China could launch its fourth aircraft carrier, the Type 004, in late 2027 or early 2028, marking another significant step in Beijing’s efforts to expand its naval power and strengthen its ability to project military force across the Indo-Pacific.
The carrier, currently under construction at the Dalian shipyard in northeastern China, is expected to be substantially larger than the country’s existing aircraft carriers. More importantly, satellite imagery has raised the possibility that it could become China’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, potentially giving the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) greater operational endurance during distant deployments.
An October 27 assessment by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests that construction of the Type 004 has reached a stage comparable to that of China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian, in May 2021.
That comparison provides a basis for estimating a launch window in late 2027 or early 2028, assuming construction continues at a similar pace.
Brian Hart of the CSIS China Power Project said he “would not be surprised” if the carrier were launched within that timeframe, provided construction maintains its current momentum.
However, the projected launch date should not be confused with the vessel’s operational readiness. The completion of its hull would represent only one stage in a lengthy process involving propulsion installation, electrical systems, aviation equipment, sea trials and the training of its future crew and air wing.
China’s Fujian, which entered service on November 5, 2025, offers a useful indication of the time required to transform a newly launched carrier into an operational naval asset. The ship underwent more than three years of fitting out and trials following its launch in June 2022.
If the Type 004 follows a broadly similar development schedule, its meaningful contribution to China’s deployed naval capabilities could emerge in the early 2030s.
Satellite imagery indicates that the Type 004’s unfinished hull measured approximately 322 metres in length and 46 metres across in early October 2026.
By August, the vessel had already reached roughly 320 metres in length, while imagery from September 4 showed construction progressing around the bow.
The completed carrier is projected to measure approximately 336 to 339 metres, placing it within the general size range of the US Navy’s Gerald R. Ford-class supercarriers.
Its estimated full-load displacement of between 110,000 and 120,000 tonnes would also make it one of the largest aircraft carriers ever constructed. However, those displacement figures remain projections rather than confirmed specifications.
The construction process has accelerated through the use of prefabricated sections. Large modules began appearing in a Dalian dry dock in early 2025, and by May 2026 their assembly had produced a recognisable carrier hull.
Scaffolding visible in satellite imagery around October 1 suggested preparations for the forward flight deck, side extensions and the starboard island.
Several large flight deck sections were reportedly added within approximately five days around the beginning of October, illustrating the speed at which prefabricated components can be assembled once they arrive at the construction site.
The development resembles the construction sequence of Fujian, whose initial modules entered dry dock around July 2020. Its superstructure was installed approximately a year later, and the carrier was launched on June 17, 2022.
Fujian’s development provides a useful benchmark, although the Type 004’s larger dimensions and potentially different propulsion architecture could produce a substantially different construction and testing schedule.
A launch in late 2027 would also coincide with the 2027 centenary of the People’s Liberation Army, giving Beijing an opportunity to showcase its expanding shipbuilding capabilities.
The most consequential uncertainty surrounding the Type 004 concerns its propulsion system.
Satellite imagery has identified two compartments, each measuring approximately 15 by 15 metres, whose configuration appears consistent with spaces designed to accommodate nuclear reactors and associated shielding.
The compartments reportedly have multiple structural layers and differ from the corresponding arrangements visible during Fujian’s construction.
These observations have fuelled speculation that Beijing is developing its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. However, China has not officially confirmed the propulsion system, the number of reactors or the vessel’s final engineering configuration.
If nuclear propulsion is confirmed, the Type 004 could gain a significant advantage in operational endurance.
Unlike conventionally powered carriers, a nuclear-powered vessel would not need frequent replenishment of conventional propulsion fuel. This could allow commanders greater flexibility to maintain higher speeds, reposition between operating areas and remain deployed for extended periods.
Nuclear-generated electricity could also support energy-intensive systems, including electromagnetic aircraft launch equipment, advanced radar and other high-demand electronic systems.
