The Swedish government has approved a sweeping new investment of more than SEK 4 billion (approximately $440 million) to rapidly acquire a family of unmanned military systems for the Swedish Armed Forces, marking one of the most decisive shifts in the country’s defense posture in recent decades. A statement published by the Government Offices of Sweden on January 12, 2026, confirms that deliveries of the new capabilities are planned between 2026 and 2028, underscoring an emphasis on speed and operational relevance rather than incremental modernization.
The package spans loitering munitions, reconnaissance drones, unmanned airborne electronic warfare systems, and unmanned vehicles for a range of maritime missions. Taken together, the investment reflects a deliberate effort to reshape Swedish combat units around unmanned and autonomous technologies, responding directly to lessons drawn from contemporary conflicts and the deteriorating security environment in Northern Europe.
The political framing behind the decision is unusually explicit. Defence Minister Pål Jonson has directly linked the accelerated procurement to battlefield lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine, arguing that drones have moved from a supporting role to the very center of modern warfare. In his assessment, unmanned systems—alongside space-based surveillance—are now essential to force resilience, rapid decision-making, and credible deterrence.
“Drone warfare is no longer auxiliary,” Jonson has emphasized, pointing to the way unmanned platforms have transformed reconnaissance, targeting, and strike operations in Ukraine. His remarks align closely with Sweden’s evolving role as a NATO member and the alliance’s renewed focus on collective defense in the Baltic region. With Sweden now fully integrated into NATO planning structures, the ability to operate seamlessly with allied forces and contribute meaningful capabilities has become a strategic imperative.
Among the various elements of the investment, loitering munitions stand out as the most urgent and politically salient. The government has acknowledged that this capability is being brought forward by five to six years compared to earlier plans, a clear admission that traditional procurement timelines no longer match the pace of technological and operational change.
For Swedish ground forces, loitering munitions represent more than just an additional precision strike option. These systems collapse the sensor-to-shooter chain by combining surveillance, decision-making, and attack into a single platform. They enable units to engage time-sensitive targets, suppress enemy air defenses and electronic emitters, and maintain persistent pressure across wide operational areas. In environments where conventional artillery or air support may be delayed, vulnerable, or politically constrained, loitering munitions offer a flexible and comparatively low-risk alternative.
Reconnaissance drones form the enabling backbone of the overall program. Sweden already operates a layered unmanned fleet, ranging from higher-end tactical systems to small drones distributed at lower command levels. The Swedish Armed Forces describe the UAV 03 Örnen as a tactical unmanned aircraft capable of providing an overview of large areas and delivering imagery to support maneuver planning and command decisions.
At shorter ranges, systems such as Svalan and Korpen have long served as organic reconnaissance tools for Swedish units. More recently, the introduction of the UAV 06 Skatan family—including UAV 06 A variants fielded by the Home Guard—has reflected a broader push to normalize day-to-day aerial surveillance across the force. Equipped with optical and infrared sensors, these smaller platforms are designed to enhance local situational awareness, force protection, and responsiveness, even at the lowest echelons.
The new investment aims to expand this existing foundation in both scale and sophistication. By prioritizing rapid delivery and adaptability, Sweden signals its intention to field a mix of expendable and more capable unmanned aircraft able to operate in contested environments. Swedish military publications have highlighted ongoing evaluations of systems designed to function under electronic attack or degraded navigation conditions, underscoring a clear focus on survivability against a technologically capable adversary.
One of the most strategically significant—but least publicly detailed—elements of the package is unmanned airborne electronic warfare. The government defines this capability as remote-controlled sensors carried by drones to detect and characterize threats, with systems deployable from both ground units and naval platforms.
Operationally, this points to unmanned aircraft tasked with mapping the electromagnetic environment, identifying hostile radars and communications, and supporting electronic protection or targeting missions without exposing crewed aircraft to risk. In the Baltic theater, where dense radar coverage and aggressive electronic warfare are expected features of any high-intensity conflict, such capabilities could prove decisive. By dispersing electronic sensing across multiple unmanned platforms, Sweden could complicate an adversary’s targeting calculus while enhancing its own situational awareness.
Maritime unmanned systems form the final major pillar of the investment and reflect Sweden’s unique geographic and strategic circumstances. The government has explicitly highlighted unmanned vehicles operating on and below the surface, including underwater systems for mine detection and seabed surveillance, as well as surface platforms for wide-area maritime monitoring.
For Sweden, these capabilities serve both wartime and peacetime priorities. The Baltic Sea is a confined, shallow, and infrastructure-rich environment where naval mines remain a credible threat. At the same time, undersea cables, energy pipelines, ports, and other critical maritime infrastructure demand persistent observation amid growing concerns about sabotage and hybrid threats. Unmanned maritime systems offer a way to monitor, protect, and, if necessary, clear critical sea routes while significantly reducing risk to personnel.
While the government has not confirmed specific suppliers or system types, the structure of the investment suggests a preference for mature, rapidly available technologies rather than long-term developmental programs. In the loitering munition domain, options on the market range from man-portable systems designed for unit-level use to longer-endurance platforms capable of deep search-and-strike missions.
In reconnaissance, Sweden is likely to continue operating a mixed fleet that combines small quadcopters, short-range fixed-wing drones, and ship-capable vertical takeoff platforms. For maritime missions, a combination of autonomous underwater vehicles and unmanned surface vessels already fielded or marketed within NATO could be adapted to Swedish operational requirements and environmental conditions.
The broader significance of the decision lies in its scope and timeline. Rather than betting on a single flagship drone program, Sweden is acquiring a family of unmanned capabilities in parallel, funded through the government’s opportunity purchases framework. This approach allows the armed forces to respond quickly to changing threats while reducing the risk associated with any one system.
If delivered on schedule and integrated effectively into training, doctrine, and command structures, the result by the end of the decade could be a tightly linked unmanned ecosystem. Reconnaissance drones would detect and track targets; loitering munitions would strike with minimal delay; unmanned electronic warfare sensors would help units survive and fight in contested electromagnetic environments; and maritime drones would secure sea lanes while monitoring the seabed.
In strategic terms, Sweden is not simply buying drones. It is buying speed, resilience, and the ability to deny any adversary the advantage of surprise in one of Europe’s most sensitive and strategically consequential regions.
