Ukraine expects to receive its first Swedish-made Saab Gripen fighter jets in January or February 2027, President Volodymyr Zelensky has said, as Kyiv seeks to strengthen its air force and develop more effective ways to counter Russian aircraft, missiles and increasingly sophisticated drone attacks.
Speaking to journalists in Copenhagen after talks with Nordic and Baltic leaders, Zelensky said Ukraine had asked Sweden to accelerate the delivery of the aircraft, describing the transfer process as already underway.
“They should arrive in January-February, possibly in February. We have raised the issue that we need them as quickly as possible. But, so to speak, the process is already underway,” Zelensky said.
He expressed gratitude to Sweden for its military assistance, adding that Ukraine was counting on the Gripens to strengthen its air defence capabilities, particularly against Russian jet-powered Shahed attack drones.
“We will see how the Gripens perform against these. We are counting on them for this as well. This is about air defence,” he said.
The anticipated arrival would mark an important development in Ukraine’s efforts to diversify its combat aircraft fleet, which currently relies on a combination of Western-supplied F-16s and Mirage 2000s alongside upgraded Soviet-era aircraft.
Sweden has committed to donating up to 16 used Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine, with deliveries expected in early 2027. The aircraft are intended to provide Kyiv with an additional combat capability as Russia continues to conduct large-scale air operations against Ukrainian military positions, infrastructure and population centres.
In a separate agreement signed on June 30, 2026, Ukraine also agreed to purchase 16 newer Gripen E aircraft from Sweden, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2029.
Kyiv has expressed considerably greater ambitions, indicating an interest in acquiring between 100 and 150 Gripen E/F aircraft over the longer term. Such a programme could include industrial cooperation, technology partnerships and arrangements for maintenance and servicing inside Ukraine.
Ukraine is simultaneously pursuing an ambitious agreement with France for the possible acquisition of up to 100 Rafale multirole fighter jets, reflecting its intention to build a modern, diversified Western-standard air force.
Ukrainian pilots and technical personnel have already begun training on Gripen aircraft in Sweden, preparing for their eventual integration into the country’s air combat operations.
The Gripen has long attracted Ukrainian interest because its operational characteristics are particularly relevant to the country’s military circumstances.
Unlike many conventional Western fighter aircraft that depend heavily on established military airbases, the Swedish-designed Gripen was developed to operate from dispersed and relatively austere locations.
It can use short runways, sections of motorways, small civilian airports and prepared road strips. Its design also allows ground crews to conduct relatively rapid maintenance and refuelling operations with limited infrastructure.
These characteristics could prove particularly valuable for Ukraine, where Russian missile and drone attacks regularly target military airfields, aircraft maintenance facilities and aviation infrastructure.
Operating from multiple locations would make Ukrainian aircraft more difficult to locate and destroy on the ground. It would also provide greater operational flexibility, allowing Kyiv to reposition fighters and potentially launch missions from unexpected locations.
The Gripen’s relatively low operating costs, advanced avionics, sensor integration and sophisticated radar systems could further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to conduct air defence missions.
The initial Gripen C/D aircraft are equipped with the upgraded PS-05/A radar, while the more advanced Gripen E models feature an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The latter offers improved detection, tracking and engagement capabilities against multiple airborne targets.
The aircraft can also carry a range of modern air-to-air weapons, including IRIS-T, AIM-120 AMRAAM and, subject to the relevant integration and delivery arrangements, the long-range Meteor missile.
Zelensky, meanwhile, has stressed that Ukraine needs additional F-16 Fighting Falcons and ammunition to sustain its existing air operations. He acknowledged that many aircraft in the country’s current fleet are ageing and require frequent maintenance and repairs.
“But they are good, fast, they are capable of destroying jet-powered Shaheds. We use them, and we are grateful to the countries that provided them to us: Denmark and Norway,” he said, referring to the F-16s.
One of the most strategically important capabilities associated with the Gripen is its potential combination with the European-made Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile.
Ukrainian officials, including Deputy Head of the President’s Office Pavlo Palisa, have described the Gripen-Meteor combination as the long-range arm of Ukrainian combat aviation.
The pairing could give Ukraine a substantially improved ability to threaten Russian tactical aircraft operating near the front lines, particularly the Su-34 fighter-bombers responsible for launching large numbers of guided glide bombs against Ukrainian positions.
Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow for air power at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), has argued that a Gripen C armed with Meteor could offer Ukraine a significantly better opportunity to engage Russian Su-34s than an F-16 equipped with AIM-120 missiles or a Mirage 2000 carrying MICA missiles.
Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies has similarly assessed the Gripen-Meteor combination as potentially the strongest realistic capability available to Ukraine for countering Russian glide bombs before their release.
The Meteor is widely regarded as one of the world’s most capable beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. Unlike conventional rocket-powered missiles, it uses a ramjet propulsion system that allows it to sustain high speed and manoeuvrability during a substantial portion of its flight.
This gives it an important advantage in maintaining energy during the terminal phase of an engagement, expanding the distance within which an opposing aircraft has little realistic chance of escaping.
Its effective engagement range is generally estimated at up to approximately 200 kilometres under favourable conditions, although actual performance depends on altitude, launch conditions, target manoeuvrability and other operational factors.
