In a powerful demonstration of growing geopolitical alignment, Myanmar’s military government has publicly expressed gratitude to Russia for a new arsenal of advanced fighter jets and military hardware, signaling a deeper and more strategic partnership between the two sanctioned regimes.
Speaking to Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of Russia’s Ministry of Defense, Myanmar’s Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, thanked Russia for its delivery of Su-30SME fighter jets and attack helicopters.
“Myanmar’s army has received Russian-made fighter jets and attack helicopters, and I would like to express my gratitude to Russia and its Armed Forces for them,” said Min Aung Hlaing. “The Su-30, a multifunctional, high-performance, fourth-generation fighter jet produced in Russia, is an important type of combat aircraft that will play a key role in strengthening our air capabilities.”
The Myanmar Air Force completed its acquisition of six Su-30SME jets in late 2024, under a 2018 arms deal reportedly worth $400 million, financed through a Russian loan. The final two aircraft were officially commissioned at Meiktila Air Base in Mandalay on December 15, 2024, in a ceremony that signaled not just military readiness but also diplomatic allegiance.
These Su-30SMEs—twin-seater, twin-engine multirole fighters—will now serve as Myanmar’s primary combat aircraft, strategically positioned at Naypyidaw Air Base. Their range and capabilities allow for effective aerial coverage of Myanmar’s full territory, according to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin.
Their deployment comes at a crucial moment for the junta, which has relied heavily on air superiority to suppress a multi-front rebellion from pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organizations that have intensified since the February 2021 military coup.
The Su-30SMEs were acquired amid growing dissatisfaction within the Myanmar military over its Chinese-made JF-17 Thunder jets, which have reportedly faced operational issues. Analysts believe the pivot toward Russia underscores a broader strategic shift, with Myanmar hedging its long-standing dependence on China by bringing in Moscow as a key partner.
“Operational readiness and maintenance issues with the JF-17 have plagued the Myanmar Air Force for years,” says a Southeast Asian defense analyst who requested anonymity. “The Su-30SMEs represent not just an upgrade in capability but also a vote of confidence in Russian military engineering.”
Russia’s support has become indispensable to Myanmar’s embattled military, especially as it confronts mounting resistance on the ground. After suffering heavy territorial losses during a coordinated rebel offensive in late 2023, the junta has increasingly relied on airstrikes to regain control—a strategy enabled largely by Russian aircraft and weapons systems.
Min Aung Hlaing’s open praise of Russian support marks a growing alignment that extends well beyond arms.
In March 2025, the Myanmar junta chief visited Moscow and met Russian President Vladimir Putin, who welcomed him warmly at the Kremlin and hailed their “steadily developing” bilateral relationship.
“We have great potential,” Putin told Min Aung Hlaing during the televised meeting. The Russian leader highlighted plans for deeper trade and investment, most notably a project to build a nuclear power plant in Myanmar.
On that visit, Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding with Myanmar’s Ministry of Science and Technology to explore building a modular nuclear power station with a capacity of 110 megawatts, expandable to 330 megawatts.
Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev told Russian television that Myanmar was interested in locating the facility near the capital, Naypyidaw. The plant would provide “cheap and ecologically safe energy,” Putin said, and is expected to create thousands of jobs while reducing Myanmar’s dependence on fossil fuels.
This development is the latest in a series of economic and technological tie-ups since the two countries signed an initial agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2023.
Myanmar and Russia are united by their pariah status on the global stage. Both are under sweeping Western sanctions—Myanmar for its 2021 coup and ongoing brutal crackdown on dissent, and Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In their respective isolation, the two regimes have found common cause in opposing Western-led international norms, expanding bilateral trade, and deepening military and political ties.
Russia now supplies nearly 90% of Myanmar’s oil imports, making it a critical energy partner for the junta. The oil, reportedly sold at a discount, helps Myanmar mitigate the effects of sanctions and chronic fuel shortages that have paralyzed its economy.
Meanwhile, Myanmar’s defense orders provide Russia with much-needed export revenue for its military-industrial complex, which has been hurt by sanctions and battlefield losses in Ukraine.
While China remains Myanmar’s largest trading partner and a significant arms supplier, the generals in Naypyidaw appear keen to avoid over-dependence on Beijing. Despite shared interests, China’s ties to various ethnic armed groups operating along the Myanmar-China border—particularly in Shan and Kachin states—have long complicated the relationship.
Beijing’s support for the junta is strategic and cautious. In public, Chinese leaders emphasize “non-interference” and “mutual respect.” In private, China is believed to be pressuring the junta to stabilize its border regions, which are critical to the success of its Belt and Road Initiative.
In a rare high-level meeting reported by Myanmar state media, Min Aung Hlaing met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow on the sidelines of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in May 2025. The general thanked Xi for China’s humanitarian aid following a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake in March and for Beijing’s continued diplomatic support.
Chinese state media quoted Xi as reiterating China’s commitment to “Myanmar’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national stability,” but also emphasized the need to “combat cross-border crimes” and “ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and projects.”
Meanwhile, inside Myanmar, the situation remains dire. Since the military seized power, over 6,600 people have been killed and millions displaced, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a watchdog group based in Thailand.
Entire regions have become ungovernable. Armed ethnic groups, such as the Arakan Army, the Karen National Union, and the Kachin Independence Army, have taken control of significant territories. These forces have often allied with the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), grassroots militias formed in response to the coup.
The junta’s air force—now more lethal thanks to Russian aircraft—has been accused of indiscriminate bombings that have hit schools, hospitals, and refugee camps. Human rights groups have called for an international arms embargo and warned that continued weapons transfers from Russia amount to complicity in war crimes.
The International Criminal Court has been pursuing Min Aung Hlaing and other senior officials for alleged crimes against humanity. However, geopolitical dynamics and the shielding power of allies like Russia and China have so far blunted international accountability.
With Myanmar descending further into civil war and its military increasingly isolated from the international community, the strategic partnership with Russia may be both a lifeline and a liability.
“Russia is giving the junta the tools to survive militarily, but not to govern or win hearts and minds,” says Dr. Aye Chan, a Myanmar scholar in exile. “This is a regime propped up by air power and foreign patronage, not legitimacy.”
As the conflict escalates and Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis deepens, the alliance with Russia will likely come under greater scrutiny. Yet for now, with Su-30s roaring overhead and Rosatom engineers mapping future nuclear grids, the junta shows no sign of changing course.
