
In a sobering and hard-hitting new report, the prestigious Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) has delivered a pointed warning about the state of France’s air combat capabilities. The detailed analysis, authored by defense experts and former French Air Force officers, underscores an alarming erosion in France’s aerial power at a time of intensifying global competition in fifth-generation warfare.
At the heart of the report lies a deeply unsettling conclusion: France’s vaunted Rafale multirole fighter jet, once the pride of the French Air and Space Force and a beacon of national aerospace engineering, is now technologically and operationally outpaced by the stealth-focused, AI-integrated platforms rapidly becoming the global standard.
The Dassault Rafale has long stood as a testament to French aerospace ingenuity. A 4.5-generation multirole fighter, it is admired for its agility, avionics, and combat versatility. But, as the IFRI report lays bare, the Rafale was never designed for survivability in a modern, stealth-dominated battlespace.
Unlike true fifth-generation fighters such as the U.S. F-35 Lightning II, the Russian Su-57, or China’s Chengdu J-20, the Rafale lacks low-observable design features. While modest radar-absorbent materials and signature-reducing shaping techniques have been integrated over time, the Rafale’s structural limitations remain glaring. Its lack of internal weapons bays and a higher radar cross-section (RCS) make it detectable in environments where stealth is not a luxury but a necessity.
In short, France’s flagship fighter is increasingly vulnerable in contested environments bristling with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. Russia’s S-400 and China’s HQ-9B surface-to-air missile networks are tailored specifically to target non-stealth aircraft. Operating in such conditions without significant support places Rafale pilots at serious risk.
The IFRI report contextualizes France’s challenges within a broader and intensifying geopolitical reality. Russia is deploying hypersonic missiles, electronic warfare assets, and high-speed drones. China is rapidly refining its stealth platforms, including the J-20 and upcoming J-35A. The United States continues to expand its fleet of F-35s, integrating them into a sophisticated web of air, sea, and space-based networks.
These advancements are not just technological. They represent a doctrinal shift toward sensor fusion, AI-assisted decision-making, and digital battlespace supremacy. Fifth-generation platforms now act as battlefield nodes, sharing data in real-time across domains. The Rafale, though equipped with advanced avionics and the potent RBE2-AA AESA radar, lacks the full-spectrum sensor integration and AI-driven fusion that defines modern air dominance.
Perhaps even more disturbing than the technological gap is what the report labels as an “acute operational vulnerability”: France’s dwindling stockpile of precision-guided munitions. In the event of a large-scale conflict, current inventories would last only 72 hours of sustained air operations.
This stark deficiency has been exacerbated by France’s support for Ukraine. Military aid packages have included SCALP cruise missiles and Aster 30 air-defense interceptors—key components of France’s own warfighting arsenal. The replenishment cycle, slowed by limited production capacity and bureaucratic procurement pipelines, has failed to keep pace with operational demands.
Adding to the problem is France’s adherence to the international ban on cluster munitions. Though laudable from a humanitarian perspective, this commitment leaves French forces without an area-saturation option for engaging dispersed ground forces. The consequence is a forced dependency on fewer, highly precise (and expensive) systems—further straining limited supplies.
Rafale vs. Fifth-Generation Competitors
Despite recent upgrades, the Rafale lags behind its fifth-generation peers in several critical categories:
- Stealth: Unlike the F-35 or J-20, the Rafale lacks internal weapons carriage, making it more visible on radar.
- Sensor Fusion: Rafale offers robust tracking and EW capabilities but falls short of the integrated AI-driven fusion engines seen in the F-35.
- Infrared Signature: The Rafale’s M88 engines, while efficient, emit significant heat, making the jet susceptible to advanced infrared search-and-track (IRST) systems and long-range IR-guided missiles.
- EW Systems: While the SPECTRA suite is among the best in the 4.5-generation class, it cannot match the F-35’s EW capabilities that allow it to operate as a standalone electronic attack asset.
- Combat Autonomy: The Rafale lacks UCAV integration. The absence of loyal wingman drones leaves it reliant on traditional support infrastructure, limiting its effectiveness in dynamic or denied environments.
- The IFRI report urges France to make a choice: either commit to a deep overhaul of its air combat strategy or face strategic obsolescence. The current stopgap approach—incrementally upgrading the Rafale while awaiting the sixth-generation Future Combat Air System (FCAS)—may not be fast enough.
While FCAS promises to deliver a game-changing leap in European airpower by the late 2030s, that timeline leaves a dangerous two-decade window where France may find itself outclassed. To close this gap, IFRI recommends:
- Accelerated Research & Development: Funding stealth retrofits and AI-enabled avionics for the Rafale.
- Stockpile Restoration: Rapid production and procurement of guided munitions, particularly METEOR, SCALP, and AASM Hammer variants.
- Allied Integration: Leveraging NATO interoperability, including joint AEW&C and SEAD tasking, to support Rafale survivability in high-threat areas.
- UCAV Partnerships: Fast-tracking drone teaming efforts, potentially through bilateral programs with Germany, the UK, or the U.S.
Since World War II, France has positioned itself as a sovereign air power—capable of defending its interests without total reliance on allies. The Rafale program, launched in the 1980s and culminating in its combat debut in Afghanistan and Libya, symbolized this independence.
But as the IFRI report notes, sovereignty must be underwritten by capability. Pride in indigenous technology cannot shield pilots from radar locks or evade a hypersonic missile. If France fails to adapt, its status as a global power—with outposts in the Sahel, Indo-Pacific, and beyond—may become increasingly difficult to sustain.
Beyond France, the report signals a broader truth: the Western monopoly on air superiority is breaking. The assumption that NATO air forces would dominate any contested airspace is no longer assured. Russia and China have invested heavily in negating the West’s aerial advantages, focusing on integrated air defenses, long-range sensors, and asymmetric tools like cyber warfare and drone swarms.
In this environment, air power must be networked, survivable, and rapidly deployable. Fighters must be invisible to radar, capable of managing the information battlespace, and interoperable across multi-domain platforms. On these metrics, the Rafale, for all its strengths, cannot compete.
The IFRI report is not merely a critique of the Rafale or a lament over depleted munitions. It is a strategic wake-up call.
France must confront the uncomfortable reality that its air force, once among the most advanced in the world, is at risk of becoming a second-tier force in the era of fifth-generation warfare. The decisions made over the next five years—on investment, procurement, and doctrine—will determine whether the Rafale fleet is remembered as a bridge to future dominance or a monument to missed opportunity.