While no official Turkish government statement has framed the issue in such terms, defense analysts, media commentators, and security experts in Turkey are increasingly examining India’s expanding diplomatic and military engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The concern stems from New Delhi’s rapidly deepening relations with Athens and Nicosia—two capitals at the center of some of Turkey’s most sensitive geopolitical disputes. Turkish commentators argue that India’s outreach appears to mirror Ankara’s own strategic behavior in South Asia, where Turkey has consistently backed Pakistan on issues ranging from Kashmir to military cooperation.
In Turkish strategic discourse, some analysts have characterized the development as a classic “tit-for-tat” strategy, a concept popularized by political scientist Robert Axelrod and mathematician Anatol Rapoport. Under this framework, states respond to another actor’s behavior by replicating it—cooperating when cooperation is offered and retaliating when confronted with hostility.
For observers in Ankara, India’s closer ties with Greece and Cyprus appear to fit this pattern. Turkey has supported Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, and politically for decades; India, they argue, is now strengthening relations with Turkey’s regional rivals in return.
Yet many Indian and international analysts dispute this interpretation, arguing that New Delhi’s growing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is driven primarily by economic connectivity and maritime security considerations linked to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), rather than any desire to confront Turkey directly.
The Turkish perception is rooted in the close relationship between Ankara and Islamabad, particularly under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Over the years, Erdogan has repeatedly voiced support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and has criticized India’s policies in the region. Turkish leaders have raised Kashmir-related concerns at international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly, often drawing sharp reactions from New Delhi.
Turkey has also emerged as one of Pakistan’s most important defense partners. Ankara has supplied Islamabad with advanced military equipment, including Milgem-class warships, T129 attack helicopters, and unmanned aerial systems. The two countries regularly conduct military exercises and maintain close defense-industrial cooperation.
Turkish support extended to diplomatic forums as well, including backing Pakistan during periods of scrutiny by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Against this backdrop, India’s growing engagement with Greece and Cyprus has attracted heightened attention in Turkey, especially after Ankara openly supported Pakistan during the India-Pakistan military tensions of 2025. Turkish military cargo flights to Pakistan and public statements by Turkish officials reinforced perceptions in India that Turkey had become an openly partisan actor.
One of the biggest concerns highlighted by Turkish media is the possibility that Greece and Cyprus may acquire India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system.
Defense analysts in Turkey argue that deployment of the missile could alter the military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean regions. Even if integration onto naval platforms proves challenging, land-based BrahMos batteries could significantly strengthen Greek deterrence capabilities.
Reports in Turkish media have also suggested that Greece is interested in expanding defense cooperation with India beyond arms purchases, including operational exchanges and military training.
Athens and Nicosia have indeed expressed strong interest in Indian defense technologies. Apart from BrahMos missiles, discussions have included loitering munitions, commonly referred to as kamikaze drones, as well as broader defense-industrial cooperation.
For Turkey, these developments are particularly sensitive because of its long-running disputes with Greece over maritime boundaries, airspace, sovereignty claims in the Aegean Sea, and the militarization of islands.
Although both countries are members of NATO, tensions have repeatedly escalated over the past several decades. The two sides came close to military confrontation during the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996 and again during disputes over Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration in 2020.
India’s relationship with Greece has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years.
A significant milestone came in August 2023 when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Greece, marking the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the country in more than four decades.
The visit resulted in the elevation of bilateral ties to a Strategic Partnership, expanding cooperation in political, economic, security, and defense sectors.
Momentum continued in February 2024 when Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis paid a state visit to India, the first by a Greek leader in 16 years.
While India and Greece signed a defense cooperation memorandum as early as 1998, military engagement remained relatively limited for many years. That began to change in 2024 with the establishment of a Joint Working Group mechanism dedicated to defense cooperation.
The practical outcomes soon became visible. Greek aircraft participated in India’s multinational air exercise Tarang Shakti 2024, while Indian Air Force Su-30MKI fighters joined Greece’s multinational Exercise INIOCHOS.