The potential benefit would be particularly important during prolonged operations in the Western Pacific, where a carrier might need to maintain continuous fighter patrols and airborne surveillance while operating far from China’s mainland.
However, nuclear propulsion would not eliminate the carrier group’s dependence on logistical support.
Aircraft would still require aviation fuel, while missiles, bombs, spare parts, food and other supplies would need regular replenishment. Conventionally powered escort vessels would also continue to depend on fuel supply ships.
A nuclear reactor would therefore reduce one major logistical burden without making the entire carrier strike group independent of replenishment.
It would also introduce new technical requirements, including specialist reactor crews, maintenance facilities and a more complex shore-based support infrastructure.
Integrating an entirely new nuclear propulsion system into a carrier could extend the testing period considerably. Reliability would have to be demonstrated under sustained high-speed operations, intensive flight schedules and demanding manoeuvring conditions.
The Type 004 is expected to use catapult-assisted take-off and arrested recovery, continuing the technological transition introduced by Fujian.
China’s first two carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, use ski-jump flight decks that impose limitations on aircraft launch weights and operational flexibility.
Fujian introduced electromagnetic aircraft launch technology, allowing heavier aircraft to take off with greater fuel and weapons loads.
The Type 004 could potentially feature four electromagnetic catapults, compared with Fujian’s three, although the number and final configuration have not been officially confirmed.
Estimates suggest that the new carrier could accommodate approximately 75 to 100 aircraft, significantly more than the estimated 50 to 60 aircraft capacity associated with Fujian.
Its larger hangar and flight deck could allow the PLAN to operate a broader combination of fighters, airborne early-warning aircraft, helicopters and unmanned systems.
The J-15T multirole fighter is expected to form an important component of the carrier’s aviation capabilities. Its catapult-assisted launch would allow greater flexibility in carrying fuel and weapons compared with ski-jump operations.
The newer J-35 stealth fighter could provide an additional capability, particularly in operations against sophisticated opposing air forces and surveillance networks.
Another important aircraft would be the KJ-600 airborne early-warning and control platform.
The KJ-600 is designed to extend radar coverage beyond the carrier’s immediate horizon, allowing commanders to detect approaching aircraft and coordinate fighter operations over a much larger area.
Such an aircraft could become particularly valuable during operations far from China’s land-based radar infrastructure.
The carrier could also accommodate Z-20 helicopter variants and unmanned aircraft for surveillance, logistical support and other specialised missions.
Nevertheless, the projected aircraft capacity should be treated cautiously. The actual number of operational fighters would depend on how much space is allocated to surveillance aircraft, helicopters, unmanned systems, maintenance and aviation support equipment.
The effectiveness of the air wing would ultimately depend on its ability to sustain repeated sorties, coordinate aircraft recovery and maintain operational readiness during prolonged deployments.
The Type 004’s potential strategic significance would be greatest in the waters east of Taiwan and across the Philippine Sea.
A Chinese carrier operating east of Taiwan could introduce an additional axis of fighter operations and airborne surveillance, complicating the calculations of the United States and its regional allies.
China already possesses extensive land-based missile and aviation capabilities along its eastern coastline. A carrier operating farther into the Pacific could complement those forces by providing mobile air power beyond the immediate reach of mainland-based aircraft.
Its airborne early-warning aircraft could help detect approaching aircraft and coordinate fighter interceptions, while stealth fighters could increase the difficulty of tracking and responding to Chinese naval aviation.
In a Taiwan contingency, such capabilities could support a range of missions, including fleet protection, maritime surveillance, air defence and operations associated with a blockade.
A carrier group could also force US and allied commanders to distribute reconnaissance, air-defence and anti-submarine resources across multiple operational directions.
However, deploying a carrier east of Taiwan would expose it to substantial risks.
The United States and its allies possess advanced submarines, long-range strike capabilities and increasingly sophisticated unmanned surveillance systems. These could threaten Chinese carrier operations and force the PLAN to allocate significant resources to protecting its flagship.
