When Airbus unveiled the A380, it was meant to deliver a decisive blow to Boeing’s long-reigning Queen of the Skies. Bigger, wider, heavier, and more ambitious than any airliner before it, the A380 was designed to dominate the ultra-large widebody segment and finally eclipse the Boeing 747. Boeing, unwilling to surrender that crown, responded with the 747-8—an extensively modernized and stretched version of its iconic jumbo jet.
What followed was one of the most fascinating rivalries in commercial aviation history. Both aircraft represented extraordinary engineering achievements. Both pushed airports, airlines, and manufacturers to their limits. And yet, despite their technical brilliance, both failed to attract the sales volumes their makers once confidently predicted.
Today, the Airbus A380 and Boeing 747-8 stand as the only two full-length double-decked passenger jets ever to enter commercial service. Comparing them offers insight not only into their physical differences, but into how the airline industry itself changed beneath their wings.
The Airbus A380-800 was conceived with a clear mission: outclass the Boeing 747 in every meaningful way. Airbus believed that growing congestion at major hub airports would force airlines to move more passengers per slot, favoring ultra-high-capacity aircraft flying between megacities. The A380 was optimized for that future.
Boeing disagreed. While it upgraded the 747-400 into the 747-8 to stay competitive, its long-term strategy pivoted toward smaller, more flexible long-range aircraft such as the 787 Dreamliner. The 747-8 was as much about extending the life of an icon as it was about challenging Airbus’ new flagship.
In sheer physical presence, the A380 largely succeeded. It is bigger than the 747-8 in almost every dimension—except one.
The Boeing 747-8 holds the narrow bragging right of being longer than the A380. Measuring 250 feet and two inches (73.3 meters), it exceeds the Airbus A380-800’s length of 238 feet and seven inches (72.7 meters) by more than 11 feet. That difference, however, is the result of history rather than intent.
The original Boeing 747-100 measured roughly 231 feet (70.5 meters) long and was stretched multiple times across successive variants. The A380-800, by contrast, was designed as the smallest member of a planned family of Superjumbos. Airbus engineers fully intended to introduce stretched versions later, which would have surpassed the 747 in length as well.
In wingspan, height, and width, the A380 is unmistakably larger. Its wings stretch 261 feet and eight inches (79.75 meters), dwarfing the 747-8’s 224 feet and seven inches (68.45 meters). This immense wingspan necessitated reinforced runways, wider taxiways, and airport modifications around the world.
The Superjumbo also towers above the Jumbo. The A380 stands 79 feet and one inch (24.1 meters) tall, compared with the 747-8’s 63 feet and eight inches (19.4 meters). On the tarmac, the difference is dramatic—an A380 visually dominates almost any airport environment.
Perhaps the most important dimensional difference lies in cabin width. The A380’s main deck is 21 feet and four inches wide (6.5 meters), slightly wider than the 747-8’s 20 feet (6.1 meters). That gap becomes far more pronounced on the upper deck.
The Boeing 747’s signature hump is iconic, but it is both partial and narrow. The 747-8’s upper deck is just 13 feet and nine inches wide (4.2 meters), sharply constraining layout options. By contrast, the A380’s upper deck spans nearly the full length of the fuselage and measures 19 feet wide (5.8 meters).
This makes the A380 the only truly full-length double-decked passenger aircraft ever built. Airlines could install wide aisles, premium cabins, lounges, and even onboard bars without compromising flow or comfort. From a purely architectural standpoint, the A380 offered airlines unprecedented flexibility.
Supporting that mass required equally impressive landing gear. The Boeing 747-8 rides on 18 wheels, while the A380 adds another four for a total of 22. This distribution spreads weight across the runway surface, reducing pavement stress but increasing mechanical complexity and maintenance demands.
Both aircraft pushed airport infrastructure to its limits, but the A380 did so more aggressively. Not all airports could accommodate it without significant investment, which limited route flexibility and deterred potential operators.
In terms of weight, the A380 stands in a different league entirely.
The Boeing 747-8 has a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) of 987,000 pounds (448 tonnes). The A380 exceeds one million pounds comfortably, topping out at 1,268,000 pounds (575 tonnes). That difference carries through every other weight category.
The 747-8’s maximum landing weight is 688,000 pounds (312 tonnes), compared with the A380’s 868,000 pounds (394 tonnes). Operating empty weight also favors the Airbus, at 610,200 pounds (277 tonnes) versus 485,300 pounds (220 tonnes) for the Boeing.
Payload capacity follows the same pattern. The 747-8 can carry up to 167,700 pounds (76 tonnes) of payload, while the A380 can lift approximately 209,700 pounds (95 tonnes). These figures underscore just how much larger the A380 truly is—not just in dimensions, but in structural capability.
The A380’s size allows it to carry significantly more fuel: 572,700 pounds (323,546 liters), compared with the 747-8’s 422,300 pounds (238,610 liters). However, size comes with penalties. The A380 burns fuel at a higher absolute rate, largely offsetting its greater capacity.
As a result, advertised range figures are surprisingly close. The A380 is listed at around 8,000 nautical miles, while the 747-8 slightly edges ahead at 8,200 nautical miles. In real-world operations, factors such as payload, winds, routing, and reserves can shift these numbers considerably.