The missile is also being integrated into the weapons architecture of the US F-35 programme, underlining its growing importance among Western air forces.
For Ukraine, the principal attraction is not simply the ability to shoot down enemy fighters. It is the possibility of forcing Russian aircraft to operate farther away from the front, reducing the effectiveness of their standoff weapons.
Russia’s extensive use of guided glide bombs has become one of Ukraine’s most difficult battlefield challenges.
Many of these weapons are based on Soviet-era gravity bombs fitted with universal planning and correction modules, commonly known by their Russian abbreviation UMPK. The kits add aerodynamic surfaces and satellite navigation systems, transforming relatively inexpensive conventional bombs into guided weapons.
Russia initially developed these systems for 500-kilogram bombs before expanding their use to 250-kilogram, 1,500-kilogram and 3,000-kilogram munitions.
The weapons allow Russian tactical aircraft to attack Ukrainian military positions, defensive fortifications, logistics facilities and settlements without necessarily entering the range of Ukrainian short-range air defence systems.
Su-34 fighter-bombers typically climb to a favourable altitude, release UMPK-equipped bombs from approximately 60–70 kilometres behind Russian front lines and then turn away from the engagement area.
The relatively small radar and thermal signatures of the glide bombs, combined with their short flight times and trajectories, make them difficult to intercept consistently.
Unlike cruise missiles, which generally have more easily detectable propulsion and radio-frequency signatures, glide bombs can present a much smaller detection window.
Ukraine has therefore relied heavily on electronic warfare and other defensive measures to disrupt their guidance systems. However, these measures cannot eliminate the threat.
The Gripen-Meteor combination could offer a different approach: destroying the aircraft carrying the bombs rather than attempting to intercept the bombs themselves.
If Ukrainian fighters can detect and engage Su-34s before or during their weapon-release phase, they could disrupt Russian strike missions and force the aircraft to abandon their planned attacks.
The combination of the Gripen’s radar, sensor fusion and Meteor’s long-range engagement capability could improve the chances of obtaining a firing opportunity during the relatively brief period when Russian bombers approach their release positions.
However, the prospect of Ukrainian Gripens threatening Russian Su-34s should not be interpreted as an easy solution.
Russian fighter-bombers rarely operate without protection. Su-34s are generally accompanied by Su-35 fighters and, in some circumstances, MiG-31 interceptors.
These aircraft can carry the R-37M long-range air-to-air missile, which is reportedly capable of engaging targets at distances approaching 300–400 kilometres under favourable conditions.
That advertised range exceeds the commonly cited maximum range of the Meteor. However, missile range alone does not determine the outcome of an air-to-air engagement.
The R-37M was primarily developed to threaten large, relatively less manoeuvrable targets, including airborne early-warning aircraft, aerial refuelling tankers and other high-value platforms.
Its effectiveness against smaller and more manoeuvrable fighters depends on several factors, including target altitude, speed, manoeuvres, electronic countermeasures and the quality of targeting information.
Meteor, meanwhile, is designed to retain considerable energy during the final stage of its flight, giving it a potentially significant advantage in the engagement’s no-escape zone.
The central question will therefore be which side detects the opposing aircraft first, establishes a reliable firing solution and launches its weapons before the other can respond.
Airborne early-warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) could play a decisive role in this contest. Their ability to detect aircraft at considerable distances, coordinate fighter operations and provide targeting information could substantially influence the effectiveness of both Ukrainian and Russian air operations.
The potential contest between the Gripen and Russia’s Su-35 will consequently depend not only on the individual capabilities of their missiles and radars but also on the quality of the wider surveillance, command and control networks supporting them.
Ukraine will also face an important operational constraint: the number of Gripens available during the initial phase will be limited. Kyiv will need to balance offensive opportunities against the risks of losing valuable aircraft that cannot be quickly replaced.
The arrival of the first Gripen C/D aircraft in early 2027 will not immediately transform the balance of air power over Ukraine.
Sixteen aircraft represent a relatively small force compared with Russia’s much larger inventory of tactical aviation. Their effectiveness will depend on pilot proficiency, weapons availability, maintenance capacity, radar integration and coordination with Ukraine’s existing air defence network.
The more advanced Gripen E aircraft, expected from 2029, could eventually provide additional capabilities through their AESA radar, improved electronic warfare systems and expanded weapons options.
Nevertheless, the initial aircraft could provide Ukraine with something it currently lacks in sufficient quantities: a fighter platform specifically suited to dispersed operations and capable of carrying advanced long-range air-to-air weapons.
The Gripen-Meteor combination may not eliminate Russia’s glide-bomb threat or prevent every Su-34 mission. But it could impose significantly greater risks on Russian tactical aviation, forcing bombers to release their weapons from farther away and potentially reducing their accuracy and effectiveness.
For Moscow, the prospect of Ukrainian fighters threatening aircraft that have so far operated with relative freedom at standoff distances could complicate established air tactics.
For Kyiv, the objective is not necessarily to establish immediate air superiority but to make Russian air operations increasingly costly and unpredictable.
The first Gripens arriving in January or February 2027 could therefore represent more than another Western fighter delivery. They could mark the beginning of a new phase in Ukraine’s effort to challenge Russia’s tactical air power and reduce the battlefield impact of one of Moscow’s most destructive weapons.
