The prospect of the US Navy deploying the Seahawk Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) alongside the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt and its strike group marks a potentially transformative moment in modern naval warfare. If successful, the experiment could accelerate a doctrinal shift that redefines how major navies approach sea control, force projection, and fleet survivability in an era increasingly dominated by precision missiles, submarines, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence.
For decades, the aircraft carrier has remained the centerpiece of American naval power. Yet, as anti-access and area-denial capabilities proliferate across the globe, the carrier’s future has come under growing scrutiny. Critics argue that aircraft carriers have become too expensive, too visible, and too strategically valuable to risk in contested waters. Supporters, however, maintain that no other platform can match a carrier’s ability to project power over vast distances.
The introduction of unmanned surface vessels into carrier strike groups may offer a way to reconcile these competing realities. By extending the reach of carrier formations, reducing risks to sailors, and complicating enemy targeting efforts, platforms such as the Seahawk MUSV could significantly enhance the effectiveness of naval operations without exposing additional crews to danger.
The importance of the Theodore Roosevelt deployment extends beyond the performance of a single vessel. Many observers view it as a critical test case that could shape the US Navy’s future concept of operations (CONOPS) for integrating autonomous systems into frontline fleet operations.
The significance of the initiative was underscored in February when Vice Adm. Brendan McLane announced that a medium unmanned surface vessel would deploy alongside the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group. According to McLane, the objective is to evaluate how the pairing functions operationally and to determine which additional mission packages could be integrated into future carrier strike groups.
The deployment comes at a time when the Navy is still grappling with fundamental questions about the role of autonomous vessels within its broader force structure. While technological advances have made unmanned platforms increasingly capable, military planners are still developing the doctrine required to employ them effectively alongside traditional warships.
The momentum behind the MUSV program became evident on May 22, when the Navy identified seven defense firms whose designs would advance to the prototype sea-testing phase of the next-generation MUSV competition. The companies selected were Leidos, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), Sea Machines, Saronic Technologies, Galliano Marine Services, PacMar Technologies, and Birdon.
The sea-testing phase is scheduled to begin this month and continue through October. Companies whose designs meet Navy requirements could receive contracts worth approximately $15 million and qualify for subsequent production opportunities.
The Theodore Roosevelt deployment therefore serves as more than an operational experiment; it may also provide valuable data that influences future procurement decisions and the broader direction of the Navy’s unmanned systems strategy.
At the center of this effort is the Seahawk MUSV, one of several autonomous vessel designs developed by Leidos. The Seahawk represents an evolution of the company’s Sea Hunter autonomous vessel, a platform originally developed under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and later transferred to the Navy for operational evaluation.
Designed to support anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime domain awareness missions, Seahawk can operate autonomously for extended periods while carrying a variety of sensors and payloads. Its capabilities make it particularly attractive as a force multiplier within a carrier strike group.
According to Conrad Chun, Vice President for Defense Communications at Leidos, the company brings more than a decade of experience in maritime autonomy. That experience has contributed to the development of Seahawk, which joined the Navy’s operational fleet earlier this year.
The Navy has already gained valuable operational experience with autonomous vessels. In 2023, it deployed four unmanned ships—including Seahawk and Sea Hunter—to the Western Pacific. However, the planned integration with a carrier strike group represents a more ambitious step toward operationalizing unmanned systems within mainstream naval formations.
Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, has noted that the Theodore Roosevelt deployment demonstrates the Navy’s growing desire to use unmanned systems as supplements to primary forces while developing tailored force packages optimized for specific missions and geographic regions.
This thinking aligns closely with the strategic vision outlined by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle. In February, Caudle unveiled a new “Fighting Instructions” framework that introduced what he described as a “hedge force strategy.” The approach seeks to capitalize on unmanned systems while creating a broader range of operational options that move beyond the traditional carrier strike group model.
Historically, carrier strike groups have consisted of a carrier supported by cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and logistics vessels operating as a tightly integrated formation. The future envisioned by naval planners may involve a more distributed architecture in which autonomous platforms conduct surveillance, electronic warfare, anti-submarine operations, and potentially even strike missions, thereby expanding the combat power of the overall force.
One of the most compelling advantages of MUSVs is their ability to operate with minimal human involvement. Unlike conventional warships, autonomous vessels do not require large crews, extensive accommodations, or the logistical support necessary to sustain sailors during long deployments.
This capability is particularly significant for a Navy facing persistent manpower challenges. The service is reportedly short of approximately 10,000 sailors while simultaneously operating under mounting budgetary pressures. In this environment, unmanned systems offer the possibility of generating greater operational capability at lower personnel costs.
Analysts frequently describe this advantage as providing more “teeth” with less “tail”—increasing combat power while reducing the support infrastructure required to sustain it.
