The United States is sounding the alarm over a burgeoning military partnership between North Korea and Russia, which top officials warn could upend strategic balances in both Europe and East Asia. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this week, Admiral Samuel Paparo, newly appointed commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, delivered a stark assessment: North Korea’s expanding arms pipeline to Russia—ranging from artillery to ballistic missiles—is being repaid with advanced air defense systems that could significantly strengthen Pyongyang’s military posture.
“It’s a transactional symbiosis,” Paparo told lawmakers on Capitol Hill. “Each state fulfills the other state’s weakness to mutual benefit.”
The exchange, he emphasized, is not merely symbolic or experimental. It marks a functional, reciprocal relationship with tangible strategic outcomes—arming Russian forces for the war in Ukraine and potentially upgrading North Korea’s long-range defense capabilities.
Admiral Paparo’s remarks add sharp detail to what analysts have been increasingly describing as a convergence of convenience between Moscow and Pyongyang.
“Thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of artillery shells” have been shipped from North Korea to Russia, Paparo stated, along with “hundreds of short-range missiles.” These weapons have largely been used to reinforce Russia’s dwindling reserves on the Ukrainian front lines. Much of the artillery is reported to be Soviet-caliber—122mm and 152mm rounds—compatible with the systems Russia has relied on since the Cold War.
In exchange, North Korea is believed to be receiving something it has long coveted: sophisticated air defense technology. While Admiral Paparo did not specify models, U.S. and South Korean intelligence sources have pointed to possible transfers of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems akin to Russia’s Pantsir-S1 or even components of the S-300 family, both of which would represent a significant leap in Pyongyang’s ability to intercept aerial threats.
“This isn’t just a barter of old bullets for outdated bombs,” said Dr. Jessica Lee, a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Asia. “This is about building up North Korea’s defensive shield in exchange for shoring up Russia’s offensive capability.”
Although both Pyongyang and Moscow have officially denied weapons transactions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, mounting circumstantial and intelligence-backed evidence suggests otherwise.
In December 2024, observers spotted a Russian military train convoy near the border with North Korea carrying vehicles that appeared consistent with launchers used for the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15), a road-mobile, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea.
Though the quality of the footage made definitive identification difficult, the dimensions and structural features of the vehicles closely matched previous sightings of the KN-15 system, analysts said.
Satellite imagery and logistics tracking have also revealed increased rail activity between the two countries, especially at Tumangang Station—the primary rail gateway between Russia and North Korea. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted a “marked increase in military-sized cargo movement” since mid-2023.
In February 2025, South Korean media reported fresh intelligence indicating another shipment of North Korean weapons was imminent. Among the items expected were the KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles—a system with a flight profile resembling that of Russia’s Iskander missile—and more artillery rounds.
The implications of this arms-for-defense exchange are global. For Russia, North Korean munitions serve as a crucial lifeline amid a protracted war in Ukraine and international sanctions that have hampered its ability to replenish stockpiles. For North Korea, the influx of Russian technology may represent an inflection point in its air defense capabilities.
Currently, North Korea relies largely on outdated Soviet-era systems like the S-75 and S-200, with only limited domestic upgrades. The introduction of modern Russian systems could offer new protections for Pyongyang’s leadership, command-and-control centers, and missile bases—making preemptive strikes riskier and less likely to succeed.
“This deal could change the calculus for U.S. and allied planners,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. “If North Korea’s ability to defend against air or missile strikes improves dramatically, that could embolden it to act more provocatively, knowing it’s harder to hit back.”
Moreover, the partnership illustrates an emerging axis of resistance to Western pressure, linking authoritarian regimes that are increasingly willing to challenge U.S.-led norms. With Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia each engaging in some form of military or technological exchange, the outlines of a new multipolar security order are beginning to take shape.
Paparo’s testimony comes at a pivotal moment for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. As the Pentagon continues to rebalance toward Asia, the growing military nexus between Russia and North Korea complicates long-term planning.
Already, the Biden administration has been stepping up regional defense initiatives. In March, the U.S. conducted its largest-ever trilateral military exercises with South Korea and Japan, simulating coordinated responses to missile launches and amphibious assaults. Washington has also deployed more missile defense assets to Guam and reaffirmed extended deterrence commitments to Seoul and Tokyo.
“The coordination we’re seeing between Russia and North Korea adds urgency to these steps,” said Lt. Gen. (ret.) Chip Gregson, former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. “It underscores why our alliances in Asia need to be as nimble and integrated as NATO.”
Yet the risk of escalation remains real. If the U.S. or its allies choose to interdict North Korean weapons shipments or target facilities believed to house new Russian-supplied systems, it could trigger retaliatory responses and spiral into a broader confrontation.
The arms transfers also challenge the credibility of international sanctions regimes. Under UN Security Council resolutions dating back to 2006, North Korea is explicitly prohibited from exporting or importing weapons and related materials. Russia, as a permanent member of the Council, is supposed to help enforce these rules.
Instead, Moscow now appears to be in clear violation, and with China frequently shielding Pyongyang from harsh consequences, the ability of the Security Council to act has diminished.
“We’re witnessing the erosion of multilateral enforcement mechanisms,” said Dr. Victor Cha, Korea Chair at CSIS. “And that emboldens rogue actors.”
U.S. officials say they are working with allies to pursue alternative channels of accountability. These include expanded intelligence-sharing, financial tracking of arms transactions, and the use of national sanctions tools such as the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.
But enforcement alone may not be enough.
As North Korea continues its provocative weapons testing—launching cruise missiles and conducting underwater drone trials—the risk of miscalculation grows. A more heavily defended North Korean military, especially one backed indirectly by Russia, could feel emboldened to take riskier actions on the peninsula.
Conversely, the U.S. and its allies may feel compelled to accelerate their own weapons deployments, including advanced missile defense systems like THAAD and Aegis Ashore, potentially igniting a new arms race in the region.
For now, Admiral Paparo’s warning serves as a critical signal.
“This isn’t just about Ukraine or the Korean Peninsula,” he told the committee. “This is about a new form of strategic cooperation between authoritarian states—one that poses challenges on multiple fronts and requires an integrated, sustained response.”
The testimony of Admiral Paparo marks a watershed in U.S. public acknowledgment of North Korea and Russia’s deepening military alignment. Far from an isolated arrangement, their transactional relationship appears to be a deliberate, mutually reinforcing strategy that could reshape both regional and global security dynamics.
