Donald Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States must take control of Greenland to protect the Arctic from what he describes as growing security threats posed by China and Russia. Framing the issue in stark geopolitical terms, the US president has warned that the strategic territory is at the centre of a global power struggle that could shape future world peace.
“World peace is at stake! China and Russia want Greenland, and there is not a thing that Denmark can do about it,” Mr Trump wrote on social media earlier this year, reigniting a debate that has simmered for nearly a decade.
China has made no secret of its ambitions to expand its influence in the Arctic region, presenting itself as a long-term stakeholder in the area’s economic development, shipping routes, natural resources, and governance structures. Yet analysts say the gap between Beijing’s stated ambitions and its actual footprint on the ground in Greenland remains wide.
As Washington sharpens its rhetoric and pushes closer security ties with Denmark and NATO allies, questions are growing over how well-founded claims of a Chinese “security threat” to Greenland really are.
China’s Arctic strategy formally took shape in 2018, when Beijing released a sweeping policy paper outlining its vision for deeper engagement in the region. In the document, China controversially declared itself a “Near-Arctic State,” arguing that climate change and global trade gave it legitimate interests in the Arctic’s future.
The policy laid out plans to expand scientific research, participate in environmental protection, invest in infrastructure, and play a role in governance mechanisms. Central to the strategy was the idea of a “Polar Silk Road,” an Arctic extension of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative aimed at developing new shipping routes and transport corridors.
Beijing argued that melting ice would unlock faster maritime passages between Asia and Europe, potentially reshaping global trade. The policy paper encouraged Chinese companies to invest in Arctic shipping infrastructure and conduct trial voyages to pave the way for regular commercial operations.
At the time, Western security officials warned that economic engagement could evolve into strategic leverage, particularly in small Arctic communities with limited infrastructure funding options. Greenland, a vast but sparsely populated autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, quickly emerged as a focal point.
Despite its grand vision, China’s progress on Arctic shipping has been slow and cautious. The harsh environment, unpredictable ice conditions, and heavy reliance on Russian cooperation along the Northern Sea Route have constrained expansion.
A notable milestone came last October, when a Chinese commercial vessel travelled from a port in eastern China to Suffolk in England via the Arctic, skirting Russia’s northern coastline. Chinese state media hailed the voyage as a breakthrough, noting it took around 20 days—roughly half the time required for a traditional route through the Suez Canal.
However, the achievement also underscored the challenges. According to state media reports, the single journey took three years of planning, extensive coordination, and favourable ice conditions. Chinese officials have said similar voyages are being considered for 2026, but there is no evidence of regular Arctic shipping traffic by Chinese firms at present.
Mr Trump has repeatedly asserted that Chinese and Russian ships are operating in large numbers near Greenland, portraying the island as being encircled by rival powers.
“Right now, Greenland is covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place,” he told reporters in early January.
Those claims have been flatly rejected by Greenlandic authorities and questioned by independent analysts. Publicly available maritime tracking data shows no Chinese or Russian vessels operating near Greenland’s coastline during the winter months, when sea ice makes navigation virtually impossible.
Analysts say seasonal realities alone undermine the president’s statements. “In winter, the waters around Greenland are largely frozen,” said one Arctic security researcher. “There simply isn’t the shipping activity being described.”
Over the past two decades, China has repeatedly attempted to establish a stronger economic presence in Greenland, but most major initiatives have been blocked or abandoned.
In 2018, a Chinese state-owned company sought to invest in upgrading and expanding a network of Greenlandic airports. Danish authorities ultimately intervened, citing security concerns amid reports of strong US diplomatic pressure. Denmark later stepped in to help finance the projects itself.
Another proposal to purchase a decommissioned Danish naval base in Greenland was similarly quashed, reportedly to prevent China from gaining a potential military foothold. Beijing has also expressed interest in acquiring satellite ground stations and financing large-scale infrastructure projects, but these efforts have met resistance.
While China has successfully established and operates several research and space-related facilities across the broader Arctic, analysts note that its overall investment footprint remains modest compared with its ambitions.
Greenland’s vast mineral wealth is one area where Chinese interest has been particularly persistent. The island holds significant deposits of rare earth elements, uranium, and other critical minerals essential for advanced technologies.
Greenland is generally ranked among the top 10 jurisdictions globally for rare earth reserves. These minerals are vital for everything from electric vehicles and wind turbines to fighter jets, precision-guided weapons, and laser systems.
China already dominates the global rare earth industry, controlling roughly 70 per cent of production and processing, according to Chinese state media. Reducing that dominance has become a strategic priority for the United States and its allies.
China holds a stake in an Australian company that was granted an exploration licence for one of Greenland’s few rare earth projects. However, political opposition, environmental concerns, and regulatory hurdles have stalled the mine, limiting Beijing’s access.
Despite years of interest, China has not secured direct control over Greenland’s mineral resources.
Mr Trump has made little effort to hide his interest in Greenland’s mineral potential. Analysts say access to critical resources is emerging as a central pillar of Washington’s renewed engagement with the territory.
A recent Greenland-related agreement announced by the US administration includes provisions aimed at securing supply chains and keeping strategic minerals out of Chinese hands. Some observers argue this reveals the deeper motivation behind Mr Trump’s rhetoric.
“Security concerns are part of the picture, but minerals are clearly a driving factor,” said one European policy analyst. “Greenland matters not just for military positioning, but for economic security in a world of great-power competition.”
NATO has also weighed in on the debate, with Secretary-General Mark Rutte saying the alliance would take steps to ensure that “the Chinese and the Russians will not gain access” to Greenland’s military or economic infrastructure.
Greenland already hosts the US-operated Pituffik Space Base, a critical node in missile warning and space surveillance systems. Western officials argue that maintaining control over such assets is essential as competition in the Arctic intensifies.
At the same time, many European leaders have pushed back against what they see as exaggerated threat narratives. They stress that while vigilance is necessary, policy decisions should be based on facts rather than speculation.
China has strongly rejected Washington’s accusations, describing claims of a looming security threat as unfounded. Chinese officials say Beijing’s Arctic engagement is focused on scientific research, environmental protection, and lawful commercial cooperation.
“The so-called China-threat is baseless,” a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, accusing the US of using fear to justify strategic expansion.
Beijing continues to signal long-term interest in the Arctic, but analysts note that its approach has become more cautious as resistance from Western governments has hardened.
There is little doubt that China sees the Arctic as strategically important and would like to expand its role in the region over time. Climate change, new shipping routes, and access to resources make the area increasingly relevant to global power politics.
However, nearly a decade after unveiling its Arctic blueprint, China’s tangible progress in Greenland remains limited. Investment bids have been blocked, infrastructure projects stalled, and shipping activity remains sporadic.
For now, analysts say, Mr Trump’s warnings appear to be driven as much by future risk calculations and resource competition as by present-day realities on the ground.
“The Arctic is becoming more important, and China wants a seat at the table,” said one Arctic expert. “But the idea that Greenland is already under pressure from Chinese control just doesn’t match the evidence.”
As geopolitical competition moves northward, Greenland is likely to remain a symbol of both strategic anxiety and long-term ambition—caught between global powers looking decades ahead, rather than responding to an immediate threat today.
