China has claimed that its HQ-9B surface-to-air missile system successfully intercepted two incoming missile targets simultaneously, including a ballistic missile and another missile that abruptly changed direction during flight, in what Beijing is presenting as a significant demonstration of its evolving air and missile defense capabilities.
The reported interception is particularly noteworthy because maneuvering ballistic missiles are among the most difficult threats for conventional air defense systems to engage. Their ability to alter trajectories during flight, particularly in the terminal phase, can complicate radar tracking, prediction of impact points and interceptor guidance.
The claim also comes against the backdrop of questions about the operational performance of Chinese-made air defense systems during the May 2025 India-Pakistan military confrontation, when Pakistan reportedly deployed Chinese-supplied HQ-9B systems against Indian aerial attacks.
On November 2, China’s state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) reported that an air defense unit belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Central Theater Command Air Force had successfully intercepted two missile targets simultaneously during a weapons-verification exercise.
Footage broadcast by CCTV showed the so-called Shenwei Missile Battalion responding to warnings of incoming missiles approaching from multiple directions. According to the report, the exercise involved different types of missile threats, including a ballistic missile and another target that suddenly changed direction while in flight.
The battalion successfully engaged both targets, marking the first time it had simultaneously intercepted two new types of missile targets, CCTV reported.
Although the initial television report did not identify the specific air defense system involved, China’s state-run Global Times subsequently identified it as the HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile system.
Shi Shidong, a member of the battalion, told CCTV that personnel had not been informed in advance about which targets their unit would be assigned to intercept.
“On the day of the mission, we hadn’t yet been assigned which targets we would engage. We knew there were several types of targets, including ballistic missiles, but we didn’t know that our unit would be the one tasked with intercepting them,” Shi was quoted as saying.
The most challenging moment reportedly came when one of the incoming targets suddenly changed direction and descended rapidly.
According to Shi, the air defense personnel had only a very narrow window to respond. The missile force identified the threat, calculated its trajectory and launched an interceptor within seconds.
“It suddenly descended sharply. If you fail to act for two seconds, or even one second, and do not launch in advance, you could miss the window,” he said.
A Chinese military commentator cited by the Global Times said the unit’s response time of less than two minutes demonstrated the effectiveness of an integrated command-and-control structure. Such a network can distribute missile warning information and tracking data among different air defense units, allowing commanders to assign interception responsibilities to the nearest available system.
However, the Chinese reports have not provided sufficient technical information to independently verify the interception or assess the difficulty of the targets.
The HQ-9 family is China’s principal long-range surface-to-air missile system and forms an important component of the PLA’s layered air defense network.
Developed from the 1990s onward, the road-mobile HQ-9 is widely considered a hybrid design influenced primarily by Russia’s S-300 air defense system, which China began importing during the 1990s. The system also incorporates elements associated with Western missile guidance concepts.
The HQ-9 was initially developed primarily to engage aircraft, cruise missiles and other aerodynamic threats at long ranges. However, China subsequently expanded the program’s capabilities to include limited defense against tactical ballistic missiles.
The original HQ-9 was followed by the improved HQ-9A in 2001 and the HQ-9B around 2015. The latter introduced improvements to interceptor range and incorporated a passive infrared seeker alongside radar-based guidance, creating a dual-mode guidance arrangement.
The addition of infrared guidance potentially improves the system’s ability to engage targets with reduced radar signatures and provides another means of tracking incoming threats.
More advanced anti-ballistic missile capabilities, particularly during the terminal phase of a ballistic missile’s trajectory, have generally been associated with newer Chinese systems, including the HQ-9C and the much more advanced HQ-19.
The HQ-9C reportedly incorporates active radar homing and hit-to-kill technology, enabling an interceptor to destroy an incoming ballistic missile through direct impact rather than relying exclusively on an explosive fragmentation warhead.
Consequently, China’s latest claim about the HQ-9B is significant. If accurate, it suggests that Beijing has improved the system’s ability to engage more sophisticated missile threats beyond its traditionally understood anti-aircraft role.
One of the technologies associated with the HQ-9 family is track-via-missile (TVM) guidance, a concept also employed by the American Patriot air defense system.
Under TVM guidance, a ground-based radar illuminates an incoming target while the interceptor carries a receiver that detects radar signals reflected from the target. Information collected by the interceptor is transmitted back to the ground station, where it is combined with radar tracking data to calculate the target’s trajectory and guide the interceptor toward an engagement.
This arrangement allows the ground-based fire-control system to continuously update interception calculations, improving accuracy during the engagement.
Nevertheless, the precise guidance configuration used by the HQ-9B in the November exercise has not been disclosed.
Ballistic missiles normally follow a predictable trajectory after completing their powered flight. Air defense systems use radar tracking to calculate their likely impact points and determine the optimal moment to launch interceptors.
However, modern maneuvering ballistic missiles complicate this process by changing their trajectories during the terminal phase of flight.
Such maneuvers can force an interceptor to adjust its course repeatedly, reducing the time available for engagement and increasing the possibility of a missed interception.
The challenge has become increasingly apparent in the Russia-Ukraine war.
