Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted a barrage of international sanctions, the Kremlin’s military-industrial machine is not only intact—it’s thriving. In a jarring assessment published May 25 by The Economist, intelligence sources revealed that Russia is producing up to 100 Shahed kamikaze drones per day. The report, backed by Ukrainian Military Intelligence and cited by the Institute for the Study of War, states that Russia may even push daily output to an astonishing 500 drones. This comes as Russia unleashed the largest drone assault of the war on May 25, launching a record-breaking 298 Shahed drones against Ukrainian cities.
These figures contradict the central goal of Western sanctions: to paralyze Russia’s ability to wage prolonged warfare by targeting its access to military technology, finance, and global supply chains. Yet, the flames consuming Ukrainian cities this week suggest otherwise.
On May 24 and 25, Russian forces pounded Ukraine with a combination of drones and ballistic missiles in what was described as the most intense aerial bombardment since the war began in February 2022. Ukraine’s air defense network—strained by attrition, delayed Western support, and technological gaps—struggled to repel the onslaught.
The most concerning development, according to Ukrainian Air Defense Forces, is the use of upgraded Russian ballistic missiles with quasi-ballistic flight patterns and radar decoys. These are difficult to intercept and capable of evading older air defense systems. While some missiles and drones were shot down, a significant number reached their targets, leading to civilian casualties and widespread infrastructure damage.
Colonel Denys Smazhnyi, a spokesperson for Ukrainian Air Defense, emphasized that the latest Shahed drones employ advanced flight tactics. They now fly at low altitudes before climbing steeply to 2,000–2,500 meters upon reaching urban areas, where they’re out of reach for many short-range defenses. This tactical evolution forces Ukraine to deploy increasingly scarce interceptor drones, helicopters, and fighter aircraft like the F-16 to counter them.
The evolution of the Shahed drone is emblematic of Russia’s resilience under pressure. Ukrainian engineers inspecting drone debris have discovered significant upgrades, including new navigation systems that no longer rely on GPS—rendering them immune to electronic jamming. These drones are reportedly guided via AI-assisted algorithms and data relays over Ukraine’s mobile internet networks.
One disassembled drone reportedly contained a cryptic message in Russian: “New control algorithm installed. Guided via Telegram bot.” This revelation—possibly left by a Russian engineer sympathetic to Ukraine—implies that the drones may be directed in real-time using publicly available software.
Colonel Yuriy Ihnat of the Ukrainian Air Force confirmed that Russia is also producing decoy drones in increasing numbers. Additionally, it has resumed heavy use of Kh-22 cruise missiles, previously scaled back due to supply limitations. Analysts interpret this as proof that Russia has successfully ramped up missile production, neutralizing what had once been a key vulnerability.
The cornerstone of Western strategy post-2022 invasion was an economic squeeze. The EU, U.S., UK, and others targeted hundreds of Russian entities and individuals, froze central bank reserves, cut Moscow off from SWIFT, and restricted access to dual-use technologies. However, recent reports show that Russia’s Shahed drone production—once estimated at 300 per month—is now surpassing that in just three days.
The shift began in early 2023 when Russia inked a $1.75 billion agreement with Iran to locally manufacture Shahed drones. The primary production hub is the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. CNN’s investigation in late 2024 revealed that the facility produced 5,760 drones in the first nine months of that year—double the output of 2023. Alabuga has since reportedly met its contractual obligation to deliver 6,000 drones by September 2025, well ahead of schedule.
The plant’s expansion has been aided by leaked documents showing active cooperation with over 30 Chinese firms, supplying everything from industrial machines to raw materials. These companies reportedly signed contracts totaling more than 700 million yuan (roughly $96 million). While China denies facilitating Russian military production, Ukrainian and Western intelligence say otherwise.
Oleh Ivashchenko, head of Ukraine’s foreign intelligence, accused China on May 26 of providing critical materials to about 20 Russian defense factories. This includes chemicals, gunpowder, and manufacturing equipment—essential elements for sustaining drone and missile production.
Russia’s ability to circumvent sanctions extends beyond official Chinese support. A shadow network of intermediaries and third-party nations helps Moscow acquire dual-use goods from Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere. Many of these components are indistinguishable from civilian electronics and appliances, making enforcement extremely difficult.
Ukrainian forensic labs like the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise have identified various electronic parts sourced from Western countries in Russian drones and missiles. Even though these parts are often bought at significantly inflated prices, the Kremlin seems willing to absorb the cost.
This adaptation strategy demonstrates the limited success of sanctions in degrading Russia’s capacity to wage war. As Ukrainian lawmaker Kira Rudik pointedly remarked on social media: “The fact that Russia can manufacture drones and missiles 3 years into the full-scale war proves the failure of sanctions execution.”
The shocking effectiveness of Russia’s drone campaign has reignited calls for more decisive Western action. President Volodymyr Zelensky, speaking after the May 25 attacks, condemned the drone strikes as “mass murder” and reiterated his plea for F-16 fighter jets and advanced missile systems.
Germany, France, the UK, and the U.S. recently agreed to lift some restrictions on the range of weapons supplied to Ukraine, allowing limited strikes into Russian territory. The Kremlin has labeled this a “dangerous escalation.” Still, Kyiv insists it needs more proactive support, especially against drones that can be launched from hundreds of kilometers away.
Meanwhile, former U.S. President Donald Trump weighed in, calling Vladimir Putin “absolutely CRAZY” but simultaneously chastised Zelensky for his tone. Trump previously claimed he could end the war in 24 hours if reelected—a claim met with skepticism.
The failure to effectively disrupt Russia’s drone production underscores a deeper strategic flaw: sanctions without enforcement and adaptability do little to curb a determined adversary. By relying on a Soviet-style industrial model—where oligarch-run factories execute state-directed goals—Russia has managed to maintain and even expand its warfighting capabilities.
What was intended as a stranglehold has become a stress test Russia is increasingly passing. This reality compels a reevaluation of not only sanction policies but the broader geopolitical assumptions that underpinned them.
