Pakistan carried out air and ground strikes overnight in eastern Afghanistan, targeting militants it blames for a deadly attack in Karachi that killed at least three Pakistani troops. The operation marks the latest escalation in Islamabad’s increasingly aggressive campaign against armed groups operating across the Afghan border and raises a broader strategic question: Is Pakistan now adopting a doctrine that India pioneered over the past decade—cross-border military strikes against terrorist sanctuaries beyond its borders?
For years, Pakistan sharply criticized India’s military operations inside neighboring countries. Yet Islamabad is now employing remarkably similar tactics against militants it says are using Afghan territory as a safe haven to launch attacks inside Pakistan.
The evolution of this strategy can be traced back to India’s dramatic shift in counterterrorism doctrine beginning in 2015.
For decades, India largely adhered to a policy of military restraint despite repeated terrorist attacks linked to groups operating from neighboring countries. That changed in June 2015 following a deadly ambush by militants of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Manipur, which killed 18 Indian soldiers.
In response, Indian special forces reportedly crossed into Myanmar and attacked insurgent camps used by the militants. The operation, involving around 70 para commandos, was described by Indian officials as a “hot pursuit” mission based on actionable intelligence.
Although details remain classified, Indian authorities portrayed the raid as a successful strike against insurgent infrastructure that had long enjoyed sanctuary across the border. More importantly, it signaled a major doctrinal shift. New Delhi was effectively declaring that international borders would no longer shield armed groups conducting attacks against India.
The Myanmar operation became the foundation for a more assertive approach that would soon be applied against Pakistan.
A year later, in September 2016, militants attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters near Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 soldiers.
India responded with what became known as the “surgical strikes.” According to New Delhi, Indian Army special forces crossed the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and struck multiple terrorist launch pads where militants were preparing to infiltrate into Indian territory.
Indian officials publicly acknowledged the operation, describing it as a preemptive strike against terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan disputed both the scale and impact of the raid, insisting no significant military action had taken place.
Regardless of the competing narratives, the strikes represented a major political and military milestone. For the first time, India openly announced a cross-border operation into territory controlled by Pakistan.
The message was clear: terrorist attacks would invite direct retaliation, even across internationally recognized boundaries.
The doctrine expanded further after the February 2019 suicide bombing in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 40 personnel of India’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).
Within days, Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 fighter jets crossed into Pakistan and struck a target near Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
The operation marked the first Indian airstrike on Pakistani territory since the 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh.
India stated that the strike targeted a terrorist training facility linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan denied that significant damage or casualties occurred and responded with retaliatory air operations the following day.
Despite the controversy surrounding the results, Balakot demonstrated that India was willing to employ air power across international borders in response to terrorist attacks.
The operation also reinforced a broader strategic concept: precision military action against terrorist infrastructure could be conducted without necessarily escalating into full-scale conventional war.
India’s most ambitious application of this doctrine came in 2025 following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir.
On April 22, militants allegedly linked to The Resistance Front (TRF), widely viewed by Indian authorities as an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, attacked tourists in the scenic Baisaran Valley. Twenty-six civilians were killed, including 25 Hindu tourists.
India responded with Operation Sindoor on the night of May 6–7, 2025.
The operation targeted nine sites associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed across Pakistan’s Punjab province and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Indian forces employed an array of stand-off weapons, including SCALP cruise missiles, Hammer precision-guided munitions launched from Rafale fighter aircraft, BrahMos missiles, and loitering munitions.
Indian officials emphasized that the operation focused exclusively on terrorist infrastructure and deliberately avoided Pakistani military facilities and civilian targets.
According to Indian claims, more than 100 militants were killed. Pakistan rejected these assertions and claimed to have downed several Indian aircraft, including Rafale fighters. India, meanwhile, maintained that it inflicted significant damage on Pakistani military assets during the subsequent exchanges.
The confrontation became the most serious military crisis between the two nuclear-armed rivals since the 1999 Kargil conflict.
Yet despite the intensity of the fighting, neither side crossed the threshold into all-out war—further strengthening India’s argument that calibrated military retaliation could be used against terrorist threats without triggering uncontrollable escalation.
Today, Pakistan faces a security dilemma that bears striking similarities to the one India has long described.
Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of allowing the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant organizations to operate from Afghan territory.
Pakistani officials argue that these groups exploit safe havens inside Afghanistan to recruit fighters, train operatives, and launch attacks across the border.
The Afghan Taliban denies the allegations and insists Afghan territory is not being used against neighboring states. Nevertheless, militant attacks inside Pakistan have surged dramatically in recent years.
As a result, Islamabad has increasingly resorted to military action beyond its borders.
The most notable escalation came in October 2025 with Operation Khyber Storm.
Pakistan conducted airstrikes against suspected TTP positions in Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika provinces. One reported target was TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud, although he reportedly survived the strike.
The operation triggered fierce retaliation from Afghan Taliban forces, particularly around the Spin Boldak border crossing, transforming what had largely been a counterterrorism problem into an interstate military confrontation.
The escalation continued in February 2026 with Operation Ghazab lil Haq.
Following Taliban attacks on Pakistani border positions, Islamabad launched extensive air operations against targets in Kabul, Kandahar, and eastern Afghanistan.
Pakistani officials openly described the campaign as a response to cross-border attacks and accused Afghanistan of harboring militants responsible for violence inside Pakistan.
The fighting produced significant casualties and further damaged relations between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan insists its operations employ precise targeting against militant compounds, weapons depots, and training facilities.
However, Afghan authorities and international observers have repeatedly raised concerns about civilian casualties.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that Pakistani airstrikes in early 2026 contributed substantially to civilian deaths and injuries.
Among the most controversial incidents was a March 2026 strike in Kabul that Afghan authorities claimed hit a drug rehabilitation center, allegedly killing hundreds of people. Pakistan disputed the allegations, but the incident intensified criticism of its campaign.
The latest June 2026 operation has generated similar controversy.
Pakistan says its strikes killed 25 militants linked to anti-Pakistan groups. The Taliban government, however, claims the attacks struck civilian areas in Paktia, Khost, and Nangarhar provinces, killing 36 civilians and injuring more than 160 others.
Afghan officials further accused Pakistan of conducting follow-up strikes as residents attempted rescue operations—an allegation Islamabad has not accepted.
While important differences remain, the parallels between India’s actions against Pakistan and Pakistan’s actions against Afghanistan are difficult to ignore.
India justified its operations on the grounds that neighboring territories were being used as sanctuaries by terrorist groups responsible for attacks against Indian citizens and security personnel. Pakistan now makes almost identical arguments regarding the TTP and other militant organizations operating from Afghanistan.
Both countries have framed their strikes as limited, intelligence-driven operations aimed at non-state actors rather than attempts to seize territory or wage conventional war. Both have emphasized precision targeting and self-defense. And both have argued that sovereignty cannot be used as a shield for groups conducting cross-border terrorism.
The irony is striking. For decades, India accused Pakistan of supporting, financing, and sheltering militant organizations responsible for attacks on Indian soil. Today, Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of doing precisely the same thing.
Whether Islamabad consciously adopted lessons from India’s experience remains open to debate. But the strategic logic increasingly appears similar: when a neighboring state is perceived as unwilling or unable to eliminate terrorist safe havens, military action across the border becomes an increasingly attractive option.
As both India and Pakistan embrace cross-border counterterrorism strikes as a tool of state policy, a new regional security reality is emerging—one in which borders are no longer viewed as absolute barriers to military retaliation. The broader question is whether this evolving doctrine will enhance regional security by deterring militant groups, or instead create a cycle of escalation that further destabilizes South Asia.
