircraft or building new missile systems.
HAL can lead the transformation by equipping a prototype HTT-40 with sensors, optics, and lightweight weapons. Testing should begin in drone-heavy environments like Rajasthan and Punjab, where the terrain and proximity to international borders provide a realistic threat profile.
Eventually, the Indian Air Force could stand up dedicated Counter-UAV Squadrons, trained specifically to track, identify, and destroy incoming drones—day or night.
The Ukraine war is a live laboratory of 21st-century warfare, and its lessons are brutally clear. Drones have democratized precision strike capability. Defending against them using traditional air defense is neither efficient nor sustainable.
India can choose to learn now—or pay later.
The HTT-40 offers a chance to get ahead of the curve. Not just with a counter-drone aircraft, but with an entirely new doctrine of air defense. In a world of emerging threats, that kind of foresight could make all the difference.
