The United States is preparing to remove Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) “with or without” a negotiated agreement with Tehran, according to remarks attributed to U.S. President Donald Trump, signaling a dramatic escalation in rhetoric surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and raising the prospect of a potential ground operation inside Iranian territory.
Speaking in unusually direct terms about the issue, Trump indicated that Washington’s objective is not limited to diplomacy, but could extend to military intervention if negotiations fail. “And we will go with them, or without them. But we won’t have people shooting at us,” he said, adding that if a deal cannot be reached, the United States could act “very harshly” and take out the material militarily. He further suggested that any removal of uranium stockpiles could involve U.S. assets directly, whether by dismantling facilities on-site or extracting the material for destruction elsewhere.
The comments come amid intensifying speculation in Washington policy circles and allied discussions in Jerusalem that a high-risk special forces operation to seize or secure Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is increasingly being considered as a contingency option.
Officials and analysts familiar with internal debates suggest that both U.S. and Israeli strategic planning communities are weighing scenarios that could involve covert or overt entry into Iranian territory to neutralize what is believed to be a rapidly advancing nuclear capability.
Israeli leadership has also made unusually explicit remarks about the feasibility of such an operation. The Prime Minister of Benjamin Netanyahu, in a recent televised interview, described the idea of physically removing nuclear material as operationally possible. “You go in, and you take it out,” he said when asked how Iran’s enriched uranium could be secured. When pressed on whether this would involve special forces, Netanyahu responded that he would not discuss military means but added that “it can be done physically.”
He further suggested coordination with Washington could make such an operation viable, stating that President Trump had previously expressed interest in the idea. “If you have an agreement, and you go in, and you take it out, why not? That’s the best way,” Netanyahu said.
According to multiple regional security assessments, the idea of a joint U.S.–Israeli special forces mission to seize Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is no longer confined to theoretical war-gaming. Some reports suggest that elements within both governments view such an operation as a potential “last resort” should diplomatic channels fail and Iran continue to advance its nuclear enrichment capacity.
An Axios report earlier indicated that Israeli officials have encouraged Washington to consider deploying special forces to secure uranium stockpiles. The same reporting noted internal hesitation within U.S. defense circles due to the operational complexity, geographic depth, and high likelihood of escalation into broader conflict.
Trump himself has previously framed Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as being under continuous surveillance. He referenced advanced monitoring capabilities, including space-based systems, claiming that U.S. forces would detect any movement near sensitive nuclear sites. “We have it surveilled… If anybody got near the place, we will know about it—and we’ll blow them up,” he said in earlier remarks.
Such statements have fueled concerns among analysts that the threshold between deterrence messaging and operational planning may be narrowing.
The renewed focus on ground operations follows what some reports describe as unsuccessful attempts to neutralize Iran’s nuclear infrastructure using long-range strike capabilities. According to assessments attributed to U.S. intelligence sources, a major bombing campaign conducted in mid-2025 involving GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator munitions dropped from B-2 stealth bombers failed to achieve the strategic objective of eliminating Iran’s core uranium stockpiles.
The operation, described in some accounts as “Operation Midnight Hammer,” reportedly targeted facilities including Fordow and Natanz. However, subsequent intelligence assessments suggested that deeply buried stockpiles and dispersed storage techniques limited the effectiveness of aerial bombardment.
Iran is estimated by some intelligence agencies to possess over 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to approximately 60 percent purity. This level of enrichment is widely considered a short technical step from weapons-grade material, typically defined at around 90 percent enrichment. Analysts note that if further refined, the stockpile could theoretically be sufficient for multiple nuclear devices, depending on weapon design efficiency.
Facilities associated with enrichment and storage, including sites near Isfahan, are believed to be hardened and dispersed, complicating any attempt at destruction from the air.
These constraints have contributed to growing discussion within policy and defense circles about whether a ground-based extraction operation might be the only reliable method of ensuring removal of the material.
