The United Kingdom is reportedly refusing to authorize the United States to use two critical bases — Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and RAF Fairford — for a possible sustained bombing campaign against Iran, according to a report by The Times.
If confirmed, the decision would mark a significant constraint on American war planning at a moment of mounting tensions with Tehran and expose a widening political rift between Donald Trump and Keir Starmer over the future of Diego Garcia and broader strategic alignment.
Both Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford play outsized roles in U.S. global strike operations. Their location, infrastructure, and longstanding integration into American bomber task force planning make them indispensable for any extended air campaign in the Middle East.
Diego Garcia, part of the Chagos Islands archipelago, sits roughly 2,300 miles from Iran’s eastern border. RAF Fairford, located in Gloucestershire, lies approximately 2,500 miles from Iran’s western frontier. By contrast, Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri — home to the U.S. Air Force’s B-2 stealth bomber fleet — is about 6,500 miles from Iran.
For American planners, that distance differential is critical. Forward basing enables higher sortie generation rates, shorter flight times, reduced strain on aircraft and crews, and more rapid rearmament and maintenance cycles. In a week-long or sustained campaign targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear facilities, missile infrastructure and command nodes, those factors could prove decisive.
Yet, according to The Times, London has so far declined to grant pre-approval for the use of its territory for kinetic operations against Iran. Under longstanding bilateral agreements, U.S. forces must secure British authorization before launching offensive combat missions from these installations.
One notable indicator of the reported restriction is the absence of U.S. strategic bombers at Diego Garcia or RAF Fairford in recent weeks. Historically, major U.S. operations in the region have been preceded by visible deployments of heavy bombers to forward operating locations.
In early 2025, an unusually large contingent of six B-2 Spirit aircraft deployed to Diego Garcia in a clear signal directed at Iran and its regional proxies. Those stealth bombers later conducted strikes against Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen before being replaced by B-52 Stratofortress bombers.
That type of forward deployment has not materialized during the current crisis. Analysts suggest the absence could reflect British reluctance to authorize use of the base for a broader Iran campaign.
RAF Fairford, meanwhile, is the only dedicated U.S. bomber forward operating location in the United Kingdom. It regularly hosts Bomber Task Force rotations and has previously supported major strike operations, including during conflicts with Iraq. Its runways, munitions storage facilities and support infrastructure are optimized for heavy bomber operations.
The last major U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, known as Operation Midnight Hammer, saw B-2 bombers fly a roundtrip mission directly from Whiteman Air Force Base. That operation, however, was designed as a one-night, high-intensity strike rather than the opening phase of a prolonged campaign.
President Trump is now reportedly weighing options for what could be a multi-day or week-long aerial offensive. Such an operation would likely target Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile launch sites, Revolutionary Guard facilities, and command-and-control networks.
In that context, reliance solely on U.S.-based bombers would dramatically increase mission durations and limit sortie tempo. The availability of Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford would substantially enhance operational flexibility.
According to The Times, British hesitation stems primarily from legal concerns. Officials reportedly worry that authorizing use of U.K.-controlled territory for strikes could expose Britain to accusations of complicity under international law.
Legal doctrine holds that states assisting in an internationally wrongful act — particularly if they possess “knowledge of the circumstances” — may share responsibility. In the absence of a clear United Nations mandate or immediate self-defense justification, British legal advisers may view participation as risky.
The U.K. Ministry of Defence declined to discuss operational specifics but reiterated its opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
“There is a political process ongoing between the U.S. and Iran, which the U.K. supports,” a ministry spokesperson said. “Iran must never be able to develop a nuclear weapon, and our priority is security in the region.”
Complicating matters is a separate political dispute over sovereignty and control of Diego Garcia. The island is part of the Chagos Islands, claimed by Mauritius. Prime Minister Starmer has advocated negotiating a 99-year lease arrangement with Mauritius that would formalize British administration while addressing long-standing legal and diplomatic disputes.
President Trump has publicly criticized the proposal, arguing that it risks weakening Western strategic control over a vital military outpost.
In a statement on his Truth Social platform, Trump warned that “Leases are no good when it comes to Countries” and urged Starmer not to “give away Diego Garcia.” He framed the island as essential to deterring a “highly unstable and dangerous regime” in Tehran and suggested its loss would damage allied security.
The Times reported that Trump withdrew support for the lease arrangement after London declined to authorize use of the base for strikes on Iran, intensifying tensions between the two leaders.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding bomber basing, the United States continues to move significant airpower assets toward the broader Middle East region. Fighter aircraft, electronic warfare platforms, airborne early warning planes, and aerial refueling tankers have been transiting through RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath.
On Friday, another flight of F-22 Raptor stealth fighters departed Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, likely headed to Europe or onward to the Middle East.
Traditionally, restrictions from host nations apply to combat operations launched from their soil, not to transit flights or support missions. Whether Britain would restrict refueling, intelligence support, or aircraft staging remains unclear.
The U.S. Air Force has invested heavily in training to operate its bombers from austere and unfamiliar locations. B-2 deployments to the Azores, Iceland and Wake Island in recent years demonstrated the aircraft’s expanding basing flexibility. The B-1B Lancer and B-52 fleets are even more adaptable, having operated from allied airfields across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
However, operating from temporary or minimally equipped sites differs significantly from sustained operations out of installations purpose-built for heavy bomber warfare. Diego Garcia’s munitions stockpiles, maintenance infrastructure, sheltered lagoon and prepositioned logistics ships provide depth that few alternative locations can replicate.
Any alternative host nation would likewise need to grant political approval for offensive operations against Iran — a decision that could prove contentious.
If Britain maintains its reported restrictions, American war planners may need to recalibrate the scope and tempo of any bombing campaign. Long-range missions from the continental United States remain feasible but would reduce sortie generation rates and increase operational complexity.
The symbolic dimension is equally significant. The U.S.-U.K. defense partnership has long been considered one of the most durable and integrated alliances in the world. A visible divergence over Iran policy could reverberate across NATO and other strategic theaters.
At the same time, London’s caution reflects domestic political calculations and international legal sensitivities. With memories of the Iraq War still resonant in British politics, government leaders may be wary of appearing to facilitate another major Middle Eastern conflict without broad international backing.
Both Washington and London have emphasized that diplomacy remains the preferred path. A White House official said President Trump’s “first instinct is always diplomacy,” noting previous operations — including Operation Midnight Hammer — demonstrated that the administration backs rhetoric with action when necessary.
For now, no bombers have arrived at Diego Garcia or RAF Fairford. The absence itself speaks volumes. Whether that reflects diplomatic patience, operational secrecy, or allied disagreement is uncertain.
What is clear is that access to those two bases would dramatically shape the character of any sustained U.S. air campaign against Iran. Without them, the United States retains formidable capabilities — but at greater cost and complexity.
As tensions with Tehran continue to simmer, the strategic calculus surrounding Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford underscores how basing rights, legal interpretation and alliance politics can influence the trajectory of potential conflict as much as aircraft and munitions themselves.
Whether Britain ultimately grants permission — or stands firm in its reported refusal — could determine not only the operational architecture of a future strike, but also the broader tone of transatlantic relations in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.
