Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó will be joining foreign policy representatives from Russia, Syria, and other nations at the Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security on October 31. This gathering, hosted by Belarus, has been styled as an alternative to the prestigious Munich Security Conference by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an alliance of six post-Soviet states including Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
The upcoming conference underscores Hungary’s increasingly close alignment with Russian and Belarusian foreign policy interests, raising eyebrows in the European Union and among NATO allies. Szijjártó’s scheduled appearance alongside Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Syrian Foreign Minister Bassam Sabbagh further indicates an apparent escalation in Hungary’s relationship with Moscow and its allies, including Syria—a nation with strong Moscow ties and contentious international standing.
This week’s conference participation by Szijjártó is the latest in a series of moves signaling Hungary’s strategic alignment with Russia and Belarus. Szijjártó has repeatedly engaged with Moscow’s top leadership, as demonstrated by his October speech at a St. Petersburg event hosted by Russian energy giant Gazprom. In his address, Szijjártó emphasized Hungary’s reliance on Russian energy, remarking that “Hungary’s secure and affordable gas supply is not possible without cooperation with Russia, whether we like it or not.” This stance highlights Hungary’s continued dependence on Russian gas amidst the European Union’s ongoing efforts to reduce energy reliance on Russia following the Ukraine conflict.
Hungary’s unique position in the EU as a state engaging openly with Belarus and Russia has sparked debate, particularly as the EU has consistently imposed sanctions on both countries for their roles in the Ukrainian crisis and human rights violations. However, Szijjártó’s outreach extends beyond Russia; he was also the first high-level official from the EU to visit Belarus in 2023 after President Alexander Lukashenko’s government launched a severe crackdown on opposition following disputed 2020 elections.
In May, Szijjártó met with Belarusian officials, further signaling Hungary’s diplomatic outreach to a state that remains ostracized by much of the international community. His visit marked a striking deviation from the broader EU stance, as most member states have avoided direct engagement with Belarus due to its political suppression and close alliance with Moscow.
Organizers of the Minsk Conference view the gathering as an ideological counterpoint to the Munich Security Conference, traditionally attended by Western nations and organizations to discuss global security concerns. In contrast, the Minsk Conference will provide a platform for Eurasian nations, particularly those sympathetic to Russia’s worldviews, to explore alternative security strategies that are less influenced by Western policies. A spokesperson from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry stated that the event will “outline the promising contours of future Eurasian security,” aligning with CSTO’s objectives of bolstering cooperation among member states.
Representatives from CSTO and other Moscow-aligned organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are expected to attend the Minsk event, further solidifying the presence of a Eurasian bloc seeking to challenge Western narratives on security and geopolitics.
Hungary’s positioning has led to growing tension with EU institutions, particularly as Budapest’s actions appear to challenge the EU’s unified stance on Russia. The European Union and NATO have imposed extensive sanctions on Russia and Belarus in response to the invasion of Ukraine, yet Hungary’s active diplomatic engagements with both Moscow and Minsk seem to undermine these efforts. This divergence reflects Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s strategy of balancing Hungary’s EU obligations with strategic interests in maintaining ties with Russia for economic and energy-related reasons.
For Hungary, maintaining access to Russian energy remains crucial. As part of this balancing act, Szijjártó has been outspoken about Hungary’s need for Russian gas supplies to sustain affordable energy for its citizens, a stance that has become increasingly difficult to uphold within the EU’s framework of sanctions. This dependency is not only a matter of economics but also political leverage, as it strengthens Hungary’s hand within the EU by presenting Budapest as a necessary interlocutor in dialogues with Moscow.
The Hungarian foreign minister’s appearance at the Minsk Conference is likely to spark further debate within the EU about member states’ adherence to the bloc’s foreign policy principles. Hungary’s independent stance, while advantageous in certain respects for its energy security, poses challenges to the EU’s objective of a unified approach to Russia. The EU’s policy response to Hungary’s growing ties with Moscow and Minsk will be critical in determining the extent to which individual member states can diverge from the bloc’s foreign policy consensus.
A growing faction within the EU has voiced concern over Hungary’s actions, arguing that Budapest’s engagements with Moscow and Minsk contradict the EU’s position on maintaining international pressure on Russia and Belarus. European officials worry that Szijjártó’s participation in the Minsk Conference will grant legitimacy to a parallel security framework that could compete with, rather than complement, EU and NATO objectives.
A particularly notable aspect of the Minsk Conference is the presence of Syria’s Foreign Minister, Bassam Sabbagh, underscoring Hungary’s willingness to engage with nations under Russian influence. Syria, heavily reliant on Moscow for military and political support, remains subject to extensive Western sanctions due to its government’s actions during the ongoing civil war.
Hungary’s association with the Moscow-backed Syrian regime represents a significant shift, suggesting that Hungary’s diplomatic outreach may extend beyond Russia and Belarus to encompass other Russian-aligned states in the Middle East. This outreach could deepen tensions between Hungary and its EU partners, particularly given that Syria is widely viewed as a human rights violator and an adversarial state in the West.
The emerging alignment between Hungary, Russia, Belarus, and Syria reflects a growing convergence of interests, particularly among nations seeking alternative political and security partnerships outside of the Western-led frameworks. This development has the potential to reshape diplomatic alliances, particularly if other states choose to follow Hungary’s lead in expanding ties with Russia-backed nations.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s ambition to create a parallel security architecture in Eurasia is central to the Minsk Conference. As a military alliance of post-Soviet states, CSTO positions itself as an organization that seeks to provide collective security guarantees to its members while countering what it views as Western interventionism. Russia, the de facto leader of the CSTO, has long sought to strengthen the alliance as a counterweight to NATO.
With the CSTO expanding its outreach and Hungary engaging in dialogue with member states, the Minsk Conference could accelerate the formation of a cohesive Eurasian security bloc that operates independently from NATO and the EU. For CSTO leaders, Hungary’s participation lends credibility to the organization’s attempts at broadening its influence beyond its traditional membership.
For Hungary, participating in a forum like the Minsk Conference provides a platform to express views that resonate with certain EU members and Eastern European states wary of complete detachment from Russia. Countries facing pressure from EU sanctions have taken note of Hungary’s willingness to pursue alternative diplomatic avenues, which could lead to Hungary becoming an intermediary between Russia-aligned states and Western Europe.
Hungary’s engagement in Minsk also speaks to the broader question of regional influence. By positioning itself as a bridge between East and West, Hungary could assert itself as a crucial interlocutor, negotiating both with the EU and with Moscow. Such a role could offer Hungary a unique bargaining position within the EU, especially on issues related to energy security, regional stability, and diplomatic relations with non-EU states.
Hungary’s participation in the Minsk Conference and its alignment with CSTO members pose strategic challenges to NATO and the EU, as these alliances could face increased resistance from states seeking alternative partnerships. The CSTO’s efforts to consolidate a security bloc independent of Western influence mark a potential shift in global security dynamics, particularly if other EU member states were to adopt similar stances.
Hungary’s positioning raises difficult questions for NATO, as Hungary is not only a member but also a participant in shaping the alliance’s policies. Should Hungary’s actions inspire similar behavior among other member states, NATO could face challenges in ensuring cohesion. NATO’s strategic response to Hungary’s diplomatic choices will likely need to balance unity with respect for individual member states’ policies, a difficult but increasingly necessary task.
