The historic first Central Asia-European Union (CA-EU) Summit in Samarkand, a new chapter in Eurasian geopolitics is being written. The five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have reconvened, this time in Astana, Kazakhstan, for the second China-Central Asia Summit, hosted on June 16, 2025.
With Chinese President Xi Jinping in attendance—his second visit to the region in less than a year—the summit is not only a diplomatic event but a strong signal of Beijing’s ambitions to entrench its presence in what was once the exclusive strategic backyard of Russia.
The growing flurry of summits in Central Asia this year, from Xi’an to Samarkand to Astana, reflects the intensifying geopolitical tug-of-war in a region rich in resources, transit routes, and diplomatic relevance—fast becoming the fulcrum of a new “Great Game.”
President Xi’s participation in the summit marks a consistent Chinese strategy toward Central Asia. His presence at both the inaugural 2023 China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an and now in Astana confirms the priority Beijing places on this region. China is increasingly asserting itself as the leading economic and infrastructure partner to these five nations.
Meeting Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Xi outlined a forward-looking economic agenda that includes expanding bilateral trade, investments, and infrastructure projects, particularly the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which Beijing has long championed. The railway, once completed, is expected to transform land connectivity across the region, circumventing Russian-controlled routes and offering a direct, high-speed corridor to China.
Xi also emphasized cooperation in clean energy, artificial intelligence, and mineral exploration, laying the groundwork for a technological and industrial foothold in Central Asia.
In bilateral talks with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Xi reinforced China’s commitment to national sovereignty and border security, pledging economic and diplomatic support for Tajikistan’s internal stability. He also met the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, further tightening regional ties with offers of infrastructure investment, digital development, and green transition funding.
The Astana summit comes just two months after Europe’s major foray into Central Asia through the first Central Asia-European Union Summit, held in April 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. There, the EU made bold commitments to invest over €12 billion (~US$13.6 billion) in infrastructure and connectivity projects across the region. Highlights of the EU proposal included:
- €3 billion for transport infrastructure.
- €6.4 billion for renewable energy development.
- €100 million for satellite internet, aimed at digitally connecting 2,000 schools and 1,700 rural villages.
A massive €10 billion investment into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), a logistical corridor bypassing Russia, aiming to shorten cargo transit times between Central Asia and Europe to 15 days.
The EU, recognizing the global strategic importance of the region, agreed with Central Asian leaders to elevate ties to a strategic partnership. Plans are underway to hold an Investors’ Forum in Uzbekistan in 2025, underlining Europe’s intent to remain engaged.
Yet, despite these ambitions, the EU remains economically outpaced by China in Central Asia. China has not only pledged more infrastructure development but has already delivered major logistics projects like Khorgos Gateway in Kazakhstan—one of the world’s largest inland ports.
The five Central Asian states are increasingly adept at playing multiple powers off one another. Traditionally tied to Russia due to Soviet legacies, the region has gradually diversified its foreign policy since the 1991 Soviet collapse. Now, Central Asia is becoming a contested zone among China, Russia, the EU, Turkey, and the United States.
While Russia still retains deep historical, military, and linguistic ties, its grip has weakened since the Ukraine war began in 2022, drawing much of Moscow’s strategic attention away from its southern flank.
“The countries of the region are balancing between different centres of power, wanting to protect themselves from excessive dependence on one partner,” noted Kyrgyz political scientist Nargiza Muratalieva.
For Russia, Chinese expansion isn’t officially a concern. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed fears of geopolitical encroachment, stating, “China is our privileged strategic partner, and the countries of Central Asia are our historical allies.” Yet Russia’s ability to fund regional development has dwindled, creating space for China to surge ahead.
The region’s newfound importance lies in its geography and resources. Located at the intersection of Europe, China, Russia, and the Middle East, Central Asia is rich in oil, gas, uranium, gold, rare earths, and water resources.
Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) views Central Asia as the cornerstone of its overland ambitions. The China-Tajikistan Highway, traversing the Pamir Mountains into Afghanistan, and the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway are two examples of BRI-funded ventures that bolster China’s influence while improving regional connectivity.
China’s interest also stems from energy security. Land routes offer more stable alternatives to sea lanes threatened by geopolitical friction or piracy. Hence, China is diversifying supply chains, and Central Asia offers both a supplier base and a land corridor to Europe.
China, Russia, Turkey, and the EU have all launched multilateral initiatives to solidify their positions in Central Asia:
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and four Central Asian states (excluding Turkmenistan), it remains a major security and diplomatic platform.
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Established by Russia in 1991, it includes most former Soviet republics and remains a soft tool of Russian influence.
- Organization of Turkic States (OTS): Spearheaded by Turkey, it draws on linguistic, cultural, and ethnic commonalities with Central Asia, particularly with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
- EU-Central Asia Strategy: Post-2022, the EU has ramped up efforts to build a footprint in the region, focusing on digitalization, education, green energy, and transit connectivity.
These overlapping affiliations reflect Central Asia’s complex identity—neither purely Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Turkic, nor European—but an intricate mix of all, shaped by centuries of conquest, migration, and revolution.
Whereas Russia’s influence is still largely military and linguistic, China has built influence through economic investment, especially in infrastructure, often delivering quicker and without the governance demands the West imposes.
Muratalieva notes: “Neither Russia nor Western institutions are capable of allocating financial resources for infrastructure so quickly and on such a large scale, sometimes bypassing transparent procedures.”
This pragmatic acceptance of Chinese funding is evident in major projects like:
- Dry ports and border crossings, including Khorgos.
- Energy pipelines, including oil and gas routes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
- Road networks and railways under BRI umbrella.
- Joint mining and green energy ventures.
Even in nuclear energy, Kazakhstan has diversified: while Russia will build its first nuclear plant, Astana has signaled openness to Chinese participation in future projects.
While the China-Russia-EU rivalry dominates headlines, Turkey is quietly expanding cultural and diplomatic ties. Through the Organization of Turkic States, Turkey promotes a pan-Turkic identity, particularly influential among youth and elites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Yet despite this shared identity, Turkey lacks the economic muscle to compete with China or the EU, positioning itself more as a cultural bridge and alternative ideological partner.
Meanwhile, the United States’ presence in Central Asia has sharply declined. Post-Afghanistan withdrawal, Washington has lost much of its operational leverage. Though still present through security dialogues and limited aid programs, the U.S. is largely a background player in the new Great Game.
With Donald Trump poised to return to the White House, European leaders increasingly feel the need to develop an independent strategic policy toward Eurasia, as Washington grows more isolationist.
As the Astana summit wraps up, Central Asia emerges more than ever as a pivot region in global politics. It is both a prize for external powers and an emerging player on its own terms.
The region’s current strategy is one of multi-vector diplomacy—embracing China’s investments, preserving strategic ties with Russia, welcoming European aid, and engaging Turkey’s cultural revivalism, all while avoiding dependency on any single power.
Central Asian leaders hope to maintain sovereignty, foster development. President Xi’s visit and the 2025 Astana summit will be remembered as a key milestone in this evolution. As pipelines, railways, and political partnerships converge on this landlocked heart of Eurasia, Central Asia is no longer a forgotten frontier—it is the epicenter of the next global realignment.