Perhaps even more significant was Greece’s decision to station an International Liaison Officer at India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram. The move reflects growing maritime cooperation and links India’s Indo-Pacific security architecture with European and Mediterranean maritime interests.
Alongside Greece, Cyprus has become an increasingly important component of India’s Mediterranean strategy.
The island nation’s strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean and its membership in the European Union make it an attractive gateway for India’s economic and geopolitical outreach into Europe.
Diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Nicosia has intensified dramatically. Foreign ministers from both countries have met frequently over the past two years, reflecting the growing importance attached to the relationship.
A major breakthrough came in January 2025 with the signing of a Bilateral Defence Cooperation Programme. The agreement laid the foundation for enhanced military collaboration, intelligence exchanges, and security coordination.
The relationship received a further boost when Modi visited Cyprus in June 2025, becoming the first Indian prime minister to do so in more than two decades.
During the visit, both countries emphasized maritime security, cyber cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, and support for regional connectivity projects. Mechanisms for real-time information exchange concerning terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling were also discussed.
The momentum continued in 2026 with the visit of Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides to India. During that trip, bilateral relations were elevated to Strategic Partnership status, and a Defense Cooperation Roadmap covering 2026–2031 was adopted.
India’s engagement with Cyprus carries additional significance because of the island’s unresolved political division.
Since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, Cyprus has remained divided between the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey.
Ankara maintains a substantial military presence in northern Cyprus, viewing itself as the guarantor of the Turkish Cypriot community’s security.
India has consistently supported a solution based on United Nations resolutions, advocating a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality. This position aligns closely with the stance of the Republic of Cyprus and differs from Turkey’s preferred framework.
New Delhi’s longstanding involvement in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) further underlines its connection to the island. Indian military personnel have served in the mission for decades, and several senior Indian officers have held leadership positions within the peacekeeping operation.
Given Turkey’s support for the Turkish Cypriot administration, India’s visible role in Cyprus inevitably attracts attention in Ankara.
Despite Turkish concerns, many analysts argue that the primary driver of India’s engagement with Greece and Cyprus is not geopolitical rivalry with Turkey but rather the development of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
Announced during the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, IMEC aims to connect India with Europe through a network of ports, railways, shipping routes, and logistics infrastructure spanning the Middle East and Mediterranean.
However, regional instability—including the Gaza conflict, attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and broader tensions involving Iran and Israel—has slowed progress on key segments of the corridor.
In response, Cyprus has proposed an alternative approach: building the European end of IMEC first.
The concept envisions Cyprus, Greece, and Italy serving as a stable western anchor for the corridor, creating a maritime logistics network that can function even before all Middle Eastern land connections become fully operational.
For Cyprus, the initiative represents an opportunity to become a strategic gateway for Indian trade, technology, and investment entering Europe. Nicosia has actively promoted the concept within the European Union, establishing a “Friends of IMEC” grouping aimed at accelerating funding and implementation.
From India’s perspective, the proposal offers a practical solution to current geopolitical disruptions and strengthens supply-chain resilience.
Turkey’s unease over India’s growing defense and strategic engagement with Greece and Cyprus is understandable given Ankara’s disputes with both countries and its close partnership with Pakistan.
Yet the available evidence suggests that India’s priorities remain centered on connectivity, maritime security, economic integration, and diversification of strategic partnerships rather than direct involvement in Eastern Mediterranean rivalries.
Nevertheless, perception often shapes geopolitics as much as reality. As India’s footprint in the region expands and defense cooperation with Greece and Cyprus deepens, Turkish concerns are unlikely to disappear.
Whether these developments ultimately evolve into a genuine strategic competition between India and Turkey—or remain a byproduct of larger economic and geopolitical trends—will be one of the most closely watched questions in Eurasian diplomacy in the years ahead.
A growing debate within Turkish strategic circles is raising an uncomfortable question for Ankara: Is India deliberately building partnerships with Greece and Cyprus as a response to Turkey’s longstanding support for Pakistan?
