China has inducted its latest land-based, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Dongfeng-61 (DF-61), into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force’s routine training, marking an unusually rapid transition from public unveiling to operational training. The development highlights Beijing’s accelerating ability to develop, manufacture and deploy advanced strategic weapons as it continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal.
China’s state-run broadcaster CCTV showcased the DF-61 on November 5, reporting that the missile had entered routine training with the PLA Rocket Force. The announcement came just 14 months after the weapon was publicly unveiled during a massive military parade in Beijing in September 2025, held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s formal surrender in World War II.
The relatively short timeline is significant. The transition from public debut to regular military training suggests that the missile has moved beyond its initial testing and induction stages and is now being incorporated into the Rocket Force’s established combat-training activities.
In the Chinese military context, routine training generally indicates that a weapons system has become part of regular unit activities. For a mobile ICBM, this can include field exercises, deployment drills, movement between launch locations and training designed to prepare crews for operational missions.
A Chinese military expert speaking to CCTV described the DF-61’s induction timeline as significantly faster than that of earlier generations of Chinese ICBMs, including the DF-41. The development, according to the expert, demonstrates how China’s military-industrial complex has accelerated the process of designing, developing, testing and introducing strategic weapons into service.
Military commentator Shao Yongling suggested that the rapid transition was possible because the DF-61 had likely completed many of its essential development and testing procedures before its public unveiling. She also pointed to the missile’s apparent technological similarities with the DF-41, which could have reduced the time required for manufacturing, logistical integration and crew training.
The announcement also carried historical significance. November 5 marked the 66th anniversary of the first launch of the DF-1, the missile that began China’s indigenous Dongfeng ballistic missile programme.
Launched on November 5, 1960, the DF-1 was a short-range, surface-to-surface missile reverse-engineered from the Soviet-designed R-2. Over the following decades, China progressively expanded the range, accuracy and sophistication of its Dongfeng missile family, eventually developing nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic systems.
The DF-61 represents another stage in that evolution. However, despite its public unveiling and reported entry into routine training, substantial uncertainty remains about its actual technical capabilities.
The DF-61 is a land-based, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile designed to carry nuclear warheads. China first publicly displayed the system during its September 2025 Victory Day military parade in Beijing.
The missile appeared alongside other strategic weapons, including the air-launched JL-1 (Jinglei-1), the submarine-launched JL-3 (Julang-3) and the DF-31BJ land-based ICBM.
Chinese state media presented the parade as the first concentrated public demonstration of the country’s land-, air- and sea-based nuclear triad. The display was intended to demonstrate the breadth of China’s strategic nuclear capabilities and its ability to deliver nuclear weapons through multiple platforms.
The DF-61 was displayed on a large transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), indicating that it is designed for road-mobile operations rather than being restricted to fixed underground silos.
Mobility is a significant feature of modern strategic missile systems. A road-mobile ICBM can be moved between deployment locations, dispersed during periods of heightened tension and concealed in designated operating areas. This complicates an adversary’s ability to locate, track and target the missile before launch.
For China, which has traditionally maintained a substantial portion of its nuclear deterrent in fixed or semi-fixed facilities, mobile ICBMs provide an additional layer of survivability and strengthen its potential second-strike capabilities.
Nevertheless, the publicly confirmed information remains limited. Beijing has not released comprehensive technical specifications for the DF-61, including its operational range, propulsion system, payload capacity, accuracy or the number and type of nuclear warheads it can carry.
Consequently, much of the available information comes from open-source intelligence, Chinese military commentary and comparisons with the older DF-41.
One of the most frequently discussed aspects of the new missile is its apparent relationship with the DF-41, China’s established road-mobile ICBM.
The two systems share several visible design characteristics, particularly their large transporter-erector-launchers. This resemblance has led many military analysts and commentators to describe the DF-61 as a possible variant, modernization or further development of the DF-41.
The DF-41 was first tested in 2012 and entered serial production in 2019. Its development gave the PLA Rocket Force considerable experience in operating modern, solid-fuel, road-mobile intercontinental missiles.
Shao Yongling suggested that similarities between the two systems could have helped accelerate the DF-61’s introduction. Existing production infrastructure, technical expertise, logistical arrangements and established training procedures could have reduced the time required to integrate the newer missile.
The DF-61 may also be compatible with existing command, communications and logistical support networks used by the Rocket Force. If so, military units would not need to establish entirely new operational structures to accommodate it.
