Southeast Asia’s airpower balance is quietly but decisively evolving, and Vietnam now appears to be at the centre of that recalibration. Hanoi, long reliant on Russian combat aviation, is increasingly exploring diversified, sanctions-resilient Western platforms capable of sustaining high-tempo operations in one of the world’s most militarised maritime theatres. According to the French publication L’Express, Vietnam is reportedly considering the French-made Dassault Rafale multirole fighter as part of a broader effort to reduce dependence on Russian military aircraft.
“Le Vietnam pourrait être l’un des prochains clients du Rafale” (“Vietnam could be one of the next customers for the Rafale”), a senior French defence assessment states, encapsulating Hanoi’s deliberate search for strategic autonomy at a time when geopolitical realignments and supply-chain disruptions are steadily undermining the reliability of Moscow-origin combat aircraft support across Asia.
Vietnam’s reported interest in the Rafale underscores an accelerating effort to diversify combat aviation sources amid sanctions-driven disruptions to Russian military supply chains and intensifying strategic competition in the South China Sea. The assessment further notes: “Jusqu’à présent équipée de Sukhoï russes, l’armée vietnamienne cherche à diversifier ses approvisionnements” (“Until now equipped with Russian Sukhoi aircraft, the Vietnamese military is seeking to diversify its sources of supply”). This framing makes clear that Hanoi’s recalibration is driven less by prestige acquisition and more by hard operational imperatives linked to fleet readiness, interoperability, and escalation control.
Significantly, confirmation that a Vietnamese pilot has already flown the Rafale suggests a transition from exploratory diplomacy to hands-on force integration assessment. Such a step indicates that Hanoi is now evaluating sortie generation rates, cockpit philosophy, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare survivability under conditions approximating real combat scenarios rather than mere brochure-level capability comparisons.
French sources point out that the groundwork for this engagement was laid years earlier. “En 2018, dans le cadre d’un déploiement de l’armée de l’Air en Indo-Pacifique, deux Rafale avaient fait escale au Vietnam” (“In 2018, as part of an Indo-Pacific deployment by the French Air Force, two Rafale fighters made a stopover in Vietnam”). That visit, modest at the time, introduced Vietnamese planners to French expeditionary airpower concepts and helped build technical familiarity through trust-based engagement rather than transactional arms marketing.
A potential Rafale contract would also carry deep symbolic weight. “Un tel contrat serait historique pour les deux pays, plus de soixante-dix ans après la fin de la guerre d’Indochine” (“Such a contract would be historic for both countries, more than seventy years after the end of the Indochina War”), the assessment stresses. In this sense, Rafale represents not only a weapons platform but also a marker of post-colonial pragmatism, reconciliation, and converging Indo-Pacific security interests.
Vietnam’s consideration of the Rafale comes as maritime coercion intensifies around the Spratly and Paracel Islands, where airpower persistence, sensor dominance, and long-range precision strike increasingly define deterrence credibility. In this environment, numerical fleet size alone matters less than the ability to sustain readiness and operate effectively within contested, sensor-dense battlespaces.
Across Southeast Asia, states are reassessing force structures amid sharpening U.S.–China rivalry, declining Russian export reliability, and rising demand for multirole aircraft that can seamlessly transition between air superiority, maritime strike, and electronic attack missions. If realised, Vietnam’s Rafale decision would not only reshape the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) but also accelerate the region’s gradual shift toward Western aerospace ecosystems, influencing defence-industrial ties, training standards, and alliance architectures for decades.
Beyond raw platform capability, Vietnam’s interest reflects a broader strategic calculation: airpower credibility in the South China Sea is increasingly defined by sustained readiness, electronic resilience, and coalition interoperability rather than sheer aircraft numbers or legacy deterrence narratives. By signalling openness to high-end European combat aviation, Hanoi is positioning itself to access diversified sustainment ecosystems, longer-term technology transfer, and greater insulation from geopolitical shocks that have constrained Russia-centric force structures across the Indo-Pacific.
Vietnam’s airpower trajectory, however, remains inseparable from its Soviet legacy. Established in 1955, the VPAF was shaped by Cold War doctrines emphasising interception, attrition, and centrally controlled operations using rugged aircraft optimised for homeland defence. During the Vietnam War, MiG-17s and MiG-21s contested U.S. air dominance, embedding a cultural preference for kinetic resilience and simplicity over technologically fragile systems.
Following national reunification in 1975, continued reliance on Soviet—and later Russian—aircraft reflected geopolitical alignment, cost efficiency, and doctrinal continuity rather than technological stagnation. The acquisition of Su-27 fighters in the 1990s and subsequent procurement of Su-30MK2 multirole aircraft gave Vietnam credible long-range maritime patrol and strike capability, enabling sustained presence across its vast exclusive economic zone.
Today, Vietnam operates roughly 36 Su-27s and 34 Su-30MK2s. While aerodynamically formidable, these aircraft are increasingly constrained by ageing avionics, analogue-centric mission systems, and rising maintenance burdens. They have played a central role in asserting Vietnamese sovereignty in the South China Sea, where air patrols have become instruments of strategic signalling rather than routine sovereignty missions.
Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022, however, have disrupted spare-parts flows, overhaul cycles, and technical support pipelines. The cumulative effect has been a gradual erosion of operational availability, compelling Hanoi to prioritise supply-chain resilience and lifecycle sustainability as core pillars of future force planning.
Vietnam’s procurement of 12 L-39NG advanced jet trainers for approximately US$400 million reflects this recalibration. The aircraft provide a Western-standard training bridge, easing pilot transition away from Soviet-era cockpit ergonomics and mission philosophies. This move signals that Vietnam’s airpower modernisation is no longer incremental but structural, preparing the ground for high-end Western combat aircraft integration.
Within this context, the Dassault Rafale occupies a distinct niche. A 4.5-generation multirole fighter, it is designed not for single-mission optimisation but for sustained dominance across contested environments. Powered by twin Snecma M88 engines, Rafale combines strong thrust-to-weight performance with long endurance, allowing rapid response across Vietnam’s extended maritime frontiers without heavy reliance on vulnerable forward basing.
Its Thales RBE2 AESA radar enables simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-surface tracking, while the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite integrates radar warning, jamming, decoys, and threat geolocation. This dramatically enhances survivability against modern surface-to-air missile systems deployed across artificial islands in the South China Sea.
Armed with Meteor beyond-visual-range missiles, Rafale would give Vietnam an unprecedented air-denial envelope, allowing engagement well before adversary aircraft could threaten Vietnamese airspace or maritime assets. Compatibility with SCALP long-range cruise missiles further introduces a standoff strike option capable of holding high-value targets at risk without exposing pilots to layered air-defence networks.
With a combat radius exceeding 1,000 kilometres, Rafale sorties could cover nearly the entire South China Sea from mainland bases, compressing adversary reaction timelines and altering escalation dynamics. For Hanoi, this aligns neatly with a defensive doctrine centred on denial and persistence rather than power projection.
Vietnam’s Rafale consideration also unfolds against a regional backdrop shaped by Indonesia’s landmark decision to procure 42 Rafale fighters for approximately US$8.1 billion. With deliveries beginning in 2026, Indonesia has demonstrated that European combat aircraft can be integrated into Southeast Asian air forces without destabilising domestic political balances.
Indonesia’s Rafale deployment strengthens deterrence around the Natuna Islands, validating the aircraft’s maritime strike and air-superiority utility in archipelagic theatres. Alongside Thailand’s Gripen fleet, Malaysia’s Su-30MKM upgrade deliberations, and Singapore’s F-35B integration, the move illustrates Southeast Asia’s accelerating technological stratification.
For Vietnam, acquiring an estimated 24 to 36 Rafales would provide parity within ASEAN while avoiding budgetary overreach. Such a fleet would support rotational readiness, pilot proficiency, and surge capacity during crises without excessive lifecycle costs. Interoperability with Indonesian Rafales during joint exercises would further enhance ASEAN-level airpower cohesion.
This emerging Rafale network subtly nudges Southeast Asia toward a European-anchored combat aviation ecosystem, diversifying away from exclusive U.S. or Russian dependence. Vietnam’s entry would amplify its diplomatic leverage within ASEAN defence frameworks and reinforce its reputation as a strategically autonomous actor.
At the strategic level, Vietnam’s Rafale calculus is inseparable from its balancing act amid intensifying great-power competition. China’s expanding militarisation of the South China Sea has transformed airspace into an active domain of contestation. Rafale’s sensors and standoff weapons would allow Vietnam to contest access without crossing escalation thresholds.
Simultaneously, reports of Vietnam exploring up to 24 F-16V fighters from the United States suggest parallel diversification rather than binary alignment. A mixed Rafale–F-16 fleet would complicate adversary planning through heterogeneous sensor, weapon, and electronic warfare profiles, though it would also demand substantial investment in training and infrastructure.
Russia’s declining reliability has created strategic space for France, whose Indo-Pacific posture emphasises sovereignty protection and freedom of navigation. A Rafale deal would align Vietnam with France’s regional strategy while preserving Hanoi’s non-aligned foreign policy stance.
Financially, a two-squadron Rafale package valued at US$4–6 billion would be a major but manageable investment within Vietnam’s defence budget, prioritising long-term deterrence stability over short-term numerical expansion. Defence ties between France and Vietnam have already deepened through helicopter sales and naval cooperation; Rafale would elevate the relationship to the highest tier, potentially including technology transfer and local maintenance facilities.
China’s likely response would involve diplomatic signalling rather than immediate escalation, given Vietnam’s consistent emphasis on defensive intent. Operational challenges remain, with full combat readiness likely several years post-delivery, but industry assessments suggest negotiations could conclude by late 2026, with deliveries between 2028 and 2030.
For Dassault Aviation, Vietnam represents both a strategic and symbolic expansion in Asia. For Hanoi, the Rafale is less about changing alliances than about ensuring that its airpower remains credible, resilient, and sustainable in an increasingly unforgiving strategic environment.