Beyond personnel savings, MUSVs can perform missions that would otherwise place sailors at considerable risk. By removing humans from the most dangerous operating environments, autonomous vessels can conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and electronic warfare missions closer to hostile forces without exposing crews to direct danger.
For carrier strike groups, the value of this capability is substantial. MUSVs equipped with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems can function as forward-deployed sensors hundreds of miles from the carrier itself. Their presence expands the strike group’s situational awareness and provides commanders with earlier warning of potential threats.
Similarly, anti-submarine warfare payloads can help detect and track hostile submarines before they approach the carrier. Electronic warfare systems can identify, disrupt, or deceive enemy sensors and communications networks.
The modular design philosophy behind MUSVs further enhances their utility. Depending on operational requirements, payload bays can be configured for mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, or intelligence collection. This flexibility allows commanders to adapt the platform to evolving mission demands without requiring entirely new vessel designs.
In many respects, Seahawk can be viewed as the carrier strike group’s forward skirmish line—a networked platform positioned ahead of the main force to identify threats and provide valuable reaction time for commanders.
Yet despite their promise, autonomous vessels are not without significant challenges.
One major concern involves logistics and maintenance. While unmanned ships eliminate many of the burdens associated with supporting crews, they still require fuel, software updates, repairs, and replacement components. Sustaining autonomous vessels during extended deployments will require new maintenance concepts and support infrastructure.
The Navy is already exploring solutions, including at-sea reloading of Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) vertical launch system cells using supply ships and specialized support platforms often referred to as “robot tenders.” Such approaches could reduce dependence on traditional maintenance crews while increasing demand for highly skilled technical personnel capable of managing complex software and network systems.
Technical challenges present another obstacle. Autonomous vessels must navigate congested waterways, adverse weather conditions, and dynamic maritime environments with limited human intervention. Ensuring safe and reliable operation under such circumstances remains a demanding engineering task.
Equally concerning is the threat posed by adversary electronic warfare capabilities. Many unmanned systems depend heavily on satellite communications and network connectivity. Jamming, spoofing, or cyberattacks could disrupt those connections and potentially degrade operational effectiveness.
Perhaps the most consequential challenge, however, involves command and control.
Questions surrounding authority, accountability, and decision-making remain unresolved. Who ultimately controls an autonomous vessel operating within a carrier strike group? Is responsibility vested in the strike group commander, the air wing commander, a dedicated unmanned systems operator, or some combination of these authorities?
More importantly, how much autonomy should be delegated to machines during combat?
Current policy generally requires human authorization for weapons release decisions. Yet future conflicts may unfold at speeds that challenge traditional command structures. Hypersonic missiles, for example, can compress decision timelines to mere seconds. In such circumstances, fully human-controlled responses may prove too slow.
This raises difficult legal and ethical questions. While humans can be held accountable for battlefield decisions, autonomous systems cannot. Determining the appropriate balance between machine autonomy and human oversight remains one of the most complex issues facing military planners.
Recognizing these challenges, Adm. Caudle’s “Fighting Instructions” specifically directs the Navy to develop detailed frameworks for integrating robotic autonomous systems into fleet operations. The guidance calls for incorporating unmanned capabilities into decisions regarding force distribution, strategic positioning, and global force management.
At present, no comprehensive operational model exists for employing autonomous systems across the full spectrum of naval missions. Developing such a framework will be essential if platforms like Seahawk are to move beyond experimental deployments and become permanent components of the fleet.
Congress has also taken notice. Members of the House Armed Services Committee have pressed the Navy to demonstrate that viable concepts of operations exist before accepting large numbers of unmanned vessels into service. Some lawmakers have advocated requiring the Secretary of the Navy to develop a formal strategy for integrating unmanned systems into fleet operations and broader joint maritime campaigns.
Ultimately, the success of the Seahawk deployment may hinge less on technology than on doctrine. The vessel’s sensors, autonomy software, and mission systems are important, but they alone cannot transform naval warfare. What matters equally is the development of operational concepts that define how autonomous platforms contribute to combat effectiveness, how commanders employ them, and how responsibilities are allocated.
If the Theodore Roosevelt experiment proves successful, it could accelerate the adoption of unmanned vessels across the fleet and signal the emergence of a new era in naval operations. If not, it may reinforce concerns that technology is advancing faster than doctrine.
For now, the deployment represents a crucial step in an ongoing evolution. The technology is increasingly available. The strategic rationale is compelling. The operational framework, however, remains a work in progress. The future of autonomous naval warfare may depend on whether the Navy can bridge that gap and transform platforms like Seahawk from promising innovations into indispensable force multipliers for the carrier fleets.