A Financial Times report, citing Ukrainian Air Force data compiled by the Center for Information Resilience, indicated that the interception rate of Russian ballistic missiles by Ukraine’s American-supplied Patriot systems reached approximately 37 percent in August 2025 but dropped to around 6 percent in September after Russia modified its ballistic missiles to incorporate terminal-phase maneuvering capabilities.
The figures illustrate how even advanced air defense systems can face substantial difficulties when confronting missiles capable of changing their flight paths during the final stages of an attack.
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE, one of the most advanced variants of the American system, is specifically designed to intercept ballistic and other high-performance missile threats. Nevertheless, the growing sophistication of maneuvering missiles has prompted further efforts to improve interceptor technology.
American defense contractor Lockheed Martin is developing the PAC-3 Edge interceptor, intended to provide improved performance against maneuvering ballistic missiles and emerging hypersonic threats.
Against this background, China’s claim that the HQ-9B intercepted a missile that abruptly changed direction is particularly important. However, without information about the target’s speed, altitude, maneuvering characteristics and countermeasures, it remains impossible to determine how demanding the engagement actually was.
The reported exercise also draws attention because Pakistan operates Chinese-supplied HQ-9B air defense systems, which were reportedly deployed during the May 2025 military confrontation with India.
During that conflict, Chinese-made fighter aircraft operated by Pakistan attracted considerable attention for their reported combat performance. However, the performance of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems generated a different set of questions.
Open-source reporting and assessments of the confrontation raised questions about whether Pakistan’s HQ-9B batteries had been able to prevent Indian aircraft and weapons from striking military installations deep inside Pakistani territory.
Analysts pointed to several potential weaknesses, including radar vulnerability to electronic warfare, the limited number of available air defense batteries and difficulties engaging fast-moving, low-flying or maneuvering threats.
India’s use of stand-off weapons, including BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles launched from Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, also highlighted the challenges facing Pakistan’s integrated air defense network.
The confrontation therefore raised broader questions about the effectiveness of the HQ-9 family against a technologically capable opponent equipped with sophisticated electronic warfare systems, advanced surveillance capabilities and long-range precision weapons.
China’s latest announcement appears intended to demonstrate that its air defense systems have continued to evolve. Nevertheless, a controlled weapons-verification exercise cannot automatically establish how effectively the system would perform in a complex combat environment involving electronic interference, multiple simultaneous attacks and sophisticated decoys.
The HQ-9B is not only important for China’s domestic military requirements but also represents a significant component of Beijing’s defense export industry.
China has supplied variants of the HQ-9 system to several countries, including Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, while other Central Asian countries have also emerged as potential customers for Chinese air defense technology.
If the reported interception demonstrates a genuine improvement in the HQ-9B’s ability to engage maneuvering ballistic missiles, it could strengthen the system’s international appeal.
Central Asian countries could be particularly interested in such capabilities. Several former Soviet republics have historically relied on Russian air defense equipment and technologies. However, Russia’s military-industrial capacity has faced considerable pressure from the prolonged war in Ukraine and Western sanctions.
The HQ-9’s technological lineage and similarities to the Russian S-300 could also make it an attractive option for countries seeking to diversify their air defense procurement while retaining some compatibility with existing military infrastructure. Actual integration, however, would depend on radar architecture, command-and-control arrangements, communications systems and weapons compatibility.
A stronger export proposition could also help China expand its influence in the international air defense market, where Russian, American and European systems have traditionally competed.
China’s reported interception also raises a broader question about the future development of the HQ-9 family.
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) represent a particularly difficult challenge for conventional missile defense systems. They combine extremely high speeds with the ability to maneuver unpredictably through the atmosphere, making their trajectories more difficult to calculate than those of conventional ballistic missiles.
Traditional ballistic missile defense systems are designed around the ability to detect, track and predict incoming threats. However, highly maneuverable hypersonic weapons can complicate each stage of that process.
The development of more advanced interceptors, improved radar networks, faster data processing and integrated command systems will therefore be essential for countering these emerging threats.
China has already invested heavily in layered air and missile defense capabilities, with systems such as the HQ-9B, HQ-9C and HQ-19 potentially performing different roles within a broader defensive architecture.
In such a configuration, more advanced systems could be assigned the initial responsibility for engaging sophisticated ballistic threats, while upgraded HQ-9B batteries could provide additional interception opportunities against threats that penetrate the outer layers.
However, the November exercise does not establish that the HQ-9B can intercept hypersonic glide vehicles. Such a capability would require substantially more evidence and testing against representative hypersonic targets.
Ultimately, China’s announcement represents an important claim about the evolving capabilities of its long-range air defense systems. The simultaneous interception of two missile targets, including one reportedly capable of changing direction during flight, suggests that the PLA is seeking to expand the operational role of the HQ-9B beyond conventional air defense.
But the absence of independent verification, detailed target specifications and information about the exercise’s operational conditions means the actual significance of the achievement remains uncertain.
For China, the test provides an opportunity to demonstrate technological progress and strengthen the international reputation of its defense industry. For potential customers, particularly Pakistan and Central Asian countries, the real question will be whether the claimed capabilities can be reproduced under realistic combat conditions against sophisticated missile threats and electronic warfare environments.