Despite increasing speculation, military analysts caution that any attempt to insert special forces into Iran would carry extreme operational risk and could trigger rapid escalation into a wider regional conflict. Iran’s air defense network, missile capabilities, and intelligence services are widely considered robust enough to detect and potentially respond to incursions.
Experts also highlight that Iran’s nuclear program is geographically dispersed and heavily protected, often located in mountainous or underground facilities designed specifically to withstand aerial bombardment.
Some analysts argue that while removal of nuclear materials has precedent in other contexts, the Iranian scenario is fundamentally different due to the absence of host-nation cooperation and the high level of military preparedness.
Supporters of the feasibility of such an operation often point to historical cases where the United States successfully removed or secured nuclear materials from unstable environments.
During World War II, Allied forces conducted coordinated intelligence and military operations to capture German nuclear research assets under the broader scientific intelligence effort known as Operation Alsos. The mission, led under the authority of the Manhattan Project, sought to prevent Nazi Germany’s atomic program from falling into Soviet hands.
Under the direction of U.S. military leadership associated with the Manhattan Project, Allied teams advanced into Europe in 1945, securing uranium stockpiles, heavy water supplies, and research materials. Large quantities of uranium ore and scientific documentation were reportedly seized before Soviet forces reached key locations.
Following the war, the United States consolidated control over much of the captured material, which contributed indirectly to early American nuclear development efforts culminating in the first nuclear test in July 1945.
More recently, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States conducted Operation Sapphire in 1994, removing approximately 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan’s Ulba Metallurgical Plant. The operation, carried out in cooperation with the Kazakh government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is often cited as a model for nuclear nonproliferation logistics.
In that operation, U.S. personnel transported the material using a C-5 Galaxy aircraft and transferred it to secure facilities in the United States for downblending.
Similarly, Libya’s 2003 decision to dismantle its nuclear program enabled the United States and partners to remove sensitive components and materials, including centrifuge technology and limited quantities of enriched uranium, under international supervision.
Even in Venezuela, smaller-scale removal of nuclear material has been conducted in coordination with local authorities and the IAEA, underscoring that such operations are typically successful only when host governments cooperate.
However, analysts emphasize that these precedents differ fundamentally from the Iranian case. In Kazakhstan, Libya, and Venezuela, operations were conducted with explicit consent from national authorities, often as part of broader diplomatic agreements.
Even Operation Alsos, though conducted in wartime conditions, occurred within the context of a collapsing regime and advancing conventional armies, a situation not directly comparable to modern Iran, which retains a functioning military command structure and asymmetric warfare capabilities.
This distinction is central to concerns voiced by defense planners who warn that attempting a unilateral extraction operation in Iran could trigger immediate retaliation across multiple theaters, including the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and potentially beyond.
The renewed focus on Iran’s uranium stockpile has also become a defining issue in U.S. and Israeli strategic alignment. Both Trump and Netanyahu have framed the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat requiring decisive action.
According to several policy briefings circulating in Washington, the core strategic question is no longer solely about containment or deterrence, but about physical removal of material deemed capable of enabling rapid weaponization.
However, divisions remain within policy circles over feasibility, escalation risks, and the potential consequences of introducing special forces into deeply fortified Iranian territory.
Some defense officials reportedly argue that even limited incursions could rapidly expand into a broader war scenario, while others believe that credible threat of action may itself serve as leverage in negotiations with Tehran.
At present, no formal decision on military action has been publicly announced by the United States or Israel, and diplomatic efforts with Iran continue in parallel. Nevertheless, the increasingly explicit rhetoric from senior leaders, combined with reported contingency planning, suggests that the issue of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile has entered a more volatile and operationally focused phase.
Whether through negotiation, coercive diplomacy, or military intervention, the question of how to address Iran’s nuclear materials is likely to remain a central point of geopolitical tension in the coming months, with significant implications for regional stability and global nonproliferation efforts.