On a per-seat basis, the A380 can be efficient when full. The problem is that consistently filling such a large aircraft proved far more difficult than Airbus anticipated.
Neither aircraft made extensive use of modern composite materials. For the 747-8, this was understandable—it was fundamentally an evolution of a 1960s design. For the A380, it proved more damaging.
The A380 became the last clean-sheet widebody airliner built predominantly from aluminum. While Airbus incorporated some advanced alloys and limited composites, the aircraft entered service just as the Boeing 787 and Airbus A350 demonstrated the efficiency gains possible with composite fuselages and wings.
As a result, critics argued that the A380 was “big” rather than “new.” Its operating economics looked increasingly dated in a market that was shifting rapidly toward lighter, more flexible twin-engine aircraft.
Both aircraft are quadjets, with two engines mounted under each wing. For the 747-8, Boeing leveraged the General Electric GEnx engine developed for the 787 Dreamliner. This decision significantly reduced development costs and improved efficiency compared with earlier 747 variants.
The 747-8 is powered exclusively by four GEnx-2B67 engines, each producing 66,500 pounds of thrust, for a combined total of around 266,000 pounds. While sales were disappointing, GE was able to recover development costs and even turn a modest profit.
Airbus took a different path. Expecting demand for more than 1,500 aircraft in the A380/747 size class, it supported two bespoke engine programs. Rolls-Royce developed the Trent 900, while Pratt & Whitney and GE partnered as Engine Alliance to produce the GP7200.
Each A380 engine generates roughly 80,000 pounds of thrust, giving the aircraft a total of around 320,000 pounds—more than even the colossal Antonov An-225, which produced approximately 310,000 pounds across six engines.
Yet the scale of the program proved to be its undoing. Only 255 A380s were built, resulting in just over 1,000 engines plus spares. Rolls-Royce eventually broke even. Engine Alliance is widely believed to have failed to do so.
On paper, the A380’s passenger capacity dwarfs the 747-8’s. The Airbus is certified to carry up to 853 passengers, compared with 605 for the Boeing. These numbers, however, are theoretical exit-limit maxima that no airline actually uses.
Airbus advertises a typical three-class A380 configuration of around 525 seats, while Boeing lists the 747-8 at 467. Even these figures tend to exaggerate reality.
In practice, most A380s fly with between 468 and 509 seats. Emirates, the type’s largest operator, has flown high-density layouts with up to 615 seats but is increasingly reconfiguring aircraft into lower-density premium layouts. British Airways operates A380s with just 469 seats, while Lufthansa’s carry 509.
The 747-8’s real-world numbers are even lower. Lufthansa, the largest operator, configures its aircraft with 364 seats. Korean Air’s 747-8s seat 368 passengers, while Air China’s seat 365. Boeing’s advertised figures overstate actual usage by more than 100 seats.
Ironically, this means some modern high-density A350-1000s now carry as many—or more—passengers than today’s operational 747-8s and even some A380s.
One of the A380’s great “what ifs” is the family that never materialized. Airbus always intended the A380-800 to be the smallest variant. Plans existed for a stretched A380-900, which would have added roughly 21 feet, bringing total length to around 260 feet and nine inches (79.5 meters).
There were even persistent rumors of an A380-1000, though details were never firm. Had these aircraft been built, the A380 would have surpassed the 747-8 in every dimension, including length.
Instead, weak sales froze development. The Superjumbo remained a single-variant aircraft, unable to adapt as market conditions shifted.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two aircraft lies in versatility.
The Airbus A380 was a one-trick pony. It was designed almost exclusively for scheduled passenger service. Although Airbus discussed a freighter variant early on, the A380F never materialized. Even during the pandemic, when grounded A380s sparked speculation about cargo conversions, none occurred.
The Boeing 747-8, by contrast, found new life as a freighter. While passenger sales were dismal—only three airlines bought the type—cargo operators embraced it. Of the 155 747-8s sold, the majority were freighters.
That versatility extended beyond commercial use. The US Air Force selected the 747-8 as the basis for the VC-25 Air Force One replacement and the future E-4 Nightwatch replacement. At least 10 aircraft will be purchased through contractors, ensuring the 747-8 remains in production long after passenger operations fade.
The commercial passenger days of both aircraft are clearly numbered. Airlines are retiring 747-8s from passenger service, and the A380 fleet is slowly shrinking as aircraft reach the limits of their economic lives.
Yet their futures diverge sharply. The 747-8 is likely to fly for decades as a freighter and special-mission platform. Its nose-loading capability, massive volume, and proven structure ensure ongoing niche demand.
The A380, lacking a cargo role and constrained by its size, faces a more uncertain end. Once its roughly 25-year design life is exhausted, few realistic second careers remain.
The Airbus A380 and Boeing 747-8 represent the pinnacle of an era when bigger was believed to be better. They are monuments to engineering ambition and to forecasts that underestimated how rapidly airline economics would change.
In size, the A380 unquestionably outclasses the 747-8. In adaptability, the Boeing aircraft has proved far more resilient. Together, they tell the story of how the industry moved away from hub-and-spoke gigantism toward point-to-point efficiency.
They may not have sold as planned, but as the only two full-length double-deck passenger jets ever built, both aircraft have secured an enduring place in aviation history—giants whose shadows will linger long after their final flights.