The carrier would therefore require a capable escort group consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and replenishment vessels.
Its operational effectiveness would depend on the ability of those forces to exchange targeting information, coordinate defensive operations and maintain reliable communications in a contested electronic environment.
Farther into the Western Pacific, particularly around the Second Island Chain and Guam, the Type 004 could expand China’s ability to maintain a visible naval presence.
Such deployments would increase the geographical area that US military planners would need to monitor while requiring Beijing to sustain longer and more complicated supply routes.
The carrier could also strengthen China’s naval presence in the South China Sea, where its aviation capabilities could support maritime surveillance and operations linked to Beijing’s territorial claims.
An extended presence near the Strait of Malacca or in the Indian Ocean would represent a more demanding test of China’s blue-water capabilities, particularly because of the distances involved and the requirement for reliable maintenance and replenishment infrastructure.
The Type 004 is part of a much broader effort to expand China’s aircraft carrier fleet.
The Pentagon’s 2025 assessment of China’s military capabilities projected that Beijing aims to operate nine aircraft carriers by 2035.
Achieving that objective would require a substantial acceleration in shipbuilding, aircraft production, naval aviation training and the development of supporting naval infrastructure.
Moving from the current carrier programme towards nine vessels would require China to maintain construction at major shipyards, including Dalian and Jiangnan, while simultaneously supporting carriers already in service.
The challenge would extend well beyond producing large hulls.
Each additional carrier would require hundreds of specialised personnel, trained naval aviators, aircraft maintenance teams, deck crews and experienced commanders.
The navy would also need sufficient destroyers, frigates, submarines and replenishment ships to operate multiple carrier strike groups simultaneously.
The United States currently operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, giving Washington a substantial advantage in its global naval presence.
However, China’s ability to concentrate its naval forces closer to home could complicate the regional balance.
The number of carriers available for deployment during a particular crisis would matter more than the overall size of either country’s fleet.
A carrier undergoing maintenance, training or refitting cannot contribute to an immediate military operation. China’s ability to maintain one carrier group on station while another trains or prepares for deployment would therefore represent a more consequential development than simply increasing the number of commissioned ships.
The progression from Liaoning and Shandong to Fujian and the proposed Type 004 demonstrates Beijing’s determination to develop increasingly sophisticated carrier capabilities.
Each generation introduces new requirements for naval aviation, propulsion, flight operations and fleet coordination.
A larger nuclear-powered carrier would represent another technological milestone, but its strategic value would depend on whether the PLAN could operate it reliably alongside a fully integrated strike group.
A launch in late 2027 or early 2028 would provide Beijing with a major political and industrial achievement, demonstrating its capacity to construct a warship comparable in scale to the largest American aircraft carriers.
However, the difference between launching a carrier and deploying an operational carrier strike group remains substantial.
Following launch, the Type 004 would need extensive fitting out, propulsion testing, aviation-system integration and sea trials before entering active service.
Its aircraft would require qualified pilots, while the crew would need to demonstrate proficiency in flight operations, emergency procedures and coordinated fleet manoeuvres.
The most important test would come during repeated deployments beyond the First Island Chain, where the carrier would have to sustain aircraft operations while relying on escorts, replenishment ships and maintenance support.
For Washington and its allies, the central question is therefore not simply when China launches its fourth aircraft carrier, but how frequently Beijing will be able to keep such a vessel operating in the Western Pacific.
If the Type 004 eventually combines nuclear propulsion, electromagnetic catapults, stealth fighters and airborne early-warning aircraft in a reliably deployable carrier group, it could significantly expand China’s ability to project military power beyond its coastal waters.
The transition from a rapidly assembled hull to a continuously available naval aviation force will determine whether the Type 004 becomes primarily a symbol of China’s industrial ambitions or a lasting instrument of military influence across the Indo-Pacific.
