The French Army is making a significant leap in modernizing its combat tactics, drawing direct inspiration from the ongoing war in Ukraine. In April, the 11th Parachute Brigade—France’s elite airborne combat unit—completed an advanced training program focused on the use of First-Person View (FPV) drones, a move that underscores the shifting dynamics of modern warfare.
Hosted at the Tactical Drone Training Center (Centre d’Entraînement Tactique Drone, CETD) in Caylus, southern France, the program is part of a broader transformation in how the French military perceives and employs unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The brigade’s initiative aims to develop a new generation of paratroopers proficient in using small, agile, and cost-effective drones for both reconnaissance and direct attack missions.
The program was developed in response to the tactical innovations observed in Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian forces have extensively used FPV drones—cheap, maneuverable, and often homemade—to strike Russian vehicles, bunkers, and infantry positions with high precision.
“Technology has become a weapon in its own right,” the 11th Parachute Brigade noted in an official statement. “This training is designed to ensure our troops are not just observers of this evolution—but practitioners.”
The French military has been closely studying the tactics employed by both Ukrainian and Russian forces. The use of FPV drones has become a symbol of asymmetric innovation: low-cost solutions achieving high-impact results. In Ukraine, such drones have been used to destroy tanks, harass supply lines, and provide real-time intelligence with minimal risk to human operators. France’s decision to replicate and adapt these tactics reflects a growing recognition that traditional military doctrine must evolve.
Over the course of the multi-week training cycle, French paratroopers were immersed in a series of escalating scenarios designed to simulate combat conditions. FPV operators were taught to maneuver their drones in complex terrain, identify enemy positions, and execute simulated attacks—often using mock explosive payloads to mirror the destructive capabilities employed on today’s battlefields.
The training placed a strong emphasis on stealth, accuracy, and team coordination. Operators worked alongside pilots of stabilized drones—larger, multi-rotor platforms equipped with advanced optics—to mimic battlefield conditions where multiple drone types are deployed simultaneously for maximum effectiveness.
“This phase of the training tested the ability of students to coordinate drone strikes while maintaining precision and discretion in hostile environments,” the brigade explained.
Instructors emphasized the importance of adapting to electronic warfare conditions, including signal interference and jamming. Operators learned how to respond when their drones lose GPS connection or come under cyberattack, key concerns in real-world deployments where adversaries increasingly use sophisticated counter-drone measures.
What sets FPV drones apart is their versatility. Originally developed for racing and hobbyist use, these drones are now being modified into improvised weapons capable of carrying grenades, shaped charges, and even anti-tank munitions.
The 11th Parachute Brigade has fully embraced this shift, expanding its training beyond reconnaissance to include offensive applications. Simulated strike missions involved bomb drops on hardened targets, testing not only the drone operator’s piloting skills but also their judgment in high-pressure scenarios.
Each mission required paratroopers to execute a complete cycle: infiltrating with minimal signature, identifying and marking targets, and coordinating the simulated attack with ground elements.
Though France is not currently involved in an active ground war on the scale of Ukraine, the military is preparing for future conflicts where drone saturation and rapid tactical adaptation will be essential. In this sense, FPV drone proficiency is not just a niche skill—it is a battlefield necessity.
The move aligns with broader NATO trends. Across Europe, militaries are accelerating their drone development programs. Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom have all announced plans to integrate FPV drones into regular infantry units. The U.S. has also expanded its use of small UAS, investing in AI-assisted drone swarms and loitering munitions.
France’s program is distinct in its focus on light infantry integration. Unlike heavy mechanized units, paratroopers are often deployed rapidly into complex, contested environments. The addition of FPV drones gives these units organic ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and strike capabilities without requiring air support or artillery.
By training at the CETD, paratroopers are learning how to operate autonomously, extending their reach and survivability. The program is also helping to develop a new cadre of drone instructors who will eventually transfer these skills across other units in the French Army.
There is also a philosophical shift underway. The 11th Brigade’s training acknowledges that warfare is becoming more decentralized and driven by tech-savvy operators rather than traditional top-down command structures.
Small units, equipped with drones, can now shape the outcome of a skirmish—or an entire battle. This democratization of firepower, while a tactical advantage, also raises difficult questions about escalation, collateral damage, and the psychological toll on both operators and adversaries.
In Ukraine, drone warfare has produced powerful battlefield effects, but also disturbing footage: FPV drones pursuing enemy soldiers, striking trenches, or recording kamikaze attacks in real-time. The French military is aware of these realities and is embedding ethical decision-making and rules of engagement into its drone training programs.
“We’re not just building capability—we’re building responsibility,” said a senior officer involved in the CETD program. “Technology without discipline can be dangerous.”
The success of the training program in Caylus is expected to influence wider reforms. The French Ministry of Armed Forces is considering expanding drone integration across its mechanized infantry, foreign legion, and special forces units.
There are also plans to procure domestically manufactured FPV drones tailored to military standards. Currently, many militaries—including Ukraine’s—rely heavily on commercially available drones modified in the field. France aims to develop more rugged, encrypted systems less vulnerable to jamming and cyber interference.
In parallel, research is ongoing into AI-assisted drone control, swarm coordination, and autonomous targeting. However, officials stress that human control remains central to current doctrine, particularly in lethal operations.
The battlefield is evolving, and the French military is determined not to be left behind. The 11th Parachute Brigade’s FPV training is a clear signal that lessons from Ukraine are being taken seriously—and rapidly internalized.
As drones become more ubiquitous, the ability to adapt quickly, operate autonomously, and outmaneuver technologically capable adversaries will be critical. The warfighter of the future is not just a marksman or a radio operator—but a drone pilot, engineer, and tactician rolled into one.
