North Korea appears to be accelerating its tank production in what experts suggest could be the next phase of its covert support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. This development could significantly deepen the military and strategic partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, further complicating the global geopolitical landscape.
Earlier this month, North Korean state media reported that leader Kim Jong Un visited a major tank production facility, where he called for a dramatic ramp-up in armored vehicle manufacturing. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the inspection tour included senior officials such as Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Yong Hwan, key figures overseeing the country’s defense industries.
While the location of the factory was not disclosed, South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-Weon suggested it might be in Kusong, North Pyongan Province—an area historically associated with military manufacturing.
Kim’s comments emphasized the urgency of modernizing North Korea’s armored forces, directing the development of high-performance tanks tailored to Korean combat needs. He praised improvements in firepower, engine performance, crew comfort, and electronic warfare—hallmarks of what he labeled a “second revolution in armored force.”
But defense analysts say this initiative may extend well beyond domestic needs.
The timing and tone of Kim’s factory visit have sparked speculation that the production surge could be intended to support Russia’s embattled armored divisions in Ukraine. If true, this would mark a new chapter in North Korea’s covert but increasingly critical role in sustaining Russia’s war effort.
North Korea has already earned an estimated $20 billion from munitions sales, troop deployments, and technical support provided to Russia. In return, North Korea is believed to have received cash, political backing, and potentially advanced military technology—assistance that may have helped it make notable strides in submarine-launched ballistic missile and intercontinental missile capabilities.
Providing tanks would further reinforce this transactional alliance, expanding North Korea’s role from supplier of munitions and manpower to that of a key equipment manufacturer in Russia’s military-industrial supply chain.
“This is not just a military transaction—it’s a geopolitical pivot,” said Choong-Koo Lee, writing for War on the Rocks in February 2025. “With China warming relations with South Korea and the U.S., Pyongyang is increasingly motivated to lean on Moscow to offset strategic isolation.”
Though considered obsolete by NATO standards, the Soviet-era T-62 tank remains central to Russia’s wartime inventory. North Korea, which has modified and produced its own versions of the T-62, maintains active production lines for these armored vehicles—an asset now viewed as valuable to Russia.
According to a 2023 article by Marcin Piotrowski for the Polish Institute of International Affairs, North Korea retains at least 2,000 operational T-62 tanks and possesses the capacity to manufacture spare parts and compatible ammunition for the 115mm and 125mm guns these tanks employ.
This compatibility matters. Russia no longer produces T-62s but has deployed hundreds of them from deep storage to replace front-line losses. Western analysts say these tanks may not match modern NATO armor, but they offer an immediate and inexpensive way to bulk up depleted Russian forces.
The scale of Russia’s losses is staggering. Open-source intelligence group Oryx estimates Russia has lost nearly 3,960 tanks between the start of the war in February 2022 and May 2025. A February 2025 report by military analyst Veaceslav Epureanu indicated that by the end of 2024, Russia had exhausted about half of its 7,342 pre-war stockpile of Soviet-era tanks. Most of the remaining vehicles are in poor condition, and refurbishing them is increasingly difficult due to parts shortages, sanctions, and internal production bottlenecks.
Data from Epureanu also revealed that Russia had 1,897 T-62s in storage in 2022, but that number had fallen to just over 1,000 by late 2024—with fewer than half considered combat-ready.
In a July 2024 Forbes article, defense writer David Axe noted that the T-62 remains attractive to Russian logistics planners because it is relatively simple to restore compared to more advanced T-72s, T-80s, or T-90s, whose complex electronics and armor systems require foreign components now largely out of reach due to sanctions.
However, the viability of relying on this aging model is nearing its limits.
Russia’s defense industrial base is under unprecedented strain. It can currently produce only 500–600 new tanks annually—a rate far too slow to replace ongoing battlefield attrition. Analysts warn that 2025 may be the final year Russia can rely on existing Soviet-era reserves for wartime replenishment.
In a January 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Pavel Luzin outlined several key constraints on Russia’s war production: degraded equipment, shrinking pools of skilled workers, inflationary pressures, and the rising cost of imported materials—all exacerbated by a weakening ruble.
Meanwhile, a February 2025 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated Russia refurbished about 1,500 tanks in 2024 but suggested that future refurbishment efforts will become increasingly costly and inefficient due to the declining condition of remaining vehicles.
Against this backdrop, North Korean tank exports—whether full vehicles or kits for assembly in Russian factories—could serve as a crucial interim solution.
Despite their availability and compatibility with existing Russian logistics, T-62 tanks are deeply flawed by modern combat standards. Military analyst Peter Suciu, writing in The National Interest in January 2025, emphasized the T-62’s vulnerability to modern anti-tank weapons, drones, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). He noted that Russia’s use of T-62s is not driven by tactical confidence but by strategic necessity.
Indeed, video footage from Ukrainian drone teams frequently shows outdated Russian armor—including T-62s and even earlier models—being destroyed before reaching the front lines. While numerically helpful, these tanks offer little in terms of survivability or breakthrough capability against Ukraine’s Western-supplied defenses.
Still, experts argue that for Russia, quantity may matter more than quality in the short term.
“The T-62 is not going to win Russia the war, but it might help prevent them from losing it outright,” said military strategist Natalia Koretska of the Kyiv Institute for Security Studies. “It’s a stopgap—a way to hold the line while Russia tries to rebuild its defense production and stretch out its remaining reserves.”
The prospect of North Korean tanks reinforcing Russian forces brings deeper strategic implications.
First, it marks a notable expansion of the North Korea–Russia military relationship, indicating trust and dependence at the highest levels. It also reflects both countries’ shared interest in challenging the current U.S.-led global security architecture.
Second, it underscores North Korea’s own transformation. Far from being a passive rogue state, Pyongyang is now leveraging its defense industry to pursue tangible gains—hard currency, missile technology, and political influence.
Finally, it highlights a shifting security dynamic in Northeast Asia. As China engages diplomatically with South Korea and Japan while maintaining sanctions enforcement, North Korea’s pivot to Russia signals its desire to diversify its strategic partnerships and assert greater autonomy.
“This is no longer about pariah solidarity—it’s about realpolitik,” said John Delury, professor of international studies at Yonsei University. “North Korea sees value in being a stakeholder in a global confrontation that is reshaping the balance of power.”
While unconfirmed, the suggestion that North Korea may begin exporting tanks to Russia adds a significant new layer to the evolving Ukraine conflict and the broader geopolitical contest now engulfing Europe and Asia.
The move would demonstrate North Korea’s growing capability as a defense supplier and cement its role as a frontline ally to Russia. For the West, this alignment poses new challenges—military, diplomatic, and economic—as adversarial partnerships deepen and defense industries become ever more intertwined.
