The modern battlefield is no longer the exclusive preserve of high-cost platforms such as Rafale fighter jets, S-400 air defence systems, or fifth-generation stealth aircraft like the F-35. Instead, warfare is increasingly shaped by cheap, smart, and expendable systems that place destructive power in the hands of both states and non-state actors alike.
Small drones, loitering munitions, autonomous ground vehicles, and robotic systems have fundamentally altered the cost calculus of war. Assets worth millions of dollars can now be threatened—or destroyed—by systems costing only a few thousand. This inversion of cost and effect is transforming warfare in ways that carry profound and immediate implications for India’s national security.
The shift is structural and irreversible. Cheap weapons have democratised lethality. They reward innovation, mass, and adaptability rather than sheer platform superiority. The lessons emerging from Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea, and the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict converge on a single conclusion: the future battlefield will be crowded, transparent, persistent, and unforgiving.
For India, facing a technologically ambitious China and a militarily adaptive Pakistan, this reality demands urgent recalibration.
For decades, military power rested on capital-intensive platforms. Tanks, fighter aircraft, warships, and missile systems symbolised strength and deterrence. While these platforms remain relevant, they are no longer decisive on their own. The proliferation of low-cost drones has exposed their vulnerabilities in stark terms.
In Ukraine, inexpensive quadcopters have destroyed main battle tanks costing millions. In the Black Sea, naval drones forced a powerful fleet to retreat and reconfigure its posture. In the Middle East, non-state actors have used low-cost aerial systems to strike air bases, ports, and commercial shipping lanes. The monopoly over precision and reach once enjoyed by advanced militaries has eroded.
The strategic implication is unsettling. The barrier to entry for effective military action has fallen sharply. Where once air power and armour were monopolised by states, today a small group equipped with commercial drones, off-the-shelf sensors, and basic AI can disrupt operations, impose costs, and shape narratives. Deterrence can no longer rest solely on the possession of expensive platforms. It must also account for resilience against sustained attrition by cheap systems.
China stands at the forefront of this transformation. Beijing has invested heavily in artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomous warfare, integrating these technologies into its broader military modernisation drive. The Chinese defence industry today produces unmanned aerial vehicles, loitering munitions, robotic ground vehicles, and autonomous logistics systems at scale. Crucially, these systems are designed not only for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also for export.
Pakistan has emerged as a key recipient—and a testing ground. Over the years, China has supplied Islamabad with armed drones, advanced surveillance platforms, and electronic warfare capabilities. The next phase is likely to involve autonomous sentry systems, ground robots, and AI-enabled battlefield management tools.
For Pakistan, these technologies offer an asymmetric means to offset India’s conventional superiority. For China, Pakistan serves as both a strategic partner and a live laboratory for refining concepts under real-world conditions.
The concern for India lies not merely in the technology itself, but in the doctrinal synergy between China and Pakistan. Cheap autonomous systems supplied to Pakistan could be employed along the Line of Control to support infiltration, surveillance, and terror-linked operations. Robotic sensors and automated surveillance can reduce manpower requirements while increasing Pakistan’s capacity for provocation below the nuclear threshold. This creates a persistent grey-zone challenge that is difficult to deter and costly to manage.
Cheap autonomous weapons compress decision-making timelines. Drones provide continuous real-time surveillance. AI-assisted systems process data faster than humans. Swarms overwhelm defences through sheer numbers. The result is a battlefield where concealment is difficult, reaction time is minimal, and mistakes are punished instantly.
For India, the implications span every front. Along the northern borders, small drones can monitor troop movements, identify patrol patterns, and cue artillery or missile strikes. Along the western front, drones can support infiltration, deliver weapons, or conduct precision attacks on military and civilian infrastructure. In the hinterland, non-state actors can use commercial drones for reconnaissance, intimidation, and propaganda.
The psychological impact is equally significant. Persistent aerial presence erodes morale and imposes constant stress. Soldiers and civilians alike operate under near-continuous observation. This fundamentally alters how forces move, concentrate, and fight.
In this environment, the side that adapts faster survives. India’s traditional approach to modernisation has been platform-centric, focused on acquiring high-end aircraft, tanks, and ships. While necessary, this approach is insufficient in the face of the threat posed by cheap weapons. What is required now is a shift toward mass-centric capability—not mass in manpower alone, but mass in sensors, shooters, and decision-making nodes.
India must develop and deploy large numbers of low-cost drones for surveillance, logistics, and strike missions. Infantry units should organically possess drone swarms and counter-drone systems, including portable jammers and electronic warfare tools. Armoured formations must integrate unmanned scouts and decoys. Artillery must be tightly coupled with drone-based targeting.
The objective is not to replace expensive platforms, but to surround them with layers of inexpensive and expendable enablers. This approach complicates enemy planning, increases survivability, and restores deterrence by signalling that India can absorb attrition without strategic paralysis.
Defence against cheap weapons cannot rely on expensive interceptors alone. Shooting down a drone costing a few thousand rupees with a missile worth several crores is economically unsustainable.
India must invest in layered counter-drone architecture. This includes electronic jammers, soft-kill systems, directed-energy weapons, rapid-fire guns, and AI-enabled detection networks that can automatically identify threats and cue responses. Border infrastructure, air bases, ammunition depots, and critical civilian installations require integrated protection.
Equally important is training. Soldiers and internal security forces must learn to operate in a drone-saturated environment. Camouflage, dispersion, deception, and mobility—skills eroded in an era of presumed air superiority—must be relearned for the age of persistent surveillance.
Cheap weapons demand cheap production. India’s defence industry must shift away from boutique manufacturing toward scalable, modular, and rapidly upgradable systems. Startups, private industry, and public sector units must be integrated into a continuous production ecosystem where speed of iteration matters more than perfection.
At a deeper level lies the issue of electronic dependency. Most autonomous systems rely on advanced chips, sensors, and AI algorithms dominated by a few global players, particularly in the United States. India cannot afford long-term dependence in this critical domain.
Indigenous semiconductor capability, AI research, and embedded systems manufacturing must be treated as strategic imperatives. This is a generational effort that may take decades, but without it India risks vulnerability in a future where wars are fought as much by algorithms as by soldiers.
Technology without doctrine is only noise. India’s military education and training systems must evolve rapidly. Commanders must understand multi-domain operations where land, air, cyber, and space intersect at the tactical level. Young officers must be empowered to make decisions in fast-moving environments.
Exercises must realistically simulate drone swarms, electronic disruption, and robotic adversaries. Lessons from Ukraine and Gaza must be institutionalised, not merely observed. Adaptation must be continuous.
Cheap weapons have made the battlefield more lethal, more transparent, and more unpredictable. For India, facing a technologically assertive China and an opportunistic Pakistan—often presenting itself as a disposable tool in great-power competition—the challenge is immediate and complex.
Yet this is not a story of vulnerability alone. It is also one of opportunity. India possesses abundant talent, a growing industrial base, and increasing strategic clarity. What is required now is urgency, integration, and sustained commitment.
Israel’s Iron Beam laser interceptor, Iran’s Shahed-series drones, Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2, Ukraine’s naval drones, and North Korea’s hypersonic advances all demonstrate that breakthrough capabilities often come from focused innovation rather than expensive big-ticket platforms.
In the age of cheap weapons, preparedness is no longer measured by what a nation can buy, but by how fast it can think, produce, and adapt. India must ensure it stays ahead of this curve, because hesitation will prove costlier than defeat.
