When U.S. President Donald Trump floated the idea of reclaiming Afghanistan’s Bagram air base last week, it instantly reignited debates about America’s fraught military history in the region, the future of U.S.–Taliban relations, and China’s growing role in Central Asia. Within 24 hours, both Beijing and Kabul dismissed Trump’s remarks in unison: Afghanistan declared that foreign troops would never again be welcome on its soil, and China warned against new geopolitical fault lines being drawn near its western frontier.
At stake is not just a dormant air base but a broader question of whether Afghanistan, four years after the U.S. withdrawal, is at risk of once again becoming a chessboard for great-power rivalry.
Speaking alongside British Prime Minister Keir Starmer during a state visit to the UK, Trump claimed his administration was in discussions to “get Bagram back.” His rationale was blunt: proximity to China’s nuclear facilities.
“We’re trying to get the base because of where it is,” Trump said at the joint press conference. “It’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons. It’s a location that should never have been given up.”
The remarks came as part of Trump’s larger pitch that America needed to reclaim strategic ground it had lost under previous administrations. He described Bagram as a missed opportunity, criticizing the Biden-era withdrawal in 2021 as “reckless.”
But the idea of returning to Afghanistan’s most notorious military installation landed like a thunderclap in Kabul and Beijing.
Bagram air base, situated 25 miles north of Kabul, is etched into the history of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Originally built in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, it became America’s main hub after the 2001 invasion. At its peak, Bagram housed tens of thousands of troops, aircraft hangars, intelligence facilities, and even a notorious detention center.
For Afghans, the base was both a reminder of foreign occupation and a target of insurgent attacks. In July 2021, as the Biden administration prepared its final withdrawal, U.S. troops abruptly abandoned Bagram overnight, cutting power and leaving behind equipment. The base was looted within hours. By August, the Taliban had swept into Kabul, reclaiming the country after two decades of war.
That history casts a long shadow over Trump’s proposal. To Afghans, the idea of reopening Bagram under U.S. control is not a technical question of logistics but an existential issue of sovereignty.
The Taliban government wasted no time in rebuffing Trump. Zakir Jalal, a senior Taliban official, posted a pointed statement on X (formerly Twitter):
“Afghanistan and America need to engage with each other and can have economic and political relations based on mutual respect and common benefits, without America having military presence in any part of Afghanistan. Military presence has never been accepted by Afghans in history.”
Jalal invoked the Doha Agreement of 2020, negotiated between the Taliban and the Trump administration itself, which laid the groundwork for the U.S. withdrawal. Under that deal, the Taliban promised not to harbor terrorist groups targeting the West, while Washington agreed to end its military footprint.
“The possibility [of U.S. military presence] was completely rejected during the Doha talks,” Jalal emphasized. “But doors to other engagements have been opened.”
The Taliban’s message was clear: economic ties, yes; intelligence cooperation, maybe; but military bases, never again.
Beijing’s response was equally swift, and notably sharp. At a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China opposed “stirring up tension and confrontation in the region.”
“China respects Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” Lin declared. “Afghanistan’s future should rest in the hands of the Afghan people.”
The subtext was unmistakable. For China, the prospect of U.S. forces returning to its western periphery is alarming. Bagram lies just a short flight from Xinjiang, where Beijing maintains heavy security amid its campaign against what it calls separatism and extremism. It also sits within the broader Belt and Road Initiative corridor linking China with Central Asia and beyond.
Beijing has cultivated pragmatic ties with the Taliban since 2021, extending diplomatic recognition and investing in Afghan mining and energy projects. China’s strategy hinges on stability—an Afghanistan that is poor but predictable, open to Chinese business, and free of U.S. troops. Trump’s comments, therefore, threatened to upend a fragile balance.
The rejection from Kabul and Beijing underscores a broader truth: Central Asia has become a zone where U.S. influence is shrinking while Chinese and Russian clout is expanding.
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Russia, though bogged down in Ukraine, still maintains bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, projecting itself as a regional security guarantor.
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China has deepened economic stakes in Afghanistan, particularly in copper and oil projects, and views Kabul as part of its larger effort to secure its western flank.
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The Taliban, isolated diplomatically, seeks investment and legitimacy from whoever is willing—primarily China, Russia, and some Gulf states.
For the U.S., regaining Bagram would be a dramatic reversal of fortunes, symbolizing a reassertion of military presence in the heart of Asia. But critics argue it is also unrealistic, given both the Taliban’s stance and the broader geopolitical resistance.
Why then did Trump float the idea? Analysts point to a mix of domestic politics and strategic signaling.
The 2021 withdrawal remains one of the most criticized moments of the Biden presidency, with images of chaotic evacuations from Kabul etched into public memory. By calling for a return to Bagram, Trump not only underscores his disapproval of Biden’s choices but also positions himself as tougher on China—a central theme of his presidency.
