Speculation is mounting across global defence and strategic circles that India is quietly preserving the Russian Su-57E fifth-generation stealth fighter as a contingency option for the Indian Air Force (IAF), even as New Delhi publicly prioritizes indigenous defence development under the “Make in India” framework.
The renewed attention surrounding the export variant of Russia’s flagship stealth platform follows Defence Minister Rajnath Singh carefully worded remarks during a recent Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) summit, where he declined to directly confirm or deny India’s interest in the aircraft.
Instead, Singh emphasized that India remained open to evaluating “all options from friendly nations” to address the country’s growing fifth-generation capability gap, while stressing that any future acquisition would need to align with domestic manufacturing priorities.
His calibrated response has been widely interpreted by defence observers as a deliberate effort to preserve strategic flexibility at a time when South Asia’s aerial balance is entering a potentially transformative phase.
India’s indigenous stealth fighter project, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), remains years away from operational deployment.
Although the programme has gained momentum, the first operational AMCA Mk1 squadrons are not expected before the early 2030s. That leaves the IAF navigating a critical transition period in which rival air forces may field advanced stealth capabilities well before India’s domestic platform becomes combat ready.
Within this context, retaining the Su-57E as a fallback option offers New Delhi a strategic insurance policy.
The move is particularly relevant amid concerns that Pakistan could eventually acquire China’s new J-35A stealth fighter, a platform developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and promoted heavily alongside Beijing’s expanding carrier aviation ambitions.
Indian defence planners appear unwilling to risk a scenario in which Pakistan fields a stealth platform years before the AMCA enters service, especially given the IAF’s existing squadron shortages.
The Indian Air Force currently operates roughly 31 active fighter squadrons, well below its sanctioned strength of 42. The shortfall has long been viewed as one of the service’s most pressing operational vulnerabilities, particularly as both China and Pakistan continue modernizing their aerial capabilities.
At the political level, India’s approach reflects a balancing act between strategic necessity and geopolitical caution.
Directly committing to the Su-57E could complicate India’s increasingly diversified defence partnerships with Western nations while exposing New Delhi to renewed scrutiny under America’s CAATSA sanctions regime, formally known as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
India already faced similar diplomatic pressure following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence system.
By avoiding a definitive public commitment, the government preserves room for maneuver while continuing parallel efforts to accelerate the AMCA programme and strengthen indigenous aerospace manufacturing.
The ambiguity also reflects the difficult international environment created by Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine, which has raised concerns about supply-chain reliability, sanctions exposure, and Moscow’s ability to sustain long-term export commitments.
Yet despite those concerns, India has not fully closed the door on the Russian platform.
Defence analysts argue that the Su-57E remains attractive because it could be integrated relatively smoothly into the IAF’s existing Russian-origin ecosystem, particularly alongside the large fleet of Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters already in service.
India’s relationship with Russia’s fifth-generation fighter programme has evolved dramatically over the past decade.
In 2018, India formally exited the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project with Russia, citing disagreements over cost, technology sharing, stealth performance, and engine reliability.
At the time, many analysts believed the partnership had effectively collapsed.
However, strategic realities shifted considerably over the following years.
By 2024, discussions reportedly resumed around a possible co-production arrangement for approximately 114 aircraft, with estimated deal values ranging between $15 billion and $20 billion.
The proposal gained additional momentum in August 2025 when Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly offered India a significantly expanded package involving full technology transfer and domestic assembly through Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
The offer was widely viewed as Moscow’s attempt to strengthen defence ties with India while countering growing American influence in New Delhi’s military modernization efforts.
Still, active negotiations slowed toward the end of 2025 as India reassessed broader geopolitical risks tied to Russia’s defence-industrial stability during the Ukraine conflict.
From an operational perspective, the Su-57E offers several advantages that make it difficult for Indian planners to ignore entirely.
The aircraft combines stealth shaping with supercruise capability, advanced thrust-vectoring manoeuvrability, and the N036 Byelka AESA radar suite.
Russian officials also claim the export variant would feature upgraded AL-51F1 engines designed to improve thrust efficiency and combat performance.
For the IAF, one of the platform’s strongest selling points is compatibility.
Because India already operates extensive Russian-origin infrastructure, training systems, maintenance chains, and weapons inventories, introducing the Su-57E would likely involve fewer logistical complications than integrating an entirely new Western stealth ecosystem.
Analysts estimate that if India were to issue a formal approval soon, initial deliveries could potentially begin between 2027 and 2028.
Such a timeline could provide the IAF with an interim fifth-generation capability until the AMCA becomes operational later in the next decade.
Former Indian military commanders have repeatedly emphasized that while indigenous capability remains the long-term objective, interim foreign procurement may still be necessary to avoid strategic vulnerability during transitional periods.
Across the border, Pakistan’s reported interest in the J-35A has generated substantial regional attention, though concrete details remain elusive.
The aircraft itself was introduced by China as a carrier-capable multirole stealth fighter intended to complement the heavier Chengdu J-20 within China’s broader airpower architecture.
The J-35A is reportedly equipped with WS-21 engines, AESA radar systems, internal weapons bays, and compatibility with long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles.
Chinese defence messaging has frequently positioned the aircraft as a lower-cost competitor to the American Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II in export markets.
Earlier reports suggested Pakistan could acquire up to 40 aircraft under a heavily subsidized arrangement valued between $50 million and $60 million per unit.
Some reports even claimed deliveries could be accelerated specifically to counter India’s Rafale fleet.
Yet significant doubts persist.
One major issue is the absence of confirmed large-scale domestic orders from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Chinese procurement priorities still appear focused heavily on expanding the J-20 fleet, leaving uncertainty about how quickly the J-35A can enter mass production.
If Beijing eventually places substantial domestic orders, export customers such as Pakistan could face lengthy production delays.
Defence experts estimate that large PLAAF procurement commitments could push Pakistani deliveries back by several years.
Another striking development has been the sudden disappearance of public discussion surrounding the J-35A within Pakistan itself.
Earlier reports claiming Pakistani pilots were already undergoing specialized training for the aircraft have largely vanished from public circulation.
Meanwhile, Khawaja Asif has publicly dismissed immediate acquisition claims as speculative.
The silence has fueled further speculation regarding either delays in negotiations or efforts to avoid drawing premature international scrutiny.
For India, however, even uncertainty surrounding Pakistan’s stealth ambitions is enough to justify maintaining contingency planning.
The slowdown in both active Su-57E negotiations and Pakistan’s J-35A narrative has effectively given India valuable breathing space.
This window allows Indian defence planners to concentrate more heavily on refining the AMCA’s stealth coatings, sensor fusion systems, artificial intelligence-assisted avionics, and indigenous engine development pathways.
At the same time, India’s broader defence-industrial ecosystem has been expanding rapidly under the “Make in India” initiative, with indigenous defence exports reaching record levels in recent years.
Still, strategic caution remains central to New Delhi’s calculations.
A sudden acceleration in Pakistan’s stealth acquisition programme could rapidly alter regional tactical dynamics, while excessive dependence on slow domestic development timelines risks deepening the IAF’s existing squadron deficit.
For now, India appears committed to pursuing a dual-track approach: advancing self-reliance while quietly ensuring that fallback options remain available if the regional security environment deteriorates unexpectedly.
In the eyes of many Indian strategists, that flexibility may ultimately prove just as important as the stealth fighters themselves.