The PLA Rocket Force’s accumulated experience in organizing ICBM exercises could also help personnel become familiar with the new equipment more quickly.
However, visual similarities alone do not establish that the DF-61 is simply an upgraded DF-41. Without official technical disclosures, it remains difficult to determine how extensively the newer missile differs in propulsion, guidance, payload integration and overall performance.
The DF-61’s operational range is among the most important unanswered questions.
China has not officially disclosed the missile’s range. However, some Chinese military commentators have suggested that it could reach approximately 18,000 kilometres.
If accurate, such a range would allow the missile to strike targets across the continental United States and other distant regions.
For comparison, the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), through its Missile Threat database, assesses the DF-41’s operational range at up to 15,000 kilometres, making it one of China’s longest-range ballistic missiles.
The suggested 18,000-kilometre range for the DF-61 would therefore represent a substantial increase. Nevertheless, this figure remains an unverified assessment rather than an officially confirmed specification.
The missile’s propulsion system is another area of uncertainty. Based on its apparent similarities with the DF-41 and other modern Chinese mobile ICBMs, analysts generally assume that the DF-61 uses a three-stage solid-fuel propulsion system.
Solid-fuel missiles offer important operational advantages over liquid-fuel systems. They can be stored for extended periods without requiring the lengthy fuelling procedures associated with many liquid-propellant missiles. This allows military units to maintain a higher state of readiness and reduces the time required to prepare a missile for launch.
The DF-61 is also widely assumed to possess multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capability. MIRV technology allows a single ballistic missile to carry several nuclear warheads, each potentially directed towards a different target.
China has not officially confirmed the DF-61’s MIRV configuration. However, the DF-41 is widely assessed to possess this capability.
On August 6, 2015, US defence officials confirmed that China had flight-tested the DF-41 with two independently targeted warheads. Subsequent assessments have suggested that the missile could carry up to 10 nuclear warheads.
CSIS also assesses that the DF-41 can carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, although estimates of its actual operational payload vary.
For the DF-61, estimates are even less certain. Some commentators suggest a capacity of between three and 10 warheads, while other assessments place the possible figure at eight to 12. None of these estimates has been officially verified.
The accuracy of the DF-61 is another critical unknown.
Ballistic missile accuracy is commonly measured through Circular Error Probable (CEP), which represents the radius within which half of a missile’s warheads are expected to land.
The Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) has estimated the DF-41’s CEP at approximately 100 to 500 metres. However, China has not published equivalent figures for either the DF-41 or the newer DF-61.
Similarly, the guidance architecture of the DF-61 remains undisclosed.
According to CSIS’s Missile Threat assessment, the DF-41 likely uses an inertial navigation system (INS), supported by stellar or satellite updates. Such systems combine onboard navigation measurements with external reference information to improve accuracy during flight.
It is reasonable to consider whether the DF-61 employs a comparable architecture, particularly if it shares technological foundations with the DF-41. However, this remains an analytical assumption rather than a confirmed technical detail.
The limited information surrounding the DF-61 reflects a broader pattern in China’s strategic weapons development.
Beijing increasingly uses military parades, carefully selected images and state-controlled media reports to demonstrate advances in its defence capabilities. These disclosures establish the existence, broad role and apparent maturity of weapons systems without necessarily revealing the technical information required for independent assessments.
In the case of the DF-61, China has confirmed its designation, land-based mobile configuration, nuclear-triad role, public unveiling and entry into routine Rocket Force training.
However, the most consequential performance characteristics remain undisclosed.
This creates significant challenges for foreign intelligence agencies and military planners attempting to assess China’s expanding nuclear capabilities. Analysts must combine visual evidence, historical development patterns, official statements and comparisons with previously deployed systems to estimate the capabilities of newer weapons.
The DF-61’s rapid transition into routine training is nevertheless an important indicator of China’s growing strategic weapons-development capacity. If the missile shares substantial technological and logistical foundations with the DF-41, Beijing may have succeeded in shortening the time required to introduce successive generations of strategic systems.
More broadly, the development comes as China continues to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal, strengthen its mobile missile forces and improve the survivability of its strategic deterrent.
For now, the DF-61 remains a weapon whose operational status is becoming clearer faster than its technical specifications. Its induction into regular training demonstrates that it has moved beyond the ceremonial stage of a military parade. But until Beijing releases verifiable information about its range, payload, accuracy and propulsion, assessments of its actual capabilities will continue to rely heavily on open-source intelligence and informed speculation.