“It’s about optics as much as strategy,” said Sarah Collins, a former Pentagon adviser now at the Atlantic Council. “Trump wants to show that he wouldn’t have ‘given away’ Bagram, and that he sees China as the real long-term adversary.”
Yet Collins notes the practical hurdles: “The Taliban is not going to voluntarily host U.S. troops again. Even if some factions were tempted by incentives, the political cost for them domestically would be fatal.”
Trump’s emphasis on China’s nuclear program highlights another layer: the escalating U.S.–China rivalry. The Chinese nuclear arsenal, particularly facilities in Xinjiang and Gansu provinces, has become a focal point of American strategic concern.
Bagram’s proximity gives it theoretical intelligence and strike advantages. But experts caution against overestimating its utility. Modern surveillance satellites, drones, and cyber capabilities make physical bases less critical for monitoring nuclear activities.
“Bagram is symbolically important but strategically outdated,” argued Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center. “The U.S. doesn’t need to be in Afghanistan to keep an eye on China. The real value would be in projecting presence, not actual operations.”
While the Taliban publicly rejected Trump’s proposal, the episode exposes a dilemma for Kabul. On one hand, the Taliban craves international recognition and economic assistance. On the other, any hint of welcoming foreign troops would undermine its legitimacy among Afghans, who fought for decades against foreign occupation.
Privately, some Taliban officials may view limited security cooperation with the U.S. as beneficial, particularly against Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), a rival militant group that has staged deadly attacks in Kabul. But allowing a base like Bagram to be reoccupied is a red line.
For now, the Taliban is signaling that it prefers trade and investment—areas where China is already leading—over military entanglements.
Beijing’s interests in Afghanistan are both economic and security-driven. Chinese companies have signed agreements to extract copper from Mes Aynak, one of the world’s largest deposits, and to explore oil in the Amu Darya basin. Beyond resources, China sees Afghanistan as a potential transit corridor linking Central Asia to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
But stability is paramount. Any U.S. military return would not only threaten Chinese projects but also risk spilling instability into Xinjiang. That is why Beijing was quick to push back against Trump’s remarks, framing them as destabilizing.
While China and the Taliban voiced outright opposition, other countries responded cautiously.
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The UK, hosting Trump when he made the remarks, avoided direct comment, with Starmer saying only that “Afghanistan’s stability is in everyone’s interest.”
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Pakistan, long accused of harboring Taliban leaders, has remained silent but is likely wary of U.S. troops reentering its neighborhood.
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India, which sees both the Taliban and China as adversaries, may privately welcome U.S. re-engagement but is unlikely to say so publicly.
The broader global reaction suggests that Trump’s idea is unlikely to find international support beyond certain hawkish circles in Washington.
Realistically, the obstacles are immense.
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Legal and Political Blockades – The Taliban is the de facto government of Afghanistan. Without its consent, any attempt to seize Bagram would be tantamount to invasion.
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Military Risks – Reoccupying the base would require a large force, risking clashes with Taliban fighters and potentially reigniting a conflict America spent 20 years trying to exit.
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Diplomatic Fallout – Such a move would strain U.S. ties with China, Russia, and even some allies wary of another Middle Eastern entanglement.
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Domestic Costs – After years of “forever wars,” American public opinion remains skeptical of large-scale deployments overseas.
“Reclaiming Bagram is more fantasy than plan,” said Carter Malkasian, a former U.S. military adviser in Afghanistan. “The cost-benefit ratio just doesn’t add up.”
Ultimately, the Bagram episode may be less about actual policy and more about symbolism. For Trump, it is a way to signal toughness on China and differentiate himself from Biden. For the Taliban, rejecting the idea reinforces its legitimacy at home. For China, pushing back underscores its role as a regional powerbroker.
The air base itself, stripped of equipment and looted years ago, is largely a ruin. But as a symbol, it continues to exert outsized influence in global politics.
The controversy raises broader questions:
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Will Afghanistan become a new front in U.S.–China rivalry? Beijing is determined to keep Kabul in its orbit, but Washington may see opportunities to complicate that.
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Can the Taliban balance ties with both China and the U.S.? Kabul may welcome economic aid from Washington but is unlikely to jeopardize Chinese support.
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What role will regional powers play? Russia, Pakistan, and Iran all have stakes in keeping the U.S. out of Central Asia.
For now, the swift rejection from Kabul and Beijing suggests Trump’s proposal is dead on arrival. But it also reveals how fragile the post-2021 order in Afghanistan remains. Even four years after America’s exit, a single remark about Bagram is enough to send ripples across continents.
The clash over Bagram is not just about an abandoned air base. It is about sovereignty, memory, and the reshaping of global power. For Afghans, it is a reminder of decades of foreign troops and the sacrifices made to expel them. For China, it is a warning that U.S. rhetoric could again intrude into its strategic backyard. For America, it is a test of whether lessons from past entanglements have truly been learned.
