Pakistan is reportedly developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking the continental United States — a historic shift that could realign global security perceptions and fracture long-standing nuclear dynamics.
According to an explosive report published by Foreign Affairs, U.S. intelligence agencies have uncovered credible indicators pointing to a clandestine Pakistani long-range missile development effort. This program, allegedly supported by Chinese technical expertise and resources, is said to be advancing toward operationalizing a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over 10,000 kilometers.
If confirmed, the implications of this development would be nothing short of seismic. It would place Pakistan in an elite and highly scrutinized group of countries — Russia, China, and North Korea — with the ability to project nuclear force directly onto American soil.
Historically, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has been rooted in deterring India — its neighbor and long-time rival. Islamabad’s first nuclear tests in 1998 were framed as a response to India’s nuclear ambitions, and its arsenal since then has focused largely on tactical and theater-level delivery systems.
Programs such as the Hatf, Ghauri, and Shaheen missile series were primarily designed for use within South Asia. For example, the solid-fueled Shaheen-III, tested as recently as 2022, boasts a 2,750-kilometer range — enough to strike anywhere in India, including its far-off island territories.
However, the development of an ICBM suggests a radical transformation in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Rather than focusing solely on countering Indian military pressure, Islamabad may now be seeking to deter American intervention in any future regional war.
This ambition is reportedly driven by fears that the United States, perhaps in coordination with Israel or India, might attempt a decapitation strike or pre-emptive disarmament effort targeting Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.
Indeed, since India’s 2025 Operation Sindoor — a joint-forces military exercise emphasizing precision deep-strike capability and missile defense integration — Pakistani military planners have been openly discussing the need for survivable second-strike options and broader deterrent reach.
An ICBM capable of threatening U.S. population centers could provide Islamabad with precisely such a deterrent shield.
Perhaps most disconcerting for U.S. defense officials is the suspected involvement of China in Pakistan’s ICBM ambitions.
While Chinese authorities deny any direct assistance, historical precedents lend weight to the allegations. Beijing has long been instrumental in helping Pakistan build out its missile and nuclear infrastructure. In the 1990s, it reportedly transferred M-11 short-range missiles and provided critical solid-fuel propulsion and guidance technologies.
More recently, satellite imagery analysis by U.S. defense think tanks has identified infrastructure development at Pakistani missile bases that closely mirror Chinese design patterns — including underground missile silos, mobile launcher storage bunkers, and reentry vehicle assembly facilities.
Some intelligence assessments suggest that Pakistan is benefiting from technology-sharing arrangements not unlike those between North Korea and Iran. Notably, Pakistani engineers and scientists have reportedly traveled to Chinese missile development complexes in Inner Mongolia and the Qinghai Plateau over the past three years under “scientific exchange” programs.
If China’s involvement is substantiated, Washington may view the development as an intentional act of indirect nuclear encirclement. Such a maneuver would open a new western deterrent vector against the U.S., complementing China’s own DF-41 and JL-3 missile systems already aimed at the Pacific theater.
The creation of an ICBM force is an enormous technical and economic undertaking. In addition to propulsion and range, it requires breakthroughs in warhead miniaturization, heat-shield and reentry vehicle design, and highly precise inertial or satellite navigation systems.
Pakistan has shown consistent progress in many of these areas. In 2017, it unveiled the Ababeel missile — a MIRV-capable platform (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) with a 2,200-kilometer range. While not yet intercontinental, Ababeel demonstrates a mastery of technologies essential for a credible ICBM program.
The financial burden, while significant, is not necessarily prohibitive. Defense economists estimate that a complete ICBM development program may cost around $3 billion over a decade. Individual missiles, depending on configuration and deployment method (silo-based or mobile), may range from $50 million to $70 million per unit.
Given Pakistan’s continued prioritization of strategic deterrence — often at the cost of conventional military modernization and even domestic development — few analysts believe that cost alone will dissuade Islamabad.
A Pakistani ICBM program would have cascading consequences:
- U.S. National Security Architecture Under Pressure
Should Pakistan demonstrate ICBM capability, U.S. missile defense systems would need urgent recalibration. Washington’s existing layers of defense — including Aegis BMD ships, THAAD batteries, and early-warning radar chains — are not currently optimized to detect or intercept threats from South Asia.
This would likely trigger redeployment of missile defense assets to the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf — thereby altering strategic priorities in the Middle East and further complicating already strained military logistics.
- Indo-Pakistani Strategic Escalation
India, which has long maintained a “no first use” policy but continues to refine its Agni series of strategic missiles, would be forced to accelerate its own programs. The Agni-VI, currently in late-stage testing, is believed to have a 10,000+ km range and MIRV capability.
An operational Pakistani ICBM would make India’s security calculus more complex, especially in a scenario where both China and Pakistan could hold Indian cities — and perhaps foreign partners — at nuclear risk.
- Global Non-Proliferation at Risk
Pakistan is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and thus operates outside many formal verification mechanisms. A successful ICBM test might embolden other states in the Global South to pursue similar paths, especially those watching the perceived double standards of Western non-proliferation enforcement.
It could also undermine U.S. credibility in urging restraint on nations like Iran, while simultaneously weakening multilateral institutions meant to curb the spread of advanced missile technologies.
According to sources within the U.S. Department of State, policymakers are already contemplating potential responses under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which provides legal avenues to impose strict penalties on nations deemed hostile to U.S. interests.
- Targeted sanctions on Pakistan’s missile and nuclear research institutions.
- Suspension of defense and civilian aid, which currently stands at several hundred million dollars annually.
- Technology export controls, especially on dual-use technologies that might feed into Pakistan’s ICBM program.
- Diplomatic downgrading and intensified intelligence cooperation with India and other regional actors.
However, there is also concern within U.S. intelligence circles that overreacting could push Pakistan further into China’s strategic embrace, making the missile threat even more entrenched and difficult to manage diplomatically.
South Asia has long teetered on the edge of strategic instability, characterized by rapid military modernization, unresolved territorial disputes, and nuclear posturing. But until now, its dangers were largely regional.
A Pakistani ICBM capable of hitting Washington, New York, or Chicago changes the game entirely.
Suddenly, the subcontinent’s power dynamics are no longer an “over there” problem — they become central to America’s own homeland security calculations.
In this context, the U.S. may be forced to rethink its posture in the Indian Ocean, accelerate QUAD-based military coordination, and deepen nuclear contingency planning with India, Australia, and Japan.
Moreover, the mere possibility of an ICBM test by Pakistan could embolden hawks within New Delhi to advocate for a shift in India’s nuclear doctrine — from assured retaliation to pre-emptive counterforce — a development that would dramatically raise the risks of miscalculation or escalation.
Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of an ICBM is more than a technological leap. It is a geopolitical gambit — a deliberate reshaping of deterrence theory, with ripples that extend far beyond the South Asian subcontinent.
As Islamabad positions itself to join the elite club of nations with true global nuclear reach, the international community faces an urgent question: can it adapt to this new reality without sliding into a new Cold War-style arms race?
